SHAME IN THE KOREAN *URI* CULTURE:
AN INTERPRETATION OF SELF PSYCHOLOGY
AND KOREAN INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOY

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Division of Religion

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ABSTRACT

Shame in the Korean *Uri* Culture:
An Interpretation of Self Psychology and Korean Indigenous Psychology

Ph.D. Dissertation by

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Shame as a self-conscious emotion can be differently experienced among cultures, since the motives and consequences of shame are attributes to the self in very different ways according to specific socio-cultural value systems. Therefore, shame for Korean people should be perceived and interpreted in the indigenous Korean value system, as the Korean shared view of the self that is conceptualized within the system can critically affect the way in which Korean people experience shame. However, the current mainstream psychology of shame and the self depends primarily on western, i.e., European and American, experiences, values, and beliefs, which are usually seen as universal in their applicability. Mainstream psychology has failed to include cultural variables in its research and theories, and this failure has led to the tendency to view all human behaviors and experiences through universal categories with limited cross-cultural applicability. Yet western-centric theories and concepts of mainstream psychology have largely been used without reservation in Korea.

For an exploration of the Korean experience of shame involving the self using the theories of Heinz Kohut's self psychology and Donald Capps' pastoral work of them, and as a proper way of applying them to the Korean cultural context, an integrated

methodology of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology is proposed. In this integrated approach, limitations of cross-cultural psychology are made up for by Korean indigenous psychology, and at the same time cross-cultural psychology supplies a theoretical tool for the application of western theories to Korean psychology, and vice versa; they can complement and supplement each other. From this perspective, Korean indigenous psychological constructs such as *uri*, *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi* in connection to shame are analyzed, and Kohut's and Capps' frameworks are modified and expanded for a relevant application. An interpretation of the Korean experience of shame through this methodology can provide strategies for enhancing the cross-cultural application to shame of Kohut's self psychology and Capps' pastoral psychology. It can help to construct a psychology of shame for Koreans, and to suggest pastoral implications crucial for responding adequately to the shame experience in the *uri* culture.

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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, shame has been the subject of research in psychology and in related disciplines such as literature, biology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. Shame is widely thought of as an emotion or an emotion-related experience. Although it has been difficult to establish universally accepted definitions of emotion among different disciplines, and various definitions of emotion have been used even within psychology, the following practical characterization of emotion may be generally acceptable and applicable: "Emotions involve affect or feelings, often equated with certain physiological events; emotions also involve cognition, however fleeting, in the form of remembering or appraising; emotions are expressions of inner feeling; emotions communicate our feelings to others; emotions overcome us."[1] As characterized here, emotions entail individuals' subjective experiences that are recognized and interpreted.

One of the important functions of the emotions is to create reference to the self. We turn toward ourselves as experiencing subjectively what we feel through certain emotions; we experience an awareness of ourselves and identify what we are through the emotions. Michael Lewis refers specifically to those emotions that involve introspection

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[1] Stephen Pattison, *Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 23.

or attention paid to the self as self-conscious emotions, and categorizes shame, along with other emotions such as empathy, sympathy, envy, guilt, pride, and regret, as a self-conscious emotion.[2] According to him, all of these emotions require self-reflection, yet shame has more to do with the self. He suggests that "shame is elicited when the self orients toward the self as a whole and involves an evaluation of the total self."[3] In shame, the evaluation of the self by the self is total; the focus is not only on the individual's behavior, but on her/his identity and her/his being, i.e., on the totality of the self. This tendency to view shame as an emotion involving the entire self is evident in psychoanalytic studies in recent decades, such as in the studies of Helen M. Lynd and Helen B. Lewis. In particular, I will focus on shame and the self in Heinz Kohut's self psychology, which emphasizes the whole self in relation to shame in the narcissistic development of the self.

I concede that the theories of shame as self-focused that were developed in the United States are useful in studying the shame experience for Koreans, since shame as perceived and interpreted in the indigenous Korean value system emphasizes one's consciousness of oneself as a human being. Nevertheless, these theories presuppose western cultural experiences; though shame is a universal phenomenon, it differs among cultures. This means that the motives and consequences of shame are attributed to the self in very different ways, according to how the self is conceptualized within cultural

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[2] Michael Lewis, *Shame: The Exposed Self* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 13.

[3] Ibid., 71.

value systems. Therefore, the Korean shared view of the self can critically affect the way in which Korean people experience shame within their own culture.

In this context, I face the challenge of how to apply my psychological knowledge, which is western (mainly European and American), to the Korean cultural context; I must engage critically with psychological research methods to investigate cultural differences in shame. This challenge suggests two interrelated questions. First, do mainstream, i.e., European and American, psychological theories interpret social and cultural phenomena in an appropriate manner for cross-cultural use? Secondly, do Korean scholars who have studied abroad apply the mainstream psychological theories in a proper way to their own context? These questions are pertinent also to a practical study for healing the Korean experience of shame in care and counseling, particularly with regard to pastoral-psychological methods. Existing psychological theories have been indivisible from practices of care and counseling in psychotherapy, and have significantly informed and strongly influenced methods of pastoral care and counseling in the church.

Regarding the first question, the study of culture has largely been ignored or devalued in mainstream psychology; theories and research usually do not include cultural variables, and are thought to apply to individuals everywhere, suggesting that "psychological knowledge developed in the United States by Anglo-American scholars using Anglo-American subjects is universal."[4] Instead, the study of culture appears to be

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[4] Hector Betancourt and Steven R. López, "The Study of Culture, Ethnicity, and Race in American Psychology," in *The Culture and Psychology Reader*, ed. Nancy R. Goldberger and Jody B. Veroff (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 95.

the domain of cross-cultural psychology, which in its earliest period was often seen as reserved for people in some remote or exotic part of the world. Investigating "other" cultures tends to be seen as the study of exotic or peculiar people, outside of the "main" culture of European and American people. Westerners' ethnocentric views of psychology often class the study of cultural variables as the study of ethnic minorities, and separate this study from mainstream psychology in the United States.[5] Consequently, mainstream psychology has failed to include culture and related variables in its research and theory, and this failure has led to the tendency to view all human behaviors and experiences through universal categories with limited cross-cultural applicability. As the clinical model of pastoral care and counseling has been informed primarily by mainstream psychology, it is normatively reflective of "the philosophical assumptions of a white, majority, dominant, middle class mainstream culture which emphasizes the universal nature of the human."[6] This largely western, American experience ignores diversity.

Cross-cultural psychology has evolved to question findings of mainstream psychology. Contemporary cross-cultural psychologists are sensitive to the usefulness of psychological dimensions of culture, such as individualism versus collectivism, and the independent view of the self versus the interdependent view of the self, to explain

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[5] Ibid., 88.

[6] P. Way, "Cultural and Ethnic Factors in Pastoral Care," in *Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling*, ed. Rodney J. Hunter (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990), 253.

cultural differences. Cross-cultural psychology can provide general explanations about systematic relationships among variables by identifying cultural similarities and differences. However, cross-cultural psychology frequently fails to identify the specific features of cultural variables, since its major purpose is to test the generality of mainstream psychological theory, and its psychological instruments for cross-cultural application are thus still western. Therefore, culture-specific features need be scrutinized to allow appropriate cross-cultural application of psychology. In the field of pastoral care and counseling as well, culturally relevant pastoral care in different countries has become a matter of concern, and this field is moving "beyond its North American-European white, largely male, middle-class origins."[7] Nonetheless, as far as training in pastoral care and counseling is still western-based, theories and practice for cross-cultural use can hardly be expected to fit specific cultures well.

Regarding the second question, we need to examine how Korean scholars have used mainstream theories in their own context. The empirical science of psychology that grew out of the western tradition was introduced during the Japanese occupation around the 1920's by Japanese psychologists and American missionaries, and its roots have been implanted firmly in Korean academic ground ever since. Accordingly, most Korean scholars who have studied abroad have accepted the principles of mainstream psychology as universal and simply applied them to the Korean context. Although some attention

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[7] David W. Augsburger, *Pastoral Counseling Across Cultures* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), 8.

was paid to cross-cultural research, only a few researchers raised questions about the validity of the mainstream theories.

However, in 1990, when the Korean Psychological Association (KPA) organized the First International Conference on Individualism and Collectivism: Psychocultural Perspectives from East and West, a drastic change for Korean psychologists was engendered. The conference represents Korean psychologists' first attempt to address Korean cultural identity from a psychological perspective. Through the conference, scholars became aware of the need to explore alternative paradigms for identification of Korean psychology, and realized the need to examine the cultural psychology inherent to the Korean context. Another international conference held in Seoul in 1996, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the KPA, sought to renew, through the diverse and rich work of Korean psychology, a field overwhelmed by American psychology.[8] Nevertheless, Korean psychology is still weak in its own theoretical and conceptual bases. Even Korean psychologists tend to hesitate to consider Korean psychological methods as "a psychology" for Koreans, and they still feel comfortable within western psychological frameworks.

Pastoral care and counseling in Korea has been dominated by the North American version of pastoral theology, care, and counseling. The field in Korea tends to copy American theories and methodologies without taking into account cross-cultural conflicts

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[8] Sang-Chin Choi and Gyueseog Han, "Korea," in *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, vol. 4, ed. Alan E. Kazdin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 456-458.

or considering cultural adaptation. In fact, a growing number of scholars who have studied and trained mostly in the United States have restricted pastoral care and counseling to the predominant American perspectives, though these scholars have played an important role in the development of the field in Korea.[9] This tendency is still pervasive in Korean churches as well as in Korean academic contexts.

There is therefore a need to increase the cross-cultural effectiveness of mainstream psychological and pastoral-psychological theories concerning shame by exploring a proper way of applying them to the Korean cultural context. To this end, I propose an integrated perspective of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology for interpreting the Korean shame experience properly. This methodology allows me to make up for the limitations both in cross-cultural psychology and in Korean indigenous psychology. A methodology of cross-cultural psychology is useful to complement mainstream psychology's limited cross-cultural applicability, but the concepts and theories used for cross-cultural comparisons are basically western and thus cannot explain specific aspects of a different culture. A Korean psychological methodology, namely Korean indigenous psychology, is necessary to keep from simply transplanting western theories to the Korean context; instead, local knowledge, concepts and belief systems appropriate to Korean culture must be used. Yet Korean indigenous psychology still needs to be formulated as structured theories. Therefore, in the

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[9] Steve S. Shim, "Cultural Landscapes of Pastoral Counseling in Asia: The Case of Korea with a Supervisory Perspective," in *International Perspectives on Pastoral Counseling*, ed. James R. Farris (Binghamton: The Haworth Pastoral Press, 2002), 78-84.

integrated approach, limitations of cross-cultural psychology are made up for by Korean indigenous psychology, and at the same time cross-cultural psychology supplies a theoretical tool for the application of western theories to Korean psychology, and vice versa; they can complement and supplement each other.

In interpreting the Korean experience of shame from this integrated perspective, I will use theories of Kohut's self psychology concerning shame and the self. First, Kohut's psychoanalytic theory of the self provides excellent formulations for an understanding of the phenomena of self-consciousness in shame, because he develops a distinctive concept of the selfobject. He elaborates the traditional psychology of the self and extends the concept of the self to that of the selfobject. This is Kohut's most significant conceptual contribution. He proposes the concept of selfobject as an extension of the self, which serves the needs of the self and helps to maintain the sense of self, and his emphasis on self-selfobject relationships is central to his theories of shame. The self-selfobject matrix, within which shame is situated, offers a more concrete picture of the self's consciousness by delineating the self's experience of the selfobject as part of the self in the dynamics of shame experiences.

Secondly, Kohut's emphasis on self-selfobject relationships provides a basis for broadening the conceptualization of self-consciousness; it offers a view of shame as an experience of the self not only as the agent but also as the object, though Kohut himself does not focus on the self as the object. This view is achieved by presupposing the role of the self and others in interpersonal dimensions of the self-selfobject matrix. This implies that self-consciousness can be different according to the nature of consciousness

of the self within different self-selfobject matrices; consequently, this can also imply culturally different conceptualizations of self-consciousness in shame. This implication provides a useful framework for an exploration of the Korean experience of shame.

However, although Kohut's frameworks can supply a conceptual and theoretical tool for an analysis of shame that involves the Korean self, they need to be revised, modified, and expanded for a relevant application. To do this, I draw on Korean indigenous psychological constructs such as *uri* (우리; Korean we-ness), *jeong* (정; affectionate attachment), *chemyeon* (체면; Korean social face), and *nunchi* (눈치; Korean tact). These concepts may not be exclusive to Korean culture, but I posit them as integral to Korean culture in this study, in that Koreans experience them very sensitively and very frequently in their daily lives, and a specific system of Korean culture has uniquely and elaborately developed them. In these phenomena, there can be some changes via acculturation and individual differences, but I focus primarily on the concepts' prevalent cultural tendencies. Due to the difficulty of translating these concepts directly into English, I try to interpret the psychological configurations of the concepts rather than simply translating the words.

I do not attempt to include Korean shame experiences that can be different according to gender, age, social class, or economic condition; all of these differences are beyond the scope of this project.

Plan of the Dissertation

In this study, I will interpret shame as a self-conscious emotion within the Korean experience, by critically applying and analyzing psychological theories of shame involving the self, with a special focus on Heinz Kohut's frameworks from an integrated perspective of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology. I will also explore pastoral implications for the Korean shame experience, by analyzing Donald Capps's pastoral work on shame with regard to the self, which are based upon Kohut's applied frameworks, and here I will continue to use the same integrated methodology. This study will demonstrate strategies for enhancing the cross-cultural application to shame of Kohut's self psychology and Capps' pastoral psychology; these strategies can help to construct a psychology of shame for Koreans, and to suggest crucial implications for pastoral strategies through which the Korean church can respond more appropriately and effectively to the shame experience in the *uri* culture.

In Chapter One, I will examine existing psychological theories of shame and the self. I will first present theories of shame as a self-conscious emotion, theories according to which shame focuses on the entire self, i.e., as consciousness of the whole self. In particular, I will focus on Kohut's self psychology, since it is particularly useful for understanding the experience of shame involving the self. For him, shame arises when the needs of the narcissistic self are not adequately responded to by selfobjects. His view of shame concerns one's whole self with regard to selfobject functions. I will make a critical review of his concepts of the self and selfobject, with a particular focus on his

formulations of self-selfobject relationships, and demonstrate that these concepts are based on western cultural assumptions. I will then suggest that the concepts need to be modified for application to the shame experience of the Korean self.

In Chapter Two, I will explore a methodology for applying Kohut's frameworks to the Korean cultural context properly. Cross-cultural psychological approaches to shame challenge mainstream psychological frameworks and expand them for cross-cultural application. I will draw in particular upon John W. Berry, a leading contemporary cross-cultural psychologist, and others, in order to critically evaluate and test the cross-cultural applicability of Kohut's theories of shame and the self. I will examine the concept of individualism and collectivism, and that of the independent view of the self and the interdependent view of the self. According to these underlying dimensions, I will discuss cultural differences in the experience of shame as self-conscious emotion. In addition, I will draw on Uichol Kim, a Korean scholar of indigenous and cultural psychology, in order to apply Kohut's theories of shame and the self to the Korean culture specifically, from the Korean indigenous psychological perspective. Finally, I will argue for an integrated perspective of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology that enrich each other.

In Chapter Three, I will examine the research methods used for Korean indigenous psychology, in particular Korean indigenous psychological constructs from the perspective of a Korean intellectual tradition, Confucianism. Drawing mainly upon the works of Sang-Chin Choi, a Korean indigenous psychologist, but also upon others, I

will probe the Korean concepts of *uri*, *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi*, and their relationship to the shame experience of the Korean self.

In Chapter Four, through this integrated methodology I will critically apply theories of Kohut' self psychology concerning shame to the Korean *uri* culture. In order to refine Kohut's frameworks for application to the Korean culture, I will expand the notion of self-consciousness in shame by drawing on the self psychologist Andrew P. Morrison's modification of Kohut's frameworks in terms of the ideal self as related to shame; by drawing on the extension of Kohut's formulations by Francis J. Broucek, a proponent of a more relational form of self-psychology, in regard to objective self-awareness; and by a discussion of intersubjectivity. Based on this expanded conceptualization of self-consciousness in shame, I will analyze the shame experience of the Korean self, especially in terms of *chemyeon*. The essential structure of shame involving *chemyeon* can be characterized according to values of social conformity, interdependence, and hierarchical relationships in highly empathically attuned and reciprocal self-selfobject relationships. This shame experience in *chemyeon* has to do with we-self-esteem. In this regard, I will discuss positive aspects of shame of the Korean self.

In Chapter Five, I will outline a pastoral psychology for Korean shame, drawing on the pastoral-psychological perspective of Donald Capps, a leading North American pastoral theologian, which is informed by Kohut's formulations, and I will further broaden Capps' perspective to include Korean psychological constructs. Using the same integrated perspective that I have employed in exploring a psychology of the Korean

shame experience, I will propose distinctive pastoral implications for the Korean shame experience. The church as a whole can serve as a Korean pastoral selfobject milieu in the response to shame. Also, for Koreans, empathy that involves *jeong* can serve as a basic source of caring and healing by means of *simjeong* discourses.

CHAPTER ONE

SELF-PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF SHAME

In this chapter, I will focus on shame as a self-related emotion and examine existing psychological theories of shame and the self in order to apply them to Korean culture. In psychoanalytic studies in recent decades, shame has had considerable attention paid to its dynamics, especially with regard to the experience of the self, called "self-consciousness";[1] "Shame itself is an *entrance* to the self. It is the affect of indignity, of defeat, of transgression, of inferiority, and of alienation. No other affect is closer to the experienced self. None is more central to the sense of identity."[2] According to these formulations, shame is an emotion involving a focus on the entire self, i.e., a consciousness of the whole self, which can reflect on itself and its deficits. Shame is said to be "the feeling we have when we evaluate our actions, feelings, or behavior, and conclude that we have done wrong. It encompasses the *whole of ourselves*; it generates a wish to hide, to disappear or even to die."[3]

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[1] Helen M. Lynd, *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1958), 19.

[2] Gershen Kaufman, *Shame: The Power of Caring* (Cambridge: Schenkman Books, Inc., 1985), vii.

[3] Michael Lewis, 2.

Based on this schema of shame, I will examine Heinz Kohut's frameworks concerning shame that involves the self. Kohut is one of the most careful observers of shame associated with the self in narcissistic phenomena. He believes that the narcissistic self is deeply conscious of itself as defective. He suggests that shame is situated in the development of the whole self in terms of its narcissistic needs, which must be met for the development of the cohesive self. Shame arises when the needs of the narcissistic self are not adequately responded to by selfobjects; it results when a selfobject is not empathically attuned and not mirroring a self appropriately. That is, the shame experience is dependent upon the dynamics of self-selfobject relationships. Although these formulations were initially developed in Kohut's clinical setting through the study of narcissistic patients, he expands them into human motivation and development in general. He asserts that selfobject experiences are important throughout the entire course of life, as selfobject functions are critical to the development of the total self.

Making a critical review of Kohut's theories, I will focus on his formulations of self-selfobject relationships in shame as a self-conscious emotion, and demonstrate that his concepts of the self and selfobject are based on western cultural assumptions. I will therefore maintain that his frameworks need to be modified for application to the shame experience of the Korean self. To this end, I will suggest that the concept of self-consciousness in his frameworks needs to be elaborated and expanded; this expansion will play an important role in my using Kohut's frameworks to explore the Korean experience of shame.

Shame as a Self-Conscious Emotion

Regarding the experience of shame involving the whole self, it is necessary to revisit Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer's conceptualization of shame as distinct from guilt. Although shame and guilt have often been referred to interchangeably, each phenomenon is associated with a different intrapsychic pattern. Piers, a psychoanalyst, gives concise definitions of shame and guilt and clearly distinguishes between them, discussing the distinct experiences that cause shame and guilt. He insists on a clear differentiation:

> Of all the more organized forms of intrapsychic tension, those manifested in the feelings of *guilt* and *shame* are possibly the most important ones, not only in emotional pathology, but quite generally in ego development, character formation, and socialization. Although they have been recognized in their importance by the great majority of modern psychologists, it is quite surprising to find that they are usually neither clearly differentiated nor adequately defined. This is particularly true for the feeling of *shame*, its phenomenology, genetics, and dynamics.[4]

He regards shame as the result of tension between the ego and the ego ideal; it arises whenever goals and images presented by the ego ideal are not reached. It is a response to the shortcomings of the self, internalizing the fear of rejection. It thus indicates the internal tension generated by failure or inadequacy to live up to the ideals, under the threat of abandonment.[5] In contrast, guilt arises out of a tension between the ego and the

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[4] Gerhart Piers and Milton B. Singer, *Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study* (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1953; reprint, New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 15 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[5] Ibid., 23-24, 97.

superego; it is related to the formation of the internal authority of the conscience. It is a response to transgression, internalizing the fear of punishment. It is thus the painful internal tension generated whenever the boundary set by the superego is touched or transgressed, evoking the threat of mutilation.[6]

Helen M. Lynd, a social psychologist, further develops Piers' conceptualization of shame and its relation to guilt, and also to identity and belonging. She indicates that shame and guilt involve different focuses, modes, and stresses, though they often overlap, but that shame has been relatively little studied, as it has been subsumed under the study of guilt. According to her, even if the distinction has been made between them through working definitions of shame, "in the usual definitions there is no self-reference as there is in shame."[7] She refers to the involvement of the whole self in the experience of shame, which offers an important clue for understanding the sense of identity. She views shame as "a wound to one's self-esteem, a painful feeling or sense of degradation excited by the consciousness of having done something unworthy of one's previous idea of one's own excellence."[8] Thus, self-awareness is central to the shame experience, which is taken as something to be hidden from oneself and dodged.[9]

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[6] Ibid., 15-16, 24, 97.

[7] Lynd, 19, 23.

[8] Ibid., 24.

[9] Ibid., 19-20.

Helen B. Lewis, a psychoanalyst, is influenced by the work of Lynd, and articulates the distinction between shame and guilt in terms of self versus behavior. For Lewis, shame and guilt involve equally negative self-evaluations in different modes. In shame, the self is the central object of negative evaluation, while in guilt, the focus of negative evaluation is not the self but the thing done or undone. We say, "I am ashamed of myself," and "I am guilty of something." "Shame is about the self; guilt involves activity of the self."[10] Shame is therefore more directly self-related than guilt and heightens the awareness of the self.[11]

Lynd describes shame as experiences of exposure, "exposure of peculiarly sensitive, intimate, vulnerable aspects of the self. The exposure may be to others but, whether others are or are not involved, it is always . . . exposure to one's own eyes."[12] This view of shame resembles the self psychologist Andrew P. Morrison's description of shame in terms of a vision of the self through one's own eyes: "Shame is fundamentally a feeling of loathing against ourselves, a hateful vision of ourselves through our own eyes—although this vision may be determined by how we expect or believe other people are experiencing us."[13] This exposure is unexpectedly experienced in relation to the

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[10] Helen B. Lewis, *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1971), 30, 34.

[11] Ibid., 30.

[12] Lynd, 27-28.

[13] Andrew P. Morrison, *The Culture of Shame* (Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc., 1998), 13.

ashamed person's evaluation of her/himself, and thus shame has to do with the core experience of the entire self. That is, shame is an experience affecting the whole self, and the whole self is exposed in shame: *I* am ashamed of what *I* am.

Because shame affects the whole self, it cannot be easily removed, as the shame experience is tied to one's identity. Lynd notes that guilt involves "a culturally defined wrong act, a part of oneself that is separable, segmented, and redeemable," but that the experience of shame "cannot be modified by addition, or wiped out by subtraction, or exorcised by expiation."[14] Whereas guilt relates to specific acts detachable from the self, shame does not involve an isolated act that can be detached from the self, and so shame can be transcended only by change in the whole self. Consequently, shame involves one's core sense of identity and functions as a central factor in identity formation.

Heinz Kohut's Self-Psychological Approaches to Shame

Self

Heinz Kohut, known as the founder of self psychology, is one of the central figures in the twentieth-century psychoanalytic movement. His theory was initially based on his analysis of the classical theory of Sigmund Freud's psychology and was developed through his work with patients diagnosed as having narcissistic personality or behavioral disorders. Kohut differentiates a patient with a narcissistic personality from one who is

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[14] Lynd, 50.

psychotic or in a borderline state, and he also contrasts narcissistic disturbances with classical transference neuroses. He felt that many narcissistic patients in his clinical setting suffered primarily from disorders of the self, not from conflicts related to aggressive and sexual impulses. Their selves were insufficiently structured, and their struggles related to fragmentation anxiety. He posited that Freud's drive theory was not sufficient for disorders of the self, and he claimed that they could be analyzed and treated by a new theory, i.e., a psychology of the self. His conception of the self can be explained according to the transition from the drive psychology or ego psychology of Freud to his psychology of the self.

Kohut defines the self in two different ways, as "a content of a mental apparatus" in the narrow sense and as "the center of the psychological universe" in the broad sense.[15] In his earlier *Analysis of the Self*, he maintains that the notion of the self and the Freudian traditional psychic structure of id, ego, and superego belong to different levels of concept formation. That is, the Freudian id, ego, and superego are "the constituents of a specific, high-level, i.e., experience-distant, abstraction in psychoanalysis: the psychic apparatus."[16] However, the self, for him, is conceptualized as a low level, i.e., experience-near, psychoanalytic abstraction, which is not an agency of the mind but a structure within the mind, and thus it is a content of the mental apparatus and not one of

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[15] Heinz Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self* (Madison: International Universities Press, 1977), xv.

[16] Heinz Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self* (Madison: International Universities Press, 1971), xiv.

its constituents.[17] Although Kohut went beyond the traditional structural theory of id, ego, and superego, he still regarded the self (in the narrow sense) as the content of id, ego, and superego.

In his later work, Kohut moved beyond traditional structural theory to a psychology of the self in the broad sense. In *The Restoration of the Self*, he suggests that drive psychology or ego psychology is not sufficient for understanding the more complex psychic configurations. He claims that his psychology of the self (in the broad sense) can be complementary to drive psychology, which belongs within the explanatory framework of a psychology of the self.[18] He notes, "Psychoanalytic theory will come closer to fulfilling its legitimate aspirations of becoming an encompassing general psychology if it now expands it[s] borders and places the classical findings and explanations within the supraordinated framework of a psychology of the self."[19]

Kohut defines the self in the broad sense as the center of the individual's psychological universe. He views the self as the core of the personality and the center of human initiative,[20] stating that the self is "a unit, cohesive in space and enduring in time,

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[17] Ibid., xv.

[18] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 63-83.

[19] Ibid., 229-230.

[20] Heinz Kohut and Ernest S. Wolf, "The Disorders of the Self and Their Treatment: An Outline (1978)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 3, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1990), 362.

which is a center of initiative and a recipient of impression."[21] This concept of the self as a supraordinate configuration implies a nuclear self (or a core self) that is central in the psyche, experienced as basic, and extremely resistant to change.[22] He explains the nuclear self as the following:

> This structure is the basis for our sense of being an independent center of initiative and perception, integrated with our most central ambitions and ideals and with our experience that our body and mind form a unit in space and a continuum in time. This cohesive and enduring psychic configuration, in connection with a correlated set of talents and skills that it attracts to itself or that develops in response to the demands of the ambitions and ideals of the nuclear self, forms the central sector of the personality.[23]

Thus, Kohut's concept of the self in his later work, which is regarded as the most important concept of the self, is illustrated in his definition of this nuclear self.

The basic constituents of the nuclear self are the pole of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self, the pole of the idealized parent-imago, and the intermediate area of basic talents and skills between the two poles. The grandiose-exhibitionistic pole of the self evolves into mature ambitions and self-esteem, and the idealized parent-imago pole into goals and ideals. The intermediate area between these poles is the "tension gradient" of basic talents and skills, an "action-promoting condition" that arises between a person's ambitions and ideals. It is "the abiding flow of actual psychological activity that

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[21] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 99.

[22] Heinz Kohut, "On Courage (early 1970s)," in *Self Psychology and the Humanities: Reflections on a New Psychoanalytic Approach*, ed. Charles B. Strozier (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 10.

[23] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 177-178.

establishes itself between the two poles of the self, i.e., a person's basic pursuits toward which he is 'driven' by his ambitions and 'led' by his ideals."[24] For the "cohesive nuclear self," each of the two poles (a pole of ambitions and a pole of ideals) should be appropriately developed. This cohesive self depends on the empathetic responsiveness of the child's selfobjects to the needs of the child's bipolar self, i.e., the response of the mirroring selfobjects to the grandiose-exhibitionistic self and the response of the idealized selfobjects to the idealized parent-imago.[25] Therefore, the cohesive nuclear self should entail adequate self-selfobject relationships.

Kohut claims that the psychology of the self in the broad sense can offer a fuller explanation than the psychology of the self in the narrow sense. For Kohut, the self is an independent center of initiative and an independent recipient of impression, which is subjectively experienced as being continuous in time and space, and not simply a representation. A cohesive self eventually develops, so that one is able to realize "through his actions . . . the blueprint for his life that had been laid down in his nuclear [bipolar] self."[26] Therefore, Kohut' psychology of the self describes how the cohesion and firmness of the self develop from selfobject experiences and, as a result, how the self

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[24] Ibid., 180.

[25] Ibid., 171-191.

[26] Ibid., 133.

can function as a "self-propelling, self-directed, and self-sustaining unit, which provides a central purpose to his personality and gives a sense of meaning to his life."[27]

This concept of the self defined by Kohut as a supraordinate agency, i.e., an independent center of initiative, closely reflects the western concern for the autonomous, independent, and cohesive self. Mainstream psychology has traditionally emphasized the importance of individual independence, achievement, self-reliance, self-actualization, privacy, and freedom of choice, which have been considered requisites of healthy human development.[28] These fundamental assumptions of traditional psychology have been derived from the Cartesian doctrine of the mind, in which the subjective world is fundamentally divided into inner and outer world; mind and body belong to two independent and separate realms, and the mind as a thinking thing exists inside and controls the body. This Cartesian philosophy of the isolated mind has had a profound effect on western thought, and has pervaded contemporary western psychology.[29] This led to Freud's model of the mind as a separate mental apparatus with structures of id, ego, and superego. Kohut's self psychology can be seen to move beyond the Cartesian concept of the mind in that he discards Freud's structure theory of id, ego, and superego

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[27] Ibid., 139.

[28] Cigdem Kagitcibasi, "Autonomy and Relatedness in Cultural Context: Implication for Self and Family," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36, no. 4 (2005): 405.

[29] Robert D. Stolorow and George E. Atwood, *Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life* (Hillsdale: The analytic Press, 1992), 7.

and emphasizes phenomenological aspects of the self as a supraordinate concept. Nonetheless, Kohut's concept of the self remains Cartesian, since it presupposes an inherent processing mechanism of the self through the structure of the nuclear self or the cohesive self. This inherently pre-programmed design[30] is presumed to be transcendent, fixed, and universal in the human psyche.

The Cartesian approach to self implies a separate and independent self, and Kohut's formulations entail this western cultural assumption of mainstream psychology. As Alan Roland, a New York psychiatrist, indicates, "Kohut delineated the centrality of individuals developing a center of initiative and agency in fulfilling socially an intrinsic design of their self."[31] In his delineation, the developmental process of ambitions, ideals and goals for the cohesive self is obviously in accord with western cultural values and essential to functioning well in western culture.[32] Yet this assumes the universal validity of the self concept, with no historical and socio-cultural variables. Therefore, I suggest that Kohut's concept of the self needs to be expanded for application to Korean culture, as there exist other modes of constructing and motivating the self in different cultures.

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[30] Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, and Donna M. Orange, "Kohut and Contextualism: Toward a Post-Cartesian Psychoanalytic Theory," *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 16, no. 3 (1999): 384.

[31] Alan Roland, *Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis: The Asian and North American Experience* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 102.

[32] Ibid., 13, 102.

Selfobject

In order to understand Kohut's concept of the selfobject [*sic*],[33] it is helpful to examine first Kohut's postulate of narcissism, which is a radical reconceptualization of Freud's concept of narcissism. In "On Narcissism," Freud writes that most of the infant's libido is developmentally directed to the ego (ego-libido), a situation that he called a primary narcissism. That is, "narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature."[34] According to him, this state of primary narcissism is one of the normal developmental stages in the early phase of life, in which the infant experiences a sense of magical and fantastical omnipotence. Later, in the highest phase of development, this libidinal energy is directed to an object (object-libido) in the state of being in love. However, when a certain frustration in the object relationship is experienced, this object-libido is withdrawn from the object and directed to the ego. This situation is called a secondary narcissism. Freud writes that

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[33] Kohut first used the term *self-object*, but in 1978, he and Ernest Wolf decided that they would eliminate the hyphen and use the term *selfobject*. They noted, "Spelling 'selfobject' without a hyphen allowed us to refer to the relationship between the self and its selfobjects by speaking of a 'self-selfobject relationship. . . ." They stress the central importance of the concept of the selfobject in the psychoanalytic psychology of the self and a significant firming of this concept through the spelling of the word without a hyphen. (Heinz Kohut, "Four Basic Concepts in Self Psychology (1979)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 4, ed. P. Ornstein [Madison: International Universities Press, 1991], 456-457.)

[34] Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in *Essential Papers on Narcissism*, ed. Andrew P. Morrison (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 18.

"the libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism."[35] Freud refers to secondary narcissism in explaining schizophrenic phenomena.

This concept of narcissism is summarized well in Sydney E. Pulver's work: "Primary narcissism was defined as the libidinal investment of the self occurring before the investment of external objects, and secondary narcissism as occurring after such investment and resulting from the withdrawal of cathexis from external objects and reinvestment in the self."[36] In this regard, it is clear that Freud considers the developmental sequence to be primary narcissism, then object love, and finally secondary narcissism. For him, primary narcissism should lead to object love in a single line. Freud thereby suggests an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido. That is, "the more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted."[37] In other words, the more of one's self is involved, the less libidinal energy is directed to others, and vice versa; the more narcissism arises, the more object love fades.

However, Kohut disagrees with Freud's view of a single developmental line from the primitive stage of narcissism to object love, and rather insists on two separate lines of development. He postulates "two separate and largely independent developmental lines:

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[35] Ibid., 19.

[36] Sydney E. Pulver, "Narcissism: The Term and the Concept," in *Essential Papers on Narcissism*, ed. Andrew P. Morrison (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 97.

[37] Freud, 20.

one which leads from autoerotism via narcissism to object love; another which leads from autoerotism via narcissism to higher forms and transformations of narcissism."[38] For Kohut, narcissism is not just a premature form that is developed into object love, but has a developmental line of its own to mature narcissism instead of to object love. In "Forms and Transformation of Narcissism," he gives examples of transformations of narcissism, such as "man's creativity, his ability to be empathic, his capacity to contemplate his own impermanence, his sense of humor, his wisdom."[39]

Kohut's postulate of two independent lines of development is important for his psychology of the self in that Freud's narcissism involves self-regard, self-concentration, or self-love, whereas Kohut's narcissism as a separate line of development leads to relationships with others who are experienced as part of the self. While Freud focuses on whether the target of energy is the self or the object, Kohut emphasizes the attributes of the relationship between the self and object.[40] For Kohut, not only object love but also narcissism involves object relationships, but in narcissism the object is experienced as part of the self (selfobjects), whereas in object love the object is experienced as separate

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[38] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 220.

[39] Heinz Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism (1966)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 1, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1978), 446.

[40] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 26.

from the self (true objects).[41] Accordingly, he states that "the antithesis to narcissism is not the object relation but object love."[42]

According to Kohut, selfobjects are "objects which are themselves experienced as part of the self."[43] Later, he defined selfobjects as "inner experiences of certain functions of others," on which the self focuses,[44] and he further claims that a selfobject refers "not to an object in the social sphere, to an object in the interpersonal sense of the word, but to the inner experience of an object."[45] His view of a selfobject is elucidated in this comment: "A selfobject is an object, at least in a sociological sense it is an object, and yet is experienced by the person as performing functions that are normally performed by himself."[46] This is how Ernest Wolf explains it:

> Precisely defined, a selfobject is neither self nor object, but the subject aspect of a self-sustaining function performed by a relationship of self to objects who by their presence or activity evoke and maintain the self and the experience of selfhood.

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[41] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 84.

[42] Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism," 429.

[43] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, xiv.

[44] Heinz Kohut, "Selected Problems in Self Psychological Theory (1980)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 4, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1991), 494.

[45] Heinz Kohut, "Letters 1980," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 4, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1991), 670.

[46] Heinz Kohut, "The Psychoanalyst and The Historian (January 29, 1981)," in *Self Psychology and the Humanities: Reflections on a New Psychoanalytic Approach*, ed. Charles B. Strozier (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 217.

> As such, the selfobject relationship refers to an intrapsychic experience and does not describe the interpersonal relationship between the self and other objects.[47]

The self needs selfobjects, which are experienced as a part of the self by means of their empathy. Self psychology focuses on the beginning of the self in childhood, when the parents serve as selfobjects for the child in the empathetic matrix. When the parents accept, understand and respond appropriately and sufficiently to their child's narcissistic needs via their empathy, the child's self becomes firm and healthy, and his/her cohesive self is then well developed.

There are two kinds of selfobjects.[48] One is the selfobject that the child is allowed to idealize, and the other is the selfobject that mirrors the child's grandiosity. The mirroring selfobjects are "those who respond to and confirm the child's innate sense of vigor and perfection"; the idealized parent-imago consists of "those to whom the child can look up and with whom he can merge as an image of calmness, infallibility, and omnipotence."[49] For the cohesive self, Kohut believes that the empathetic response of both the idealized selfobject and mirroring selfobject is needed. He maintains, "We must be in possession of available nuclear self-esteem and ambitions, on the one hand, and of core ideals and goals, on the other, in order to seek out mirroring selfobjects and be

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[47] Ernest S. Wolf, *Treating the Self: Elements of Clinical Self Psychology* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1988), 184.

[48] Later, Kohut mentions another selfobject as the alter-ego, in twinship experiences of the self.

[49] Kohut, "Four Basic Concepts in Self Psychology (1979)," 457.

nourished by their response to us and in order to seek out idealizable selfobjects and be enlivened by the enthusiasm we feel for them."[50] In this way, selfobjects maintain "the cohesion, vitality, strength, and harmony of the self."[51]

These selfobjects are needed throughout life to provide cohesiveness for the self. Kohut emphasizes the importance of empathetic functions of selfobjects via the analogy of oxygen: "[M]an can no more survive psychologically in a psychological milieu that does not respond empathically to him, than he can survive physically in an atmosphere that contains no oxygen."[52] He also insists on the inherent nature of self-selfobject relationships: "And his nascent self 'expects' . . . an empathic environment to be in tune with his psychological need-wishes with the same unquestioning certitude as the respiratory apparatus of the newborn infant may be said to 'expect' oxygen to be contained in the surrounding atmosphere."[53]

Kohut writes, "The self . . . is, like all reality . . . not knowable in its essence. We cannot, by introspection and empathy, penetrate to the self per se; only its introspectively or empathically perceived psychological manifestations are open to us."[54] This necessary

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[50] Heinz Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* ed. Arnold Goldberg (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 77.

[51] Ibid., 197.

[52] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 253.

[53] Ibid., 85.

[54] Ibid., 310-311.

empathy is initiated by the selfobject. This selfobject function not only is important at the start but also should be sustained, as the structure of the cohesive self, although eventually built up, is never complete. Therefore, Kohut further points out that "self-selfobject relationships are present from birth to death," and that "the healthy self always needs the sustaining responses of selfobjects from the first to last breath."[55]

Kohut maintains that successful analysis does not bring about independence from selfobjects but enables the self to choose healthier and more appropriate selfobjects and to make better use of them for its lifelong narcissistic needs. This is because "a self can never exist outside a matrix of selfobjects."[56]

Selfobject Functions in Narcissistic Development of the Self

Kohut explains the narcissistic development of the self as a separate line of development from that of object love. He presents the concept of primary narcissism in two forms: the narcissistic self and the idealized parent-imago.[57] He calls these forms the basic narcissistic configurations, as they arise from the early unconscious attempt to preserve the original perfection that the infant experiences as a sense of magical

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[55] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 49.

[56] Ibid., 61.

[57] Heinz Kohut, "The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (1968)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 1, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1978), 477-509.

omnipotence. In the psychological state of the infant, there is no I-you differentiation, and therefore the mother is experienced as part of the self. This is the infant's experience of undisturbed equilibrium, a stage of primary narcissism. However, when the balance of primary narcissism is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of maternal care, the child experiences disappointments, imperfection, or limitations in the admired mother or environment. The infant's psychic structure then attempts to deal with the loss and the feelings of emptiness by replacing the feelings of previous perfection by establishing the grandiose self and the idealized parent-imago. The central mechanisms can be described as "I am perfect" (grandiose self); and "You are perfect, but I am part of you." (idealized parent-imago);[58] These two configurations coexist, are present from the beginning, and have separate lines of development.

In the one development of these narcissistic configurations, the child tries to save part of the lost perfection by assigning it to a grandiose and exhibitionistic image of the self: the grandiose self. Under optimal developmental conditions, that is, under "appropriately selective parental response to the child's demands for an echo to and a participation in the narcissistic fantasies," the child learns to accept "his realistic limitations, the grandiose fantasies and the crude exhibitionistic demands are given up."[59] In other words, when the mother appropriately and empathetically mirrors the child's grandiosity, she can provide the conditions of optimal frustration of the child's grandiose-

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[58] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 25-27.

[59] Ibid., 107.

exhibitionistic needs. The child's narcissistic needs are then transformed into inner psychological structures and "replaced by ego-syntonic goals and purposes, by pleasure in his functions and activities and by a realistic self-esteem."[60]

Kohut notes that in order for normal and optimal development of the narcissistic self, the child needs to experience some psychological tolerable level of frustration, i.e., "optimal frustration," which results from an optimum, non-traumatic and phase-appropriate empathetic failure of the selfobject. This empathetic failure allows for a "transmuting internalization" which occurs gradually and phase-appropriately.[61] Kohut explains this concept through an analogy:

> Transmuting internalization means that what someone gets from the outside is received so gradually, in such a fractionated, detailed, bit by bit way that what is inside then becomes adapted to one's own need. It has been transmuted. Let us use a biological analogy: when you swallow the molecules of albumin, of protein, you swallow foreign proteins. As you digest it, it becomes broken up into the molecular constituents, and then it becomes rearranged in terms of your own protein. Beef protein, or egg protein, when chewed and digested, become human protein. They don't remain beef and egg protein. Still, you need protein in order to form protein. It gets broken down into bits and then rearranged to your own patterns.[62]

Through this process of transmuting internalization, the self gradually internalizes the mirroring selfobject into itself and establishes a cohesive psychological structure and self-regulatory function. Here lies the important selfobject function of mirroring, that is,

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[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 49-50; Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 86-87.

[62] David M. Moss, "Narcissism, Empathy, and the Fragmentation of Self: An Interview with Heinz Kohut," *Pilgrimage* 4, no.1 (1976): 34.

echo and confirmation of the child's grandiosity and an approving response to the child's exhibitionism.[63] An adequate selfobject function is needed to mirror the child's natural exhibitionism and grandiosity and to respond affirmatively to the child's needs for mirroring so that the child can maintain narcissistic equilibrium.

In normal development, under conditions of optimal frustration and via transmuting internalization, the grandiose self eventually becomes transformed into healthy ambitions and realistic goals, as well as the ability to regulate self-esteem. This is one of the developments of the bipolar self, i.e., the development of the grandiose-exhibitionistic pole of the self. This pole of ambitions and goals is established from the child's cohesive grandiose-exhibitionistic self via the empathetically responding, merging-mirroring-approving selfobject.[64] This development represents the transformation from primitive narcissism to mature narcissism.

In the other development of these narcissistic configurations of the self, the child attempts to preserve the original state of narcissistic perfection by "giving over the previous perfection to an admired, omnipotent (transitional) selfobject": the idealized parent-imago.[65] Under optimal circumstances, the child experiences gradual disappointment in the idealized selfobject, and the idealized selfobject becomes gradually realistic via the process of transmuting internalization. The crucial function of idealized

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[63] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 123.

[64] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 185.

[65] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 25.

selfobjects is to provide the ability for self-soothing and regulation of narcissistic tension by allowing themselves to be idealized for the child's narcissistic needs. When the child feels "the disintegration of the preceding broader and more complex psychological unit of unquestioning assertiveness,"[66] the self of the child experiences anxiety, tension, and rage. The mother (idealized selfobject) then provides the child with the phase-appropriate experience as a merger with the omnipotent selfobject by empathetically responding to the child's anxiety and tension. Accordingly, the child experiences the feeling states of the selfobject as if they were his own; they are transmitted to the child via touch and tone of voice and other means.[67]

In healthy development, under conditions of optimal frustration and via transmuting internalization, the idealized parent-imago becomes transformed into healthy ideals and self-soothing and tension-regulating ability. This is the development of the idealized parent-imago pole of the self. This pole of ideals or idealized goals is established from the child's cohesive idealized parent-imago via the empathetically responding selfobject who permits and indeed enjoys the child's idealization of him and merger with him.[68] This development also represents, along with the development of the grandiose-exhibitionistic pole of the self, the transformation from primitive narcissism to mature narcissism.

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[66] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 86.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., 185.

However, if the child experiences traumatic shortcomings in maternal and paternal care, and the optimal conditions are not met, the grandiose self and the idealized parent-imago then lose the opportunity to complete their development. This is usually the result of a caretaker's unempathetic personality or his or her own unresolved trauma. If the mirroring selfobject is fixated on archaic grandiosity, the selfobject is not able to mirror the child's narcissistic needs. Then, the development of the grandiose self is traumatically disturbed, and the grandiose self does not merge with or integrate the selfobject but "is retained in its unaltered form and strives for the fulfillment of its archaic aims."[69]

Nonetheless, Kohut asserts that the early need for acceptance and confirmation of the grandiose self can be re-established by selfobjects (or analysts) in one's later life. He encountered this therapeutic revival of an earlier developmental stage through clinical transferences in the analytic situation, and called it mirror transference.[70] According to Kohut, mirror transference is:

> . . . the therapeutic reinstatement of that normal phase of the development of the grandiose self in which the gleam in the mother's eye, which mirrors the child's

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[69] Kohut, "The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders," 478.

[70] Kohut mentions three forms of mirror transference: the archaic merger, the alter-ego transference or twinship, and the mirror transference in the narrower sense. This can lead to a certain confusion, but he views mirror transference in the narrower sense as most accurate in representing the term "mirror transference" for the form of the analytic reactivation of the grandiose self. Although he describes three types of mirror transference, he refers to them collectively as mirror transference, as distinct from idealizing transference. (Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 114.)

> exhibitionist display, and other forms of maternal participation in and response to the child's narcissistic-exhibitionistic enjoyment confirm the child self-esteem and, by a gradually increasing selectivity of these responses, begin to channel it into realistic directions. As was the mother during that stage of development, so is now the analyst an object which is important only insofar as it is invited to participate in the child's narcissistic pleasure and thus to confirm it.[71]

In this situation, one's narcissistic equilibrium is very vulnerable, and one needs to attach oneself to the selfobject for the maintenance of one's self-esteem. In mirror transference, one is able to mobilize one's grandiose fantasies and exhibitionism via the therapist's (the selfobject's) empathetic participation and response.

If the child experiences traumatic disappointments in the admired adult, the idealized parent-imago is also retained in its unaltered form, and the person searches for an omnipotent figure for the maintenance of narcissistic equilibrium and for tension regulation. Kohut calls this idealizing transference and defines idealizing transference as the following:

> The *idealizing transference* is the therapeutic revival of the early state in which the psyche saves a part of the lost experience of global narcissistic perfection by assigning it to an archaic (transitional) object, the idealized parent imago. Since all bliss and power now reside in the idealized object, the child feels empty and powerless when he is separated from it and he attempts, therefore, to maintain a continuous union with it.[72]

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[71] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 116.

[72] Kohut, "The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorder," 479.

In idealizing transference, one can sustain the feeling that one has become united with the image of the idealized analyst (selfobject), and thereby the narcissistic equilibrium can be maintained.[73]

In his later work, Kohut refers to these transferences as selfobject transferences and develops the two categories of transferences into three, adding the twinship or alter ego transference, which is no longer referred to as a subgroup of the mirror transference.[74] He indicates that "important twinship (alter ego) experiences are self-sustaining events."[75] The alter-ego need is to experience an essential alikeness with the selfobject, as a twin in appearance, manner, and opinion. In this development, the alter-ego selfobject is needed to confirm the intermediate area of skills and talents, between the pole of ambitions and the pole of ideals, which consists of the nuclear self. These selfobject transferences show that the developmental process of the self is never complete, since the self needs selfobjects throughout life. Therefore, selfobject functions, such as the mirroring selfobject function and the idealizing selfobject function, along with the alter-ego selfobject function, are crucial not only for the child's narcissistic needs but also for the maintenance of the cohesive self in one's later life.

Kohut's emphasis on self-selfobject relationships points to dependency needs of human beings throughout life. It implies, as Roland points out, "the very need for the

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[73] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 86.

[74] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 192-193.

[75] Ibid., 198.

development of self psychology within the culture of North American individualism where it was initially formulated."[76] Roland asserts,

> From a cross-cultural perspective, the very formulation of selfobject relationships—individuals' needs throughout life for others to be empathically attuned, idealizeable, and to share in the comraderie of skills for the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem and a cohesive self—is a trenchant critique of the Northern European/North American culture of individualism that so stresses the self-contained, self-reliant individual.[77]

However, although Kohut's formulations critique North American radical individualism, they still reside in western cultural meanings and assumptions. As Kohut "has not been immune from taking basic cultural assumptions for granted, which then enter unreflectedly into his theory,"[78] his formulations entail individual achievement, self-direction, and the fulfilling of one's inner potentials, which can be obtained from self-selfobject relationships.

The need for a psychology of self-selfobject relationships arises in Northern American culture, but Korean culture traditionally assumes self-selfobject relationships as the core of humanity, though this assumption is not grounded in the frameworks of self psychology. Therefore, the Korean cultural and psychological salience of self-selfoject relationships can be investigated through the frameworks of self psychology; this will refine the present self-psychological formulations concerning self-selfobject relationships.

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[76] Roland, 101.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., 102.

Self-Psychological Appreciation of Shame

According to Kohut, self disturbances of a pathological degree result only from the failure of the developmental opportunities of both the pole of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self and the pole of the idealized parent-imago. He states that the cause of psychopathology of the self is related to "the specific pathogenic personality of the parent(s) and specific pathogenic features of the atmosphere in which the child grows up."[79] Defects in the self occur due to empathy failures of the selfobjects, and these failures often result from narcissistic disturbances of the selfobjects.[80]

Kohut suggests subdividing the disturbances of the self into primary and secondary types.[81] Secondary disturbances' manifestations are the reactions of the undamaged and consolidated self to the vicissitudes of life. If the self is firmly established, wide swings of self-esteem in response to victory or defeat can be tolerable. The self's secondary reactions, such as heightened and lowered self-esteem, triumph and joy, dejection and rage, accompany the changes in the state of the self and are not pathological, but, according to Kohut, they can be explained only within the framework of the psychology of the self.

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[79] Ibid., 187.

[80] Ibid., 87.

[81] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 191-193; Kohut and Wolf, 363-366.

Kohut and Wolf classify the primary disturbances of the self as five psychopathological entities: psychosis, borderline states, schizoid and paranoid personalities, narcissistic behavior disorders, and narcissistic personality disorders. The former three kinds of psychopathology of the self are not therapeutically analyzable because the self does not connect with the analyst via selfobject transferences, due to the diseased nature of the self. Only the latter two kinds of psychopathology of the self, among all the primary disorders of the self, are analyzable.

Kohut and Wolf describe five narcissistic personality types.[82] First, mirror-hungry personalities feel thirst for mirroring selfobjects' confirming responses to cover the damages of the self, which lead to their inner sense of worthlessness and lack of self-esteem. Secondly, ideal-hungry personalities are continuously searching for idealizing selfobjects because they can experience themselves as worthwhile only when relating to selfobjects to whom they can look up. Thirdly, alter-ego personalities need a relationship with a selfobject that they experience as if they were experienced by the selfobject. The fourth type consists of merger-hungry personalities whose self is seriously enfeebled and needs selfobjects "in the lieu of self structure." The fifth type is made up of contact-shunning personalities, which are the reverse of the merger-hungry personalities. They avoid social contact, and they are isolated because they intensely need others. The first three narcissistic personality types are frequently found in everyday life and should not be considered pathological but rather normal, because "it is the location of the self-defect

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[82] Kohut and Wolf, 375-380.

that produces the characteristic stance of these individuals, not the extent of the defect in the self."[83] However, the latter two narcissistic personality types can be considered pathological. Although he stresses that the manifestations presented by narcissistic disorders are not always diagnostic,[84] Kohut focuses in his clinical work on narcissistic behavior or personality disorders, which he claims are analyzable and curable. Shame has to do with these narcissistic personality disorders.

Kohut specifically indicates two manifestations of narcissistic disorders: shame and rage. He notes that "the narcissistically vulnerable individual responds to actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefaced withdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight)."[85] He explains shame and rage as reactions to narcissistic injuries as follows:

> . . . the most intense experiences of shame and the most violent forms of narcissistic rage arise in those individuals for whom a sense of absolute control over an archaic environment is indispensable because the maintenance of self-esteem—and indeed of the self—depends on the unconditional availability of the approving-mirroring selfobject or of the merger-permitting idealized one.[86]

According to him, shame is the central affect in narcissistic disorders, and narcissistic personalities are apt to experience shame. He conceptualizes shame as a product of lack

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[83] Ibid., 379-380.

[84] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 22.

[85] Heinz Kohut, "Thought on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage (1972)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 2, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1978), 637.

[86] Ibid., 645.

of affirmation of the narcissistic self's grandiosity. That is, the grandiose self is in need of selfobjects who are able to mirror the child's exhibitionism and grandiosity, but if the unempathetic mother does not respond to the child's wishes, then narcissistic shame can be experienced. Kohut writes, "The essential disturbance underlying the experience of shame concerns the boundless exhibitionism of the grandiose self."[87] Thus, shame is a response to flooding exhibitionism and grandiosity; shame results when the reality ego is overwhelmed by the narcissistic need of grandiosity experienced as failure—the selfobject's failure in mirroring.[88] This narcissistic shame prevents a firm sense of cohesive self and self-esteem.

Drawing on Kohut's work on development of the self and shame, Morrison also focuses on the relationship between shame and narcissism, particularly the relationship between shame and the ideal self, and elaborates on Kohut's ideas.[89] Morrison thinks that the development of the ideal self is crucial to the shame experience, with "the ideal self representation as a goal, with failure to attain it reflecting the subjective sense of self-defect and shortcoming so central to the experience of shame."[90] He suggests that the ideal self is a more useful concept than the ego ideal in the understanding of shame; he

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[87] Ibid., 656.

[88] Ibid., 629-630.

[89] Andrew P. Morrison, "Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism," in *Essential Papers on Narcissism*, ed. Andrew P. Morrison (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 348-371; *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism* (Hillsdale: Analytic Press, 1989).

[90] Morrison, "Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism," 356.

differentiates the ego ideal from the ideal self despite their close relatedness. For him, the ego ideal represents "the classification of goals, ideals, and valued object representations which the patient internalized as a check-list against which to compare himself," while the ideal self is "the more subjective, less specific and cognitive, sense of self, towards which the individual aspires with regard to ideals and standards."[91]

He claims that Kohut is not aware of the importance of the ego ideal or the ideal self, though Kohut discusses shame in relationship to the ego ideal in an earlier paper, in which he posits the ego ideal as "related to drive control," whereas the narcissistic self wants "to be looked at and admired."[92] Kohut states, in this paper, that "shame . . . arises when the ego is unable to provide a proper discharge for the exhibitionistic demands of the narcissistic self."[93] However, in his later work, Kohut abandons the notion of the ego ideal as "controlling the exhibitionistic drive components and thus in preventing shame,"[94] and he instead relates shame to omnipotent grandiosity and selfobject failure. According to Morrison, the reason for Kohut's abandonment of the notion of the ego

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[91] Morrison utilizes D. Schecter's metaphor of "the North Star which guides and orients us though we cannot expect to actually reach it." (D. Schecter, "The Loving and Persecuting Superego," *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 15, no. 3 [1979]: 368.) Morrison suggests that the North Star represents the ego ideal, while "the subjective sense of how closely one approximates that beacon's directions represents the ideal self." (Morrison, "Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism," 356.)

[92] Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism," 435-436.

[93] Ibid., 441.

[94] Morrison, *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism*, 72.

ideal is parallel to that of his abandonment of drives in his later theories; consequently, the need for the ego ideal as a drive-controlling structure becomes irrelevant. As Kohut maintains two separate lines of development for narcissism and object love, he moves gradually away from the role of the libidinal object to the self and the function of the selfobject, and hence gradually dismisses the relationship of the ego ideal to shame.[95]

Morrison disagrees with Kohut's schema that shame occurs only in response to exposure of grandiose-exhibitionistic claims, and focuses on shame also with regard to failure and the ideal. He asserts, "Central to my discussion of shame is modification of grandiose ambitions and/or the ideal of perfection which may occur through identification with the accepting empathic selfobject/analyst."[96] He suggests that shame is related to self-critical judgments, to failure and defects of the ideal self, considering, within the context of Kohut's development theory, especially compensatory structures in the development of the bipolar self (grandiosity and the idealized parent-imago). According to Kohut, the child has two chances for development of a healthy and cohesive self. If there is a disturbance in the formation of one pole of the self, an attempt will be made to compensate for the weakness by strengthening the other pole.

> The two chances relate, in gross approximation, to the establishment of the child's cohesive grandiose-exhibitionistic self (via his relations to the empathically responding merging-mirroring-approving self-object), on the one hand, and to the establishment of the child's cohesive idealized parent-imago (via his relations to the empathically responding self-object parent who permits and indeed enjoys the

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[95] Ibid., 72-73.

[96] Morrison, "Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism," 360.

child's idealization of him and merger with him), on the other.[97]

In this theoretical framework of the restoration of the self, the first opportunity arises early, usually with the mother's selfobject function of empathetic mirroring of the child (the exhibitionistic-grandiose self); the second opportunity arises later, usually with the father's selfobject function of being idealized by the child (the idealized parent-imago). For the whole nuclear self, if the grandiose self component of the nuclear self cannot become consolidated by the mirroring selfobject failure, then its "voyeuristic" component, the idealized parent-imago, can give it enduring form and structure by the empathetic idealized selfobject later on. Finally, self disturbances of a pathological degree result only when the child fails to have both of these developmental opportunities through the failure of both selfobjects.[98]

Within this context, Morrison argues that shame, as a "secondary reaction" of the self, is a response to the failure of a compensatory self structure.[99] As he points out, the primary structural defect in the nuclear self because of mirroring selfobject failure can be compensated for by enhancing self-esteem through the pursuit of ideals. However, defects in the self's compensatory structures cause shame; recurrent failure in attaining responsiveness from the idealized selfobject results in a failure of a compensatory structure to attain an ideal, including the ideal of gaining the mirroring of a selfobject,

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[97] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 185.

[98] Ibid., 185-186.

[99] Morrison, "Shame, Ideal Self, and Narcissism," 364.

and consequently results in shame. In this sense, for Morrison, shame is a response to failure in attaining the goal, i.e., "a response to a defect in the ideal self."[100] Morrison states:

> I believe that the ego ideal—and particularly the ideal self—provides a framework for understanding shame from an *internal* perspective. The value, idealizations, and internalized parental expectations of perfection, which form the content of the ego ideal, have been structuralized and no longer require the presence of the external object as guide. . . . It is *failure* to live up to the ideal self—experienced as a sense of inferiority, defeat, flaw, or weakness—that results in the feeling of shame.[101]

Morrison follows Kohut's compensatory structures in the development of the bipolar self and sees the two developmental experiences as sequential. However, for Kohut, they do not necessarily progress sequentially in a strictly linear manner, though the development moves from the self's grandiosity being mirrored to the self's merger with the ideal "in the majority of cases."[102] The child's developmental needs can be directed toward the same parent or toward both, in either order. In this regard, in my view, it is not likely either that shame arises only due to failure to live up to the ideal self (Morrison), or that shame can be understood only in terms of the grandiose self (Kohut), because the two developmental experiences can occur coincidently or can be variously ordered in the compensatory structure.

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[100] Ibid.

[101] Morrison, *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism*, 36.

[102] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 185-186.

Furthermore, as Susan B. Miller points out, Kohut's concept of shame often seems to imply Morrison's view that "shame is elicited when one compares the actual self against inner standards," and Morrison sometimes suggests that "shame is a *direct response* to inadequate mirroring from objects, which can occur without mediation by an ideal self structure."[103] In addition, Morrison concludes that shame results from the *need* for the selfobject itself when the selfobject fails to provide its satisfying functions, but he notes that "this selfobject need and hunger may itself come to represent a falling short of the imposed ideal of self-sufficiency."[104] In this vein, it does not seem that Kohut's and Morrison's schemas are contradictory to each other, but rather Morrison's modification can be seen to contribute to broadening and strengthening Kohut's shame theory. Therefore, I maintain that shame is primarily related to a reaction to mis-attunement of the selfobject and is particularly related, directly or indirectly, to either the failure of mirroring or the failure of idealization, or both.

This extension of Kohut's frameworks is important for analyzing the Korean experience of shame, since this experience largely entails failure to live up to the ideal self that Kohut does not focus on.

Kohut's psychoanalytic theory of shame can be characterized by the radical departure from classical theory. Howard A. Bacal and Kenneth M. Newman describe

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[103] Susan B. Miller, *Shame in Context* (Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1996), 94, 106.

[104] Morrison, *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism*, 85.

characteristics that distinguish self psychology from classical psychoanalysis, and indicate that some characteristics are shared to one degree of another by certain object-relations theories. However, as Kohut removes the concept of the ego ideal from his shame theory, he also dismisses the contributions of object relations theory, because he sees the concept of the ego ideal as too closely tied to drive theory and object relations theory. Kohut understands that the ego ideal is fundamentally related to a structure of drive control; it may represent the idea of an internalization of the idealized parental object, derived from a perspective of object relations theories, but he claims that object relations lie "on the psychological surface that can easily be translated into behavioral terms" and that his concepts are not those of "social psychology."[105] Bacal and Newman maintain that though Kohut's self psychology is a distinct psychoanalytic theory of development and therapy, it also rests on an object-relational foundation. They point out that Kohut seems reluctant to see his work as related to object-relations theory because he may want his theory to remain linked to the intrapsychic perspective but may not want it to be characterized as an interpersonal relations theory or a social psychology.[106]

It seems to me that it is partly because of such reluctance on his part that shame for Kohut does not have to do with self-critical judgments or defects of the ideal self, as

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[105] Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism, 429.

[106] Howard A. Bacal and Kenneth M. Newman, *Theories of Object Relations: Bridges to Self Psychology* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 227-228.

is seen in his statement, "Many shame-prone individuals do not possess strong ideals."[107] However, his focus on selfobject functions, particularly in the self-idealized selfobject relationship, presupposes "the representational world of objects delineated by the idealized selfobject,"[108] even though his concept of self-selfobject relationship does not refer to the interpersonal relationship but to the self's subjective-psychological experience of an object. Certainly in Kohut's theory, the parental presence is significant in the development of the cohesive self in terms of providing selfobject functions; this entails the existence of a certain relationship of the self with an object, an other, or the world. However, Kohut does not focus on the differentiated, object-representational qualities of the idealized selfobject, but on its function itself. Morrison suggests that this reflects Kohut's commitment to "the centrality of the self over its objects."[109]

In this sense, Morrison's modification of Kohut's theoretical frameworks with regard to the ideal self, which represents relationships between the self and some standard in the shame experience, is meaningful to my argument in terms of an application of Kohut's frameworks to Korean culture. First, concerning the shame experience generated interpersonally, it implies a comparison between the actual self and the ideal self, which motivates a view of self as the object or the internalized other. Consequently,

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[107] Kohut, *The Analysis of the Self*, 181.

[108] Andrew P. Morrison, "The Eye Turned Inward: Shame and the Self," in *The Many Faces of Shame*, ed. Donald L. Nathanson (New York: The Guilford Press, 1987), 276.

[109] Ibid., 277.

the implication is that shame as a self-conscious emotion can be differently conceptualized according to the nature of consciousness of the self, e.g., the role of the self and the other, in the shame experience. I will show how this premise of comparison can situate shame as a self-conscious emotion in the Korean context, and how an expanded understanding of self-consciousness can play a crucial role in using self-psychological theories of shame to explore the Korean shame experience.

Secondly, Morrison's view of shame as a response to the need or longing for the selfobject itself, which itself represents a shortcoming in the ideal self, reflects the significance of the self's relatedness to an object or an other in the self's experience of the selfobject. As he indicates, it is particularly true that the self experiences shame in the presence of need itself, "because of American culture's high valuation of the ideal of independence and autonomy."[110] This connotes a cultural difference in shame; the shame experience depends on the nature of the ideal self and of self-selfobject relationships, which can be different across cultures. This connotation can lead to an understanding of self-selfobject relationships within the expanded conceptualization of self-consciousness regarding the Korean experience of shame. I will discuss these views of mine further in Chapter Four.

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[110] Morrison, *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism*, 84.

CHAPTER TWO

AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SHAME:

A METHODOLOGICAL CONCERN

This chapter explores a methodology for a proper application of Kohut's frameworks to the Korean cultural context. Exploring the psychology of shame from a cultural perspective challenges the mainstream psychological framework that depends primarily on European and American thinking. This reflects the ethnocentric nature of current western psychology,[1] which has been formulated within western experiences, values and beliefs; these are usually seen as universal in their applicability to other cultures. In the same vein, Kohut's theories of shame involving the self, examined in the previous chapter, are formulated based on the assumptions of western cultures and ignore cultural differences and their implications. Yet there exist considerable cross-cultural variations in the nature, experiences, and meanings of shame and the self.

Therefore, for an exploration of the Korean shame experience using the theories of Kohut's self psychology, cultural differences in the experience of shame and the self first need to be discussed. I will use the cross-cultural psychological perspective as a method of investigation, drawing on the research of John W. Berry and others, in order to

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[1] Patricia M. Greenfield and Rodney R. Cocking, "Preface," in *Cross-Cultural Roots of Minority Child Development*, ed. P. M. Greenfield and R. R. Cocking (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), ix-xix.

critically evaluate and test the cross-cultural applicability of Kohut's psychological theories of shame and the self.

Particularly in this case, beyond simple comparison and contrast of the experience of shame and the self in different cultures, the Korean experience needs to be investigated through Korean culture-specific concepts within the Korean context. As cultural psychologists argue, psychological structures and processes depend substantially on cultural meanings and practices; culture and the psyche are mutually constitutive. Therefore, Kohut's theories of shame and the self need to be refined, modified, and expanded for a relevant application. For methodology, I will use the indigenous Korean psychological perspective, drawing on Uichol Kim and others.

Finally, I will argue for an integrated perspective of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology, in which cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology complement, supplement and enrich each other.

Cross-Cultural Psychological Approaches

Cross-cultural psychology is one of the approaches to systematic investigation of cross-cultural variation. Cross-cultural psychology is a scientific study of variations in human behavior and experience that are influenced by culture. John. W. Berry, a leading contemporary cross-cultural psychologist, et al. define the field of cross-cultural psychology as the following:

> Cross-cultural psychology is the study: of similarities and differences in individual psychological functioning in various cultural and ethnocultural groups;

> of the relationships between psychological variables and socio-cultural, ecological and biological variables; and of ongoing changes in these variables.[2]

As this definition implies, conceptions of culture need to be examined first. A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn collected and reviewed hundreds of definitions of culture and proposed a comprehensive definition influential for cross-cultural psychology:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts: the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; cultural systems may on the one hand be considered as products of actions, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.[3]

Berry et al. note that culture is both "out there" (in the group) and "in here" (inside people or between individuals), and that an objective and stable quality of a group can both influence and be influenced by individual activity and behavior. They make this recent suggestion about culture that many cross-cultural psychologists may accept:[4]

> To the cross-cultural psychologist, cultures are seen as products of past human behaviour and as shapers of future human behaviour. Thus, humans are producers of culture and, at the same time, our behaviour is influenced by it. We have produced social environments that continually serve to bring about continuities and changes in lifestyles over time and uniformities and diversities in lifestyles

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[2] John W. Berry, Ype H. Poortinga, Marchall H. Segall, and Pierre R. Dasen, *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.

[3] A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn, "Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions," in *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology* 47, no. 1, ed. A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 181.

[4] Berry et al., 227-229.

> over space. How human beings modify culture and how our cultures modify us is what cross-cultural psychology is all about.[5]

As the term "cross" denotes, cross-cultural psychology is defined primarily by its comparative method. As Berry points out, the comparative method is the core of the scientific method for cross-cultural study: "Without comparison, differences, similarities, co-variation and cause cannot be observed or inferred."[6] Comparative studies are typically nonmanipulative, without a conspicuous experimental method. However, according to Berry, "the selection of natural phenomena for comparison may constitute a quasi manipulation of some variables."[7] That is, a comparative method is viewed as a quasi-experimental method. In addition to the comparative perspective, Berry takes the "cultural" perspective: "These approaches are both necessary; neither is sufficient."[8] He argues that it is desirable and possible to employ both the within (cultural) and the across (comparative) approaches to investigating culture-behavior relationships. To focus only

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[5] M. H. Segall, P. R. Dasen, J. W. Berry, and Y. H. Poortinga, *Human Behavior in Global Perspective: An Introduction to Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 23.

[6] John W. Berry, "Introduction to Methodology," in *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Vol. 2. Methodology*, ed. H. C. Triandis and J. W. Berry (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1980), 2.

[7] Ibid.

[8] John W. Berry, "Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Symbiosis of Cultural and Comparative Approaches," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 3 (2000): 197.

on the "cultural" aspect leaves us "culture-bound" and to focus only on the "cross" aspect leaves us "culture-blind."[9]

This can also be argued in terms of the *etic* and *emic* perspectives that were initially proposed by K. L. Pike in his discussion of phon*etic*s (vocal utterances that are universal) and phon*emic*s (culturally specific vocal utterances).[10] By analogy, *etic* (culture-universal) refers to the study of behaviors from a position outside the system, and from an examination and comparison of many cultures, whereas *emic* (culture-specific) means the study of behaviors from within the system, and an examination of only one culture. An e*tic* approach involves structure created by the analyst on the basis of phenomena considered absolute or universal, whereas an *emic* approach involves structure discovered by the analyst according to criteria that are relative to internal characteristics.[11] The approach to cross-cultural comparison that employs the *etic* method is termed *imposed etic* or *pseudo etic* when the universals are merely assumed. These etics are usually only Euro-American emics, imposed blindly on the phenomena in other cultural systems. On the other hand, *derived etic* emerges from empirical data; it is derived from the common features of the phenomena.[12] Berry argues that both emics and

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[9] Ibid., 204.

[10] K. L. Pike, *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior* (The Hague: Mouton, 1966).

[11] Berry, "Introduction to Methodology," 11-12.

[12] Ibid., 12.

etics are necessary to analysis in cross-cultural psychology: "Without etics, comparisons lack a frame; without emics, comparisons lack meat."[13] In this sense, the "cultural" aspect of cross-cultural psychology requires a perspective similar to that of the *emic,* and the "cross" aspect requires a perspective similar to that of the *etic.*

Implied in such definitional frameworks are the goals of cross-cultural psychology, as Berry asserts.[14] The first goal is to transport current psychological theories and findings about human behavior to other cultural contexts in order to test their validity and applicability. This goal is associated with the *imposed etic* approach, which results in a massive amount of data on psychological similarities and differences across cultures. It is known as the first and most obvious goal of cross-cultural psychology, and some critics object that testing existing (mostly western-oriented) theories in other (usually non-western) cultures in order to confirm their generality has limits in many regards. The second goal is to explore other cultures to discover psychological variations that are not represented in existing theories. It is associated with the *emic* approach, which can be identified with the moves toward "cultural" psychologies. The third goal is to integrate psychological knowledge obtained from the first two goals and to generate a more pan-human or global psychology. It is associated with the *derived etic* approach, which can be identified with the search for a universal psychology.

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[13] Ibid., 13.

[14] Berry et al, *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*, 3-4; Berry, "Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Symbiosis of Cultural and Comparative Approaches," 198.

Cross-cultural psychology can provide general explanations about systematic relationships among variables by identifying, on the basis of comparative analysis, different cultural patterns and different psychological phenomena across cultures. However, its theoretical and methodological limitations have not gone without criticism. Cross-cultural psychology can be regarded as closer to mainstream psychology in that it aims ultimately toward "a universally applicable psychological theory." Richard A. Shweder, a cultural psychologist, indicates that a related goal is to "keep peeling away at the onion skin of culture so as to reveal the psychic unity of mankind at its core."[15] In this approach, culture is typically treated as independent variable, and thus the level of its abstraction is likely to be high. Through the abstraction, generalizations about psychic unity are presupposed: that the human mind and its processes are essentially the same everywhere, though they have cultural differences in content and context. Such generalizations, which are generated in western labs with western subjects, are presumptively interpreted as fundamental and universalized to the whole world.[16] Therefore, a critique is that cross-cultural psychology, in its methodology, imports the western inventories and tests their generality in new cultural contexts in order to identify their universality. Even if cross-cultural psychology can establish comparability across different cultures for culture-specific dimensions, the cultural construct, the meaning of

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[15] Richard A. Shweder, "The Psychology of Practice and the Practice of the Three Psychologies," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 3 (2000): 212.

[16] Ibid.

the test situation, or the method of study may not in any strict sense be equivalently applicable across cultures, but rather imposed from a western structure on the new cultural contexts.

In the cross-cultural psychological approach, the cross-cultural differences seen in shame experiences can reflect culture-specific views of the self,[17] as the construction of the self varies as a function of culture. In my search for the cross-cultural differences in perspectives on shame and the self, I will examine the concept of individualism and collectivism (hereafter I/C), along with the independent view of self and the interdependent view of self that correspond to I/C, in conceptualizing the relationship between culture and the self.

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[17] The cultural meaning of the self here may be slightly different from the psychoanalytic meaning of the self as the individual's own person, denoting some psychic structure or psychological entity within the person. The term "self" is used in various ways, including concepts of individual, person, or sense of self. Melford E. Spiro claims that many anthropologists and socio-cultural psychologists confuse the psychological conception of the self with the cultural conception of the person in using the term "self." (Melford, E. Spiro, "Is the Western Conception of the self 'Peculiar' within the Context of the World Cultures?" *Ethos* 21, no. 2 [1993]: 117.) Similarly, Grace G. Harris also points out the terminological confusion in the treatment of the self and views the self as a psychological concept defining human beings who are centers of being or experience, including experience of that human's own someoneness. (Grace G. Harris, "Concepts of Individual, Self, and Persons in Description and Analysis," *American Anthropologist* 91, no. 3 [1999]: 601-602.) According to Harris' indication, I use the meaning of the self from the cultural view in this study, namely that people see and experience themselves using the concepts, terms, values, and ideologies in their cultural contexts. I employ, in this sense, cross-cultural psychological arguments concerning the self, namely that people are likely to experience and develop different conceptions of the self in different cultural contexts.

Individualism and Collectivism

One of the main dimensions that can make for cultural differences in conceptions of self has been that of individualism and collectivism. I/C were initially conceptualized by Geert Hofstede (an influential Dutch researcher on the interactions between national cultures and organizational cultures), as opposite poles of a value dimension that differentiates various cultures.[18] In his work, I/C create one of the four dimensions[19] along which culture varies, and each of the forty country samples[20] is classified as high, medium, or low on the basis of these four dimensions. The United States, Canada, and Western European countries were found to be far toward the individualistic end of the I/C dimension, and Asian, African, and Latin American countries are found to far toward the other end. Hofstede defines I/C as follows:

> *Individualism* pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. *Collectivism* as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout

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[18] Geert Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values* (Beverly Hills: Sage Press, 1980).

[19] Hofstede defined four basic dimensions of cultural variation: individualism versus collectivism, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, large versus small power distance, and masculinity versus femininity.

[20] The number of samples was extended to fifty-three in later publications. (Geert Hofstede, "Dimensions of national cultures in fifty countries and three regions," in *Explications in Cross-Cultural Psychology*, ed. J. B. Deregowski, S. Dziurawiec, and R. C. Annis [Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1983])

> people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.[21]

He argues that in individualistic cultures, autonomy, emotional independence, individual initiative, self-fulfillment, and "I" consciousness are emphasized. On the other hand, collectivistic cultures emphasize collective identity, emotional dependence, group solidarity, sharing, duties, obligations and "we" consciousness. He demonstrates I/C as a unidimensional cultural construct, which is a concept useful for "subsuming a complex set of differences;"[22] and therefore a multidimensional model needs to be suggested, as he notes, which can more fully explain I/C at the individual level.[23]

The cross-cultural psychologist Harry C. Triandis points out the "fuzzy" nature of I/C, which makes measurement difficult even at the cultural level, as all the countries can be categorized as individualistic and collectivistic countries to different degrees and in different combinations. He describes I/C as the following:

> *Collectivism* may be initially defined as a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (family, co-workers, tribe, nation); are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives; are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals; and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives. A preliminary definition of *individualism* is a social pattern that consist of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as

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[21] Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1991), 51.

[22] Geert Hofstede, "Foreword," in *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications*, ed. U. Kim et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), xi.

[23] Ibid.

> independent of collectives; are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others; and emphasizes rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others.[24]

Through this multidimensional conception of I/C, Triandis developed another dimension : vertical and horizontal varieties of I/C.[25] This distinction is made based on a person's acceptance of inequality. In both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the vertical dimension accepts inequality and emphasizes hierarchy as a given, while the horizontal dimension stresses people's equality as a given for status and most other attributes. He thus identified four types of cultures: the vertical collectivist (VC), the vertical individualist (VI), the horizontal collectivist (HC), the horizontal individualist (HI). He indicates that all types of individuals can reside in all the four types of cultures, and that each individual is likely to use some combination of vertical and horizontal and individualistic and collectivistic components. In VC, people see themselves as interdependent members of an in-group and give both freedom and equality a low rank. They see themselves as individually different from others and accept hierarchy. In VI, people see themselves as independent and different from others, emphasize freedom and place a low value on equality. In HC, people see themselves as interdependent members of an in-group, emphasize everyone's equality and de-emphasize freedom. In HI, people

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[24] Harry C. Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 2.

[25] Ibid., 44-52.

see themselves as independent and basically the same as others, and place a high value on freedom and equality.

In addition to the vertical-horizontal dimension, Triandis illustrates another two factors determinative of the degree of I/C in any given culture: cultural tightness versus looseness, and cultural complexity versus simplicity.[26] According to him, cultural tightness and looseness refer to the extent people agree on the norms of the culture and behave according to them. Cultural tightness emerges in homogeneous and relatively isolated societies. In such cultures, people clearly tend to follow the norms and are less likely to accept other norms. Tight cultures are high in collectivism and tend to be highly interdependent. In contrast, cultural looseness occurs in heterogeneous societies, in which there are multiple norms about what to do, and tolerance of deviation from them. In such cultures, people do not much depend on each other. Additionally, Triandis argues that "the more complex the culture, the more individualist it is likely to be."[27] Complex cultures can provide more information on choices than do simple cultures and thus promote individualism. Cultural complexity tends to be associated with cultural looseness, while cultural simplicity is correlated with cultural tightness.

Triandis conceives that individualism is most often a consequence of cultural looseness and complexity, and collectivism most often a consequence of cultural

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[26] Ibid., 52-60.

[27] Harry C. Triandis, "Individualism-Collectivism and Personality," *Journal of Personality* 69, no. 6 (2001): 911.

tightness and simplicity. However, he notes that the relationship between collectivism/individualism and cultural tightness/looseness may not very strong (although it is likely to be linear), because both tightness and looseness are "situation-specific,"[28] and that many exceptions in the cultural pattern of tightness and collectivism versus looseness and individualism can be expected. Individualism can emerge both in complex and simple cultures and collectivism both in loose and tight cultures.

Triandis et al. propose that the personality dimensions of idiocentrism and allocentrism at the individual level correspond to I/C at the cultural level.[29] Using data from the cultural and individual difference analyses, they identified individuals who are allocentric and idiocentric in both kinds of cultures. Triandis describes idiocentrism and allocentrism as within-culture variables and also as "situation-specific dispositions"[30] at the psychological level. Within each culture there are individuals who are allocentric and think and behave like people in collectivistic cultures; and who are idiocentric and think and behave like people in individualistic cultures. Triandis points out that personality includes "transituational"[31] components; there are also individuals who are countercultural. There are idiocentrics who use individual goals to determine their

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[28] Triandis, *Individualism and Collectivism*, 53.

[29] Harry C. Triandis et al., "Allocentric versus Idiocentric Tendencies: Convergent and Discriminant Validation," *Journal of Research in Personality* 19, no. 4 (1985): 395-415.

[30] Triandis, "Individualism-Collectivism and Personality," 912.

[31] Ibid., 913.

behavior even in collectivistic cultures, and allocentrics who are more likely to select collectivist solutions even in individualistic cultures. He emphasizes that the research on I/C at the cultural level ignores individual differences and therefore should use multimethod approaches, as people can be both allocentric and idiocentric at the individual level.[32] He notes that within each individual, and each society as well, I/C "can coexist and are simply emphasized more or less in each culture, depending on the situation."[33]

However, although, as the discussion above shows, I/C are complex constructs and have been conceptualized in various multidimensional ways, these I/C categorizations represent only broad approximations of cultural dimensions; they need to be further refined and elaborated. Even though certain collectivistic and individualistic elements can be found in all collectivistic and all individualistic cultures, there are also culture-specific collectivist and culture-specific individualist elements. For instance, Korean, Chinese and Japanese cultures can be collectivistic, but each of these cultures has some specific attributes of collectivism that should be added to the research on I/C.

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[32] Harry C. Triandis, "Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Study of Collectivism and Individualism," in *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Application*, ed. U. Kim et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 46.

[33] Harry C. Triandis, "Collectivism and Individualism as Cultural Syndromes," *Cross-Cultural Research* 27, no. 3/4 (1993): 162.

Finally, the nature and content of I/C "must be contextualized within each culture."[34] Accordingly, I need to examine the nature of collectivism within Korean culture.

Jae-Ho Cha, a Korean psychologist, discusses collectivism (and individualism) in traditional Korean culture in terms of Koreans' values, beliefs/attitudes, and behaviors.[35] This research reveals that Korean collectivism has such specific features as many offspring, ancestor worship, filial piety, concern for family line or bloodline, communal support for success, and sacrifices required of women. As illustrations, he presents important terms such as *kamun* (가문; family clan), *uiri* (의리; obligation or duties, with implied self-sacrifice), *ye* (예; courtesy), *jeong* (정; affectionate attachment), *chinbun* (친분; personal closeness), *chung-hyo* (충효; the dual principles of loyalty to country and filial piety), *nunchi* (눈치; other-awareness or situational sensitiveness, which can be called Korean tact), and so forth.[36]

He also presents a discussion of collectivism in contemporary Korea and the changes that have emerged in Korean collectivism. His data show that the traditional values of loyalty and filial piety and the significance of extended family or clan have declined in recent years. At the same time, such values as social justice, equality, human

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[34] Uichol Kim, "Individualism and Collectivism: Conceptual Clarification and Elaboration," in *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Application*, ed. U. Kim et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 40.

[35] Jae-Ho Cha, "Aspects of Individualism and Collectivism in Korea," in *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Application*, ed. U. Kim et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 157-174.

[36] Ibid., 166.

rights, and social welfare have been strengthened. Nevertheless, he indicates that Koreans still remain largely collectivistic rather than individualistic. He gives attention to *uri* (우리; Korean we-ness), which is palpable only in conversations among Koreans, and notes that the word's continuous use with a specific meaning is another indication that collectivism is alive. Sang-Chin Choi and Soo-Hyang Choi, Korean cultural psychologists, found the most characteristic discourse system of Korean collectivism to be described by the *uri* concept.[37] *Uri* will be explored in further detail in Chapter Three.

The Independent and Interdependent Views of the Self

The constructs of individualism and collectivism have been closely identified with cross-culturally different conceptualizations of the self. Triandis et al. describe the relation of I/C to cultural conceptions of the self as key to I/C:

> The major themes of collectivism are self-definition as part of group(s), subordination of personal goals to ingroup goals, concern for the integrity of the ingroup, and intense emotional attachment to the group. The major themes of in individualism are a self-definition as an entity that is distinct and separate from group(s), emphasis on personal goals even if pursuit of such goals inconveniences the ingroup, and less concern and emotional attachment to the ingroups.[38]

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[37] Sang-Chin Choi and Soo-Hyang Choi, "We-ness: A Korean Discourse of Collectivism," in *Psychology of the Korean People: Collectivism and Individualism*, ed. Gene Yoon and Sang-Chin Choi (Seoul: Dong-A Publishing & Printing Co., 1994), 57-84.

[38] Harry C. Triandis et al., "Individualism and Collectivism: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Self-Ingroup Relationships," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54, no. 2 (1988): 335.

Triandis indicates that the correspondence of I/C to the conceptions of the self is quite apparent; he proposes a definition of the self as a core attribute of I/C: "Individualists view the self as autonomous and independent from groups," and "Collectivists view the self as interdependent with others."[39] This distinction was, in fact, most prominently illustrated by Haze R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, cross-cultural psychologists, who posit independent and interdependent self-construals. They propose the independent view and interdependent view of the self, writing of how these different ways to construe the self can influence cognition, emotion, and motivation.[40]

Markus and Kitayama describe individuals with an independent view of the self as being "individualist, egocentric, separate, autonomous, idiocentric, and self-contained,"[41] which characterizes American or Western views of the self in general. They suggest that the Western notion of the self can be defined "as an entity containing significant dispositional attributes and as detached from context."[42] In contrast, the self is viewed as interdependent with context, or as the "self-in-relation-to-other,"[43] primarily in non-Western or Asian cultures. Individuals with an interdependent construal of the self

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[39] Harry C. Triandis, "Cross-Cultural Psychology," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 2, no. 1 (1999): 128.

[40] Hazel R.Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation," *Psychological Review* 98, no. 2 (1991): 224-253.

[41] Ibid., 226.

[42] Ibid., 225.

[43] Ibid.

are considered to be "sociocentric, holistic, collective, allocentric, ensembled, constitutive, contextualist, connected, and relational."[44]

These construals of the self are discussed according to their structure and dynamics, including the roles of others, and the basis of self-esteem.[45] According to Markus and Kitayama, the key distinction is the separateness from social context (independent construal) and the connectedness with social context (interdependent construal); in other words, an individual's belief regarding how her/his self is related to others. The independent construal of the self is bounded, unitary, and stable, while the interdependent construal of the self is flexible and variable. The independent self emphasizes internal and private features such as abilities, thoughts, and feelings, whose tasks are being unique, expressing the self, realizing internal attributes, promoting one's own goals, and being direct in communication. In contrast, the interdependent self emphasizes external and public features such as status, roles, and relationships, whose tasks are belonging and fitting in, occupying one's proper place, engaging in appropriate action, promoting others' goals, and being indirect in communication. Moreover, whereas for the independent self, others are important for self-evaluation, the interdependent self depends on relationship with others to actually define the self. Thus, the basis of self-esteem for the interdependent self is to adjust, to restrain the self, and to

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[44] Ibid., 227.

[45] Ibid., 230.

maintain harmony with social context; that of the independent self is to express the self and to validate internal attributes.

Markus and Kitayama propose that the independent and interdependent construals of the self are "among the most general and overarching schemata of the individual's self-system,"[46] although they also acknowledge individuals' differences:

> Not all people who are part of an independent culture will thus characterize themselves as independent, nor will all those who live as part of an interdependent culture claim to be interdependent. Within independent and interdependent cultures, there is great diversity in individual self-definition, and there can also be strong similarities across cultures.[47]

They describe the two self-construals primarily in explaining American-Japanese differences. Their major assumptions are often criticized. David Matsumoto, for example, reviews the theory most extensively and challenges their major premise that the United States is more individualistic and Japan more collectivistic; he argues that independent and interdependent construals of the self lack empirical support.[48] Matsumoto claims that of eighteen studies that formally tested I/C differences between the United States and Japan, seventeen provided little or no support for the common premise of American individualism and Japanese collectivism. Moreover, according to

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] David Matsumoto, "Culture and Self: An Empirical Assessment of Markus and Kitayama's Theory of Independent and Interdependent Self-Construals," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 2, no. 3 (1999): 289-310.

Matsumoto, studies examining self-construal differences between the U.S. and Japan offered little evidence to support the assumptions of Markus and Kitayama.

Matsumoto points out that theories of culture and the self should be more precisely developed and that, although the theory of independent versus interdependent selves has had a major impact on cross-cultural psychology,

> Future work will need to allow for the possibility of the simultaneous co-existence of seemingly opposing views of the self that contribute to behavior in differing relative degrees depending on the specific context of behavior and the psychological domain accessed.[49]

He suggests alternative approaches to research on culture and the self that encompass the mutual interrelatedness of independence and interdependence, and relative flexibility beyond dichotomies.

Matsumoto's claim is that there is little evidence of differences between independent and interdependent selves in the form of national differences in psychological phenomena. In other words, underlying elements of independent and interdependent self-concept, which have been conceptualized based upon various empirical studies in terms of I/C for the past two decades, since the highly influential work of Hofstede, including studies of Markus and Kitayama, do not necessarily represent cross-national differences. Elements of interdependent self-concept represented in Japan can be seen also in the U.S., and elements of independent self-concept represented in the U.S. can be found also in Japan. The assessed content of I/C is more

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[49] Ibid., 304.

crucial to characterizing independent and interdependent selves than is the cross-national distinction in I/C.

Daphna Oyserman, Heather M. Coon, and Markus Kemmelmeier, in their meta-analyses,[50] similarly challenge the assumption that European Americans are more individualistic and less collectivistic than other cultural groups. They argue for a better understanding of IND (individualism) and COL (collectivism) as "domain-specific, orthogonal constructs differentially elicited by contextual and social cues."[51] They maintain that contrasting countries in IND-COL as a bipolar single dimension can be intuitively appealing but does not sufficiently explain the impact of IND and COL on psychological processes such as conceptualization of the self. Rather, they assert that the core content of related constructs in IND and COL needs to be carefully conceived because, for example, an element in IND, "a focus on personal achievement," may not always be related to individualistic values, and an element in COL, "seeking the advice of parents," may not always be related to collectivistic values.[52]

Oyserman et al. examined the scales used for individualism and collectivism in the past twenty years, sorted scales into categories, and found twenty-seven distinct types of scales. They distinguished COL-focused and IND-focused items, with each item

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[50] Daphna Oyserman, Heater M. Coon, and Markus Kemmelmeier, "Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical Assumptions and Meta-Analyses," *Psychological Bulletin* 128, no. 1 (2002): 3-72.

[51] Ibid., 8.

[52] Ibid.

assigned to only one content category. On this basis, the researchers indicated that personal independence (or separateness) and personal uniqueness are the core elements of IND; they identify obligation and duty to the in-group (and cross-nationally, maintaining harmony) as the core elements of COL. Other content components are viewed as divergently scaled; for example, family focus is sometimes included in COL, sometimes not, and hierarchy and competition are sometimes included in part of both IND and COL. Consequently, Oyserman et al. found that if elements of relationality are included in the core components of COL, Americans would appear high in COL in that they feel close to members of their groups and seek others' advice; Americans are attuned to others. However, Americans are not necessarily collectivist—though they are relational—in terms of the core elements of COL; they do not feel obligated to others. Oyserman et al., therefore, argue that Americans are individualists, as defined by the scales, but are apparently relational in ways that reflect individualistic values.

Oyserman et al. are correct that the basic psychological assumptions of self-concept developed within the cultural framework of I/C should be explored with attention to the core components of I/C, and, accordingly, of independent/interdependent selves. Yet an examination must be made on the basis of specific features of I/C within each culture, as far as they can be formulated within each indigenous cultural context. Regarding the Korean self in the Korean culture, it is important to delve into specific content elements of Korean collectivism. That is, I can agree that sense of obligation and duty to the in-group, in-group harmony, and in-group loyalty and identity are the core components of collectivism, on which the principal distinction between individualism

and collectivism is based, but I will necessarily refer to more-specific elements of Korean self in more-specific features of Korean collectivism.

In terms of some specific aspects of the self in collectivism in East Asian cultures, including the Korean culture, Uichol Kim, a leading Korean indigenous psychologist, illustrates three different modes of collectivism: undifferentiated mode, relational mode, and co-existence mode.[53] The undifferentiated mode, on which the traditional conceptualization of collectivism (e.g., in the work of Hofstede and Triandis) has focused, is defined by firm and explicit group boundaries coupled with undifferentiated boundaries between self and group. In this mode, an individual is governed and defined by an in-group. The interdependent view of self demonstrated by Markus and Kitayama can be categorized on the basis of this extreme form of collectivism.

The relational mode is characterized by porous boundaries between in-group members that allow thoughts, ideas, and emotions to flow freely, and stresses the relationships of the in-group members. Markus and Kitayama find the sign of the interdependent self in the reciprocal interdependence with others, which "involves the willingness and ability to feel and think what others are feeling and thinking, to absorb this information without being told, and then to help others satisfy their wishes and realize their goals."[54] The concept of *amae* (甘え; indulgent dependency)[55] in Japanese

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[53] Uichol Kim, *Individualism and Collectivism: A Psychological, Cultural and Ecological Analysis* (Copenhagen: NIAS Books, 1995), 25-29.

[54] Markus and Kitayama, 229.

culture and the concept of *jeong* (정; affectionate attachment)[56] in Korean culture can be discussed as essential components of the relational mode.

In the coexistence mode that separates the private self from the public self in collectivism, the private self and the public self coexist but have contradictory elements within an individual in a culture. The public self becomes enmeshed with collectivistic values such as family loyalty, in-group solidarity, and national identity, while the private self maintains individualistic values of self-cultivation and personal striving. Japanese concepts of *honne* (本音; true feelings or true mind or the inner self) and *tatemae* (建前; principles or conventions)[57] are good indications of the Japanese dual self in the coexistence mode. It can be said that if *tatemae* is the visible side of the coin, *honne* is the hidden side of the coin. For instance, when conflicts happen in Korea between individuals and society, individuals are expected to suppress them, keep them within the private domain and not display them in public. That is why Korean society lays great

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[55] The Japanese psychologist Takeo Doi formulated a culturally variant psychology of the Japanese self by exploring the Japanese indigenous concept of *amae* that is applicable only to Japanese society. The behavior of children toward their parents is the classic example of *amae*, or dependency needs, which represent the emotional link in close relationships in Japan. (Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependent* [Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1973])

[56] The Korean concept of *jeong* can be represented by the strong emotional bond in the family relationship (especially the relationship between mother and child) and close friendship. *Jeong* is related to such associations as "sacrifice, unconditionality, empathy, care, sincerity, shared experience, and common fate." (Kim, 44)

[57] Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Self: The Individual versus the Society* (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1986).

emphasis on the maintenance of *chemyeon* (체면; Korean social face) in public, which is a way of preserving social harmony.

In this vein, Kim claims that previous researchers such as Markus and Kitayama[58] have failed to distinguish the undifferentiated mode from the coexistence mode in that they have suggested that inner opinions and internal attributes are not significant constituents of the self in collectivism. According to Kim, "internal attributes represent the hidden side of a coin (i.e., private self) and social demands represent the visible side of the coin (i.e., public self)";[59] both aspects of the self should be considered, especially in East Asian cultures, including the Korean culture. Thus, the Korean self as an interdependent self is likely to be reflected only in the undifferentiated mode, but, more accurately, it is represented as the public self, whereas the private self can be hidden in the coexistence mode; it is also characterized by the relational mode. *Jeong* in the relational mode and *chemyeon* in the coexistence mode in Korean collectivism will be further probed in Chapter Three.

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[58] Markus and Kitayama argue, regarding the interdependent self, that "it is the individuals' roles, statuses, or positions, and commitments, obligations, and responsibilities they confer, that are the constituents of the self, and in that sense they are self-defining.... [O]ne's internal attributes (e.g., private attitudes or opinions) are not regarded as the significant attributes of the self." (Markus and Kitayama, 240)

[59] Kim, 29.

Cultural Differences in the Experience of Shame and the Self

The psychological tradition has focused on universality in emotion, holding that human emotional experiences are basically the same across cultures, and founding its depictions on western assumptions. But cultural variations in emotion have been much in evidence. Catherine A. Lutz, in her ethnographic study of emotion as an aspect of everyday life on the South Pacific atoll Ifaluk, demonstrates the strong cultural component in the construction of emotion.[60] She argues that "emotional meaning is fundamentally structured by particular cultural systems and particular social material environments. The claim is made that emotional experience is not precultural but *preeminently* cultural."[61]

Therefore, shame as emotion can be expected to differ in its meaning and subjective experience among cultures, particularly between collectivist and individualistic cultures, representing the most clearly marked out dimensions of cultural constructs; the values of these cultures cause differential arousal of shame. Batja Mesquita focuses on the cross-cultural differences in emotions with regard to the respective syndromes of I/C.[62] Mesquita reports that emotions in collectivistic cultures

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[60] Catherine A. Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

[61] Ibid., 5.

[62] Batja Mesquita, "Emotions in Collectivist and Individualist Contexts," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 80, no. 1 (2001): 68-74.

tend to be embedded in relationships with others and are perceived to reflect the status of those relationships, whereas emotions in individualistic cultures are assumed to emphasize a bounded, subjective self. In this respect, it can be presumed that in collectivistic cultures, shame has a very different meaning and subjective experience than it would in individualistic cultures.

In an investigation of cultural differences in the experience of shame and guilt, Harald G. Wallbott and Klaus R. Scherer discuss possible influences in terms of the cultural dimensions of Hofstede, such as the orientation of a society more toward individualistic values or more toward collectivistic values.[63] They report that shame experiences in collectivistic cultures differ from shame experiences in individualistic cultures and from guilt experiences in both kinds of cultures as well. They show that shame experiences in collectivistic cultures are characterized by shorter duration, less emphasis on morality, fewer negative influences on self-esteem and on relationships, more laughing/smiling, and higher felt temperature, compared to individualistic cultures. In contrast, shame experiences in individualistic cultures resemble guilt experiences to a larger degree. In short, individualism tends to be associated with shame experiences that are rather similar to guilt, whereas collectivism tends to be associated with shame and guilt experiences that are rather distinct from each other. These findings are seen to

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[63] Harald G. Wallbott and Klaus R. Scherer, "Cultural Determinants in Experiencing Shame and Guilt," in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, ed. June P. Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 465-487.

reflect anthropological distinctions such as shame culture versus guilt cultures, primitive cultures versus modern or developed cultures, and open cultures versus closed cultures.

Most cross-cultural studies of shame have involved comparison to studies of guilt, on the basis of cross-national research between western cultures or the American culture and non-western cultures or Asian cultures, notably the Japanese culture. The dichotomous characterizations of shame and guilt can be traced back to Ruth Benedict's study on the dynamics of shame and guilt in the American culture and the Japanese culture.[64] She characterizes Japan as a shame culture and the United States as a guilt culture in terms of internal versus external sanction, observing that "true shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism."[65] However, the work of Benedict was criticized for the inapplicability of the shame culture versus guilt culture dichotomy to Japan and the United States as the typical samples, respectively.[66] Rather, it can be seen that "persons in a society may be more oriented by shame or more directed by guilt, but both are present to some degree in the culture and its people"[67]

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[64] Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

[65] Ibid., 223.

[66] Doi, 48-57.

[67] David W. Augsburger, *Pastoral Counseling Across Cultures* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 120.

Benedict's view of shame and guilt has impacted to a large degree on later cross-cultural studies of shame, although her controversial distinction has been largely abandoned and a more complex conceptualization of shame and guilt has developed. Individual differences in proneness to shame of Asians and proneness to guilt of Whites were researched;[68] a study of cultural differences in the experience of shame in Asian and western cultures emerged: "Shame may be felt more intensely, felt for longer duration, felt at a higher level of awareness, and more regularly recognized in interaction in Asian cultures than in Western cultures."[69]

Yet I will go beyond such limited cross-cultural distinctions and focus on shame involving the self from the view of the self in different cultural dimensions. Cultural value systems, such as depicted by the I/C scale, can affect the way in which emotions are perceived, interpreted and valued, as they structure the way in which the self is conceptualized within cultures. Shame involving the self is different among cultures, as the conceptions of the self vary across cultures. Kurt W. Fischer and June P. Tangney, cross-cultural psychologists, view shame as a "self-conscious" emotion in that it involves conscious awareness of the self and evaluation of the self against some standard.[70] They

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[68] June P. Tangney, "Assessing Individual Differences in Proneness to Shame and Guilt: Development of the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, no. 1 (1990): 102-111.

[69] Francis I. Ha, "Shame in Asian and Western Cultures," *American Behavioral Scientist* 38, no. 8 (1995): 1127-1128.

[70] Kurt W. Fischer and June P. Tangney, "Self-Conscious Emotions and the

maintain that all the emotions are fundamentally social, but that the self-conscious emotions, necessarily involving self-directed attention and cognition, are especially firmly founded in social relationships. The self-conscious emotions vary according to the meaning and practices of the self and the meaning and practices of the relationships between self and others in different socio-cultural contexts.

Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel R. Markus and Hisaya Matsumoto view such variation in emotions as "a consequence of whether the social context fosters and implements a view of the self as independent from others, or, in contrast, as interdependent with others."[71] They suggest that the self's independence is more closely related to "socially engaged emotions" (e.g., pride or anger), in which the self is likely to be more engaged in the current relationship, while the self's interdependence is more closely related to "socially disengaged emotions" (e.g., shame), in which the self is likely to be more disengaged from the current relationship.[72] According to them, shame as a self-conscious emotion can be categorized among socially disengaged emotions.

Affect Revolution: Framework and Overview," in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride*, ed. J. P. Tangney and K. W. Fischer (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 14.

[71] Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel R. Markus, and Hisaya Matsumoto, "Culture, Self, and Emotion: A Cultural Perspective on 'Self-Conscious' Emotions," in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride*, ed. June P. Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 440.

[72] Ibid., 451.

However, Kitayama, Markus and Matsumoto's association of shame with the interdependent self can be seen to be similar to earlier cross-cultural studies of shame, such as those asserting more shame-proneness or more shame-awareness in Asian cultures. It is true, in effect, that shame can be experienced more or less both by the interdependent self and the independent self in cultures and differently by either self in different cultures. My concern in this study is rather to investigate how shame as a self-conscious emotion is differently perceived, interpreted, and conceptualized within different cultures, and how cultural differences in conceptions of the self affect the differential shame experience. Therefore, I focus on the cross-culturally different experience of shame as a self-conscious emotion from the view of the self as construals of the interdependent self and of the independent self as well in collectivistic and individualistic cultures, respectively.

Further, as discussed earlier, specific Korean patterns of shame must be explored on the basis of the specific nature and content of Korean collectivism and specific aspects of the Korean interdependent self.

Korean Indigenous Psychological Approaches

Cultural Psychology and Indigenous Psychology

To make up for the limitations in cross-cultural psychology, an alternative perspective of cultural psychology can be offered. As Triandis perceives, cross-cultural psychology can be closer to experimental psychology, and cultural psychology can be

closer to indigenous psychology; this is in terms of experimental psychology emphasizing etics, and indigenous psychology emphasizing emics, with cultural and cross-cultural psychology being located in between.[73] Although cultural psychology is known to be the closest relative to cross-cultural psychology, it is very similar to indigenous psychology. Indigenous psychology and cultural psychology have independent origins, but they share the recognition that psychological theories are important aspects of shared cultural meaning. The cultural grounding of all psychological theory has been a strong motive for indigenous psychology.[74] Thus, the concepts of cultural psychology and indigenous psychology can be used in similar ways, but they are different from cross-cultural psychology.

According to Shweder, cultural psychology is "the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion."[75] Cultural psychology involves a model of a culture's distinctive psychology, which is constructed by describing the specific sources of non-equivalence and non-

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[73] Harry C. Triandis, "Dialectics between Cultural and Cross-Cultural Psychology," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 3 (2000): 186.

[74] Patricia M. Greenfield, "Three Approaches to the Psychology of Culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?" *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 3 (2000): 225.

[75] Richard Shweder, "Cultural Psychology: What Is It?" in *The Culture and Psychology Reader*, ed. Nancy R. Goldberger and Jody B. Veroff (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 41.

comparability that arise when stimulus situations are transported from one community to another. Thus, it claims that there may be multiple diverse psychologies, rather than a single uniform psychology: "universalism without the uniformity."[76] As Shweder notes, the search for multiple psychologies implies that cultural psychology does not look through cultural variations for the common psychic core. It rather focuses on "differences in the way members of different communities perceive, categorize, feel, want, choose, evaluate and communicate."[77] Cultural psychology presupposes a reciprocal and dynamic relationship between psyche and culture, instead of a view of culture as a contextual factor outside of the psyche.

Cultural psychology has grown out of dissatisfaction, in general with the universalism and decontextualized methodology of psychology, and in particular with cross-cultural psychology; imported western psychology has been deemed not useful for application to local cultures. Cultural psychologists maintain, from an *emic* approach, that the presumed universals of current psychological theories are not true universals but actually western impositions, and they argue that every culture possess its own unique characteristics, which should be understood from within the culture.[78] They thus

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[76] Shweder, "The Psychology of Practice and the Practice of the Three Psychologies," 209-210.

[77] Ibid., 213.

[78] Uichol Kim, "Indigenous, Cultural, and Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Theoretical Conceptual, and Epistemological Analysis," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 3, no. 3 (2000): 265.

challenge the *etic* (more accurately, *imposed etic*) approach in cross-cultural psychology, which represents one of its goals as testing and verifying the universality of existing psychological theories. Such criticisms may have encouraged indigenous psychologies to evolve into a reaction against the unjustified claims of universality of western mainstream psychology and of western-oriented cross-cultural psychology, and to make a claim for the view that each culture needs to be understood from within its own reference frame. It is indeed right, in this sense, that western psychology is "culture-bound" and not universal, and is itself also an indigenous psychology, as it depends on its own cultural context.

In defining "indigenous," Uichol Kim and John W. Berry name three key features: (1) what it is (i.e., native), (2) what it is not (i.e., transported or transplanted from another region), and (3) what it is for (i.e., designed for natives).[79] "Psychology" has been traditionally defined as the scientific study of human behavior or the mind. Combining these definitions, indigenous psychology is "the scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people."[80] Indigenous psychology is an attempt to produce a local psychology within a specific cultural context "from the bottom up" on the basis of local

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[79] Uichol Kim, Y-S Park, and D. Park, "The Korean Indigenous Psychology Approach: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Applications," *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 48, no. 4 (1999): 452.

[80] Uichol Kim and J. W. Berry, eds., *Indigenous Psychologies: Research and Experience in Cultural Context* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 2.

phenomena, findings, and experiences. It advocates examining and incorporating knowledge, skills, and beliefs people have about themselves, by studying them in their natural contexts. The primary goal of indigenous psychology is not to abandon science, objectivity, and a search for universals, but to create a more properly global, systematic, and universal psychology that can be theoretically and empirically verified.[81]

In the indigenous psychological approach, Kim indicates, "culture is not viewed as a variable, quasi-independent variable, category (e.g., individualism or collectivism), or a mere sum of individual characteristics." Rather, "culture is an emergent property of individuals and groups interacting with their natural and human environments."[82] Kim makes a distinction between two perspectives on culture. From the perspective of an outsider looking in, "culture is seen as *affecting* the way people think, feel, and behave," but from an insider's perspective, culture is the way people think, feel, and behave as we think, feel, and behave *through* culture, and thus it is basic and natural."[83] He maintains that culture is viewed from the insider's perspective in indigenous psychology.

Cultural psychology, unlike indigenous psychology, still involves a view by an outsider. Cultural psychology has not been traditionally based on formal psychological

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[81] Uichol Kim, K-S Yang, and K-K Hwang, "Contributions to Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context," in *Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context*, ed. U. Kim, K-S Yang, and K-K Hwang (New York: Springer, 2006), 6.

[82] Kim, "Indigenous, Cultural, and Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Theoretical Conceptual, and Epistemological Analysis," 270.

[83] Ibid.

theories with culture-specific origins. In contrast, for indigenous psychology, psychological concepts and psychological theory should be developed within each culture. The goal of indigenous psychology is to take informal folk theories of psychology and translate them into formal theories of psychology.[84] In Kim's view, the challenge for indigenous psychology is to understand subjective first-person knowledge from the insider's experiences (e.g., phenomenological, episodic, and procedural knowledge) and to translate it into objective third-person knowledge (e.g., analytical, semantic, and declarative knowledge).[85] This is the integrationist approach that Kim advocates for indigenous psychology, and in particular for Korean indigenous psychology, which is distinguished from cultural psychology. Such an approach emphasizes the importance of integrating the context and content of psychological knowledge in a search for universals.

One of the most controversial issues in indigenous psychology is how its goals can be achieved; what the best methodology is, and what its scientific approaches toward a universal psychology should be. It is argued that theories of indigenous psychology are incomplete; they are not developed yet into general theories of human thought and behavior, as they are culture-specific. K-K Hwang points out, "Indigenous psychologists should construct formal theories illustrating the functioning of the human mind that may be applicable to various cultures, and then use these theories to study the particular

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[84] Greenfield, "Three Approaches to the Psychology of Culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?" 225.

[85] Kim, "Indigenous, Cultural, and Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Theoretical Conceptual, and Epistemological Analysis," 271.

mentalities of people in a given culture with the scientific methods of empirical research."[86]

In response to this challenge, Kim and Y-S Park introduce the idea that indigenous psychology represents the transactional scientific paradigm, in which human beings are viewed as agents of their own action and collective agents through their culture, and are thus motivated to control and manage their environment. That is, we are both the subject and the object of investigation in human science.[87] In this sense, Kim's approach to the integration of the objective third person point of view with the subjective first person perspective can provide scientific credibility for indigenous psychology. The integrationist approach emphasizes the need to integrate knowledge generated by indigenous psychologies and cross-cultural psychologies. It represents the *derived etic* approach that attempts to integrate the knowledge gained from the *imposed etic* with local indigenous knowledge from the *emic* approach. The *derived etic* approach is regarded as a necessary step toward verified universal knowledge.

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[86] K-K Hwang, "A Philosophical Reflection on the Epistemology and Methodology of Indigenous Psychologies," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2005): 5.

[87] Uichol Kim and Y-S Park, "Integrated Analysis of Indigenous Psychologies: Comments and Extensions of Ideas Presented by Shame, Jackson, Hwang and Kashima," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 8, no. 1 (2005): 82.

Korean Indigenous Psychology

Uichol Kim, Y-S Park, and D. Park apply the underlying assumptions of indigenous psychological approaches to Korean behavior and thought.[88] Their indigenous psychology is in sharp contrast to traditional mainstream psychology and forms an alternative paradigm. Korean indigenous psychology is characterized as a bottom-up, model-building approach, whereas mainstream psychology represents a top-down approach in search of abstract, universal laws of human behavior, emulating the natural sciences by adopting their methods (experimentation and statistics).

Korean indigenous psychology recognizes, as discussed, the existence of two types of knowledge: first, analytical, semantic, and declarative knowledge that is based on objective, impartial, third person analysis; and secondly, phenomenological, episodic, and procedural knowledge that is based on subjective, first-person understanding. As an analogy, Kim et al. take the grammar of a word (third-person knowledge) and the use of the word in everyday life (first-person knowledge) of a native language speaker. The speaker can freely use her/his language in everyday life but may not know the grammatical structure of her/his spoken words, as the practical meaning of the word is in its actual use. Likewise, we may know about our action but may not know how to analytically describe it. Kim et al. assert that the task of indigenous psychologists is to translate the phenomenological, episodic, and procedural knowledge into analytical,

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[88] Kim, Park, and Park, 451-464.

semantic, and declarative knowledge. In Korean indigenous psychology, third-person knowledge is not unimportant, but this knowledge must be supplemented by the first person knowledge of the actor and the second person knowledge of the observer, as both subjective and phenomenological aspects of human functioning are essential in explaining behavior and action.

Korean indigenous psychology is an example of an alternative scientific research method, which must be developed to correspond with the phenomenon that is being investigated. In other words, research tools need to be contextualized and should allow individuals to provide their own expertise. According to Kim et al., the first step of Korean indigenous psychology is to examine concepts and collective representations that exist in everyday life. The indigenous psychology approach assumes that people have a complex, dynamic, and generative understanding of themselves and their social world. It is the role of the researcher to translate people's understanding into analytic and semantic knowledge, because they may not be able to analytically describe the underlying structure of it.

The second step of the Korean indigenous method is to examine concepts that are widely discussed and used in a particular society. Two types of concepts can be investigated. The first consists of empirically indigenous concepts, in this case those that are particular to the Korean culture, such as *uri* (우리; Korean we-ness), *jeong* (정; affectionate attachment), *han* (한; lamentation), *chemyeon* (체면; Korean social face), and *nunchi* (눈치; Korean tact). The second consists of concepts that have been popularized

by psychologists and researchers, such as self and stress, and these can be addressed through the indigenous psychological approach. In other words, a study in Korean indigenous psychology can be conducted either by psychological analysis of indigenous concepts or by indigenous analysis of psychological concepts. In either case, Korean indigenous psychology emphasizes practical significance and applications both in basic and applied research.

Korean indigenous psychology is a very useful methodology for making psychological knowledge culturally appropriate in the Korean cultural context. However, the approach should be explored with caution; Korean indigenous concepts must be carefully formulated. These concepts have limited communicative value to people who do not understand the Korean language, and it may be difficult to ascertain whether the conceptualizations are accurate. In addition, the analyses of these indigenous concepts should be supported by empirical evidence; descriptive analysis is only the starting point of research.[89] Many indigenous psychologists, including Korean researchers, use a philosophy, Confucianism, to explain behavior in a particular cultural tradition. They can use it as a conceptual framework but, as Kim et al. argue,[90] any explanations from it must be translated into psychological concepts or theories and empirically verified. Korean indigenous psychology is a relatively new and emerging field and still merits debate and reformulation. It is an approach, but it has not yet fully developed into a theory. It

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[89] Kim and Park, 90.

[90] Kim, Park, and Park, 454.

should be further systematized for an integrated understanding of Korean psychological phenomena.

An Integrated Perspective of Cross-Cultural Psychology and Korean Indigenous Psychology

To delve into the Korean shame experience in this study, I will explore Kohut's psychological theories of shame and the self with cross-cultural psychological methods according to my assessment of the local relevance of these. Most Korean psychologists have had to import and adapt mainstream theories for an analysis of psychological phenomena in their culture, as if the mainstream theories were universal in their applicability. This may be due mainly to the scarcity of Korean-based theories and methods, and also to lack of skepticism about the mainstream theories' validity for Korean culture. In this regard, cross-cultural psychology is a useful methodology in its *imposed etic* approach, despite its limitations (as discussed earlier), and provides a theoretical framework for transporting existing psychological theories into other cultural contexts in order to test their validity.

However, the application of mainstream concepts and theories suggests the need to search for Korean concepts and tools that can provide more solid and applicable meaning to Korean people through theoretical and empirical analyses. Therefore, I will explore Korean psychological concepts and phenomena using the *emic* approach. I will then refine and modify Kohut's theories for cross-cultural application to Korean culture. The methodology for this study, therefore, may be called the *derived etic* approach,

which attempts to integrate the knowledge obtained from the *imposed etic* and *emic* approaches through a process of comparison.

This methodology can be categorized as indigenization from without. Virgilio G. Enriquez distinguishes the processes of indigenization from without and indigenization from within.[91] Indigenization from without involves importing psychological theories, concepts, and methods, and modifying or extending them to fit the local cultural context and the local *emic* knowledge. However, indigenization from without still represents an external imposition; indigenous knowledge is not viewed as the primary source of knowledge but as an auxiliary source. New and different perspectives are simply added onto an existing paradigm. This approach cannot challenge the basic scientific assumptions of psychology, although it can expand existing psychological theories; the existing theories can thus limit scientific discoveries.[92] Alternatively, indigenization may occur from within, in which case indigenous information is considered the primary source of knowledge. This approach advocates a shift in the scientific paradigm, a transformative change in which theories, concepts, and methods are internally developed

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[91] Virgilio G. Enriquez, "Developing a Filipino Psychology," in *Indigenous Psychologies: Research and Experience in Cultural Context*, ed. U. Kim and J. W. Berry (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 152-169.

[92] Kim, "Indigenous, Cultural, and Cross-Cultural Psychology: A Theoretical Conceptual, and Epistemological Analysis," 267.

by using "the local languages and cultures as sources for theory, method, and praxis."[93] The Korean indigenous psychological approach advocated by Kim et al. is an example.

I follow the methodology of indigenization from without (despite a danger of cross-cultural impositions), yet I proceed in a manner that reflects the Korean indigenous perspective (the methodology of indigenization from within). A theoretical framework and basic concepts for Korean psychology have not been well established. Using only the indigenization from within approach uncritically for this study would also be dangerous, as there is apparently no comprehensive shame assessment instrument, no formal and systematic tool indigenous to Korean culture. Therefore, I propose an integrated approach.

To recap, the theoretical frameworks of I/C have often been criticized. The initial conceptualization of I/C was formulated on the basis of a single dimension, and many multidimensional conceptualizations of I/C have been suggested. It can be said that both individualism and collectivism exist in all cultures (though one is more likely to predominate than the other), incorporating multiple levels of different cultural dimensions. However, despite the criticisms, in my view the study of I/C is useful for interpreting cross-cultural similarities and differences. Kim indicates its usefulness further as follows:

> [I/C] constructs provided structure to the rather fuzzy construct of culture. They allowed the linkage of psychological phenomena to a cultural dimension. . . . They re-vitalized cross-cultural psychology by providing a theoretical framework

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[93] Enriquez, 163.

> to a field that has been unable to operationalize the concept of culture. . . . IC proved to be a more concise, coherent, integrated, and empirically testable dimension of cultural variation. . . .[94]

The independent/interdependent views of the self that parallel the I/C paradigm have shown their importance in representing systematic cultural differences in self-concept, through specification of the exact mechanisms by which differences occur, although their antecedent studies are limited to cross-national differences and does not capture many other differences between and within cultures. Matsumoto argues that "[t]hese views are innovative, unique, and interesting, and represent the nature of culture and self-related cognitions as qualitatively more complex than previous approaches."[95] In spite of its shortcomings, therefore, this model of two self-construals offers a useful tool for specifying the psychological mechanisms that may underlie cross-cultural differences in the self-concept. Nevertheless, these cross-cultural constructions of I/C and of independent/interdependent self-construals must be explored on the basis of their core content and specific features within each culture.

Therefore, in this study, I will use existing psychoanalytic theories of Kohut's self psychology and test them in the Korean cultural context, and then examine the resulting psychological understanding in that context by the cross-cultural approach. In doing so, I will basically follow the conceptualization of I/C and of independent/interdependent

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[94] Kim, *Individualism and Collectivism: A Psychological, Cultural and Ecological Analysis*, 3.

[95] Matsumoto, 306.

views of the self. Yet, with regard to specific contents of Korean collectivism and specific aspects of the Korean interdependent self, I will examine and analyze Korean indigenous psychological constructs such as *uri*, *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi*. They serve as key indicators of the psychological structure of the Korean culture and are the most relevant phenomena for a cultural understanding of shame in the Korean self. In this way, I will refine and extend the present theories of Kohut's self psychology concerning shame.

CHAPTER THREE

KOREAN INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGYCAL CONSTRUCTS REFECTING SHAME EXPERIENCES IN THE *URI* CULTURE

It is best to use concepts indigenous to Korean culture as examples of Korean indigenous psychology. Korean indigenous concepts can be analyzed from Korean intellectual traditions, in particular from Confucianism, as Confucian principles and ethical codes can be viewed as the most influential among all the philosophical roots of Korean culture for an understanding of Korean collectivism.

In this chapter, I will probe the Korean indigenous constructs of *uri* (우리; Korean we-ness), *jeong* (정; affectionate attachment), *chemyeon* (체면; Korean social face), and *nunchi* (눈치; Korean tact)[1] as central tools for building theoretical frameworks of Korean indigenous psychology concerning the Korean experience of shame and the self; I will draw mainly on Sang-Chin Choi, but also on others. These concepts, as expressed in Koreans' daily lives, are not translatable into another language. They are conceptualized as personality traits, social norms, or values, and are integral to the shame experience of the Korean self. The analysis of these concepts from the perspective of Korean

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[1] There are different English spellings of Korean words, based on different English phonetic systems. I will use the spellings of the Romanization system of the Korean language established by the National Institute of the Korean Language, a system which became effective from the 7th of July, 2000.

indigenous psychology will be essential for exploring a proper way of applying Kohut's frameworks to the Korean cultural context.

Confucianism as a Context for Korean Indigenous Constructs

The main thesis of the Confucian intellectual tradition is a universal set of principles concerning human nature. *Tao* or *Dao* (道; way or truth) is the most embracing concept; it manifests itself in harmony and balance and is placed at the root of human beings. *Tao* can be referred to as *t'ien* (or *tian*)-*tao* (天道; way of Heaven), as human nature is said to be endowed by Heaven and revealed through equilibrium and harmony.[2] In other words, the human being, in contrast with nature or Heaven, is not the focus in Confucianism, but rather the human being who seeks harmony with nature and mutuality with Heaven.[3] *Tao*, as both endowed and intrinsic to human beings, thus represents a central view of human nature; it reflects the human responsibility of realizing *t'ien-tao* to restore balance and harmony to human society: "It is man that can make the Way great, and not the Way that can make man great."[4]

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[2] Wing-Tsit Chan, trans. and comp., *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 95.

[3] Tu Wei-ming, "Confucianism," in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: HarperConllins, 1993), 141.

[4] *Analects*, 15:28.

Among several key virtues that Confucian conceptions of human nature focus on, *jen* or *ren* (仁; humanity or human-heartedness) is of importance in its inclusiveness. It is the general virtue and "occupies the central position around which other cardinal virtues are ordered." Thus, it is "basic, universal and the source of all specific virtues."[5] It represents the man of humanity, which signifies love of others and living together.[6] The concept of *jen* is essentially relational in terms of the meaning of man in society, as the Chinese character of *jen* (仁) consists of the word for man (人) and the word for two (二), which signifies a group.

The relational nature of humanity is linked to the concept of *i* or *yi* (義; righteousness), which refers to respecting those for whom respect is required by the relationship. Mencius advocates *jen* and *i* together, for "humanity was necessary to bind people together and righteousness was necessary to make distinctions."[7] Basically, he maintains that the practice of *jen*, through *i*, starts with the family in fulfilling one's duties as defined by one's status and role as father, mother, brother or sister. This *i* is practiced and regulated by the principles of *li* (禮; propriety), through rules or social norms. Therefore, the concept of *jen* is fundamentally related to the concept of *i* along

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[5] Tu Wei-ming, *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 81.

[6] *Mencius*, 4B:28.

[7] Chan, 50.

with *li*. This crucial relationship among *jen*, *i*, and *li* is presented well in the *Doctrine of the Mean*:

> Humanity (*jen*) is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man, and the greatest application of it is in being affectionate toward relatives. Righteousness (*i*) is the principle of setting things right and proper, and the greatest application of it is in honoring the worthy. The relative degree of affection we ought to feel for our relatives and the relative grades in the honoring of the worthy give rise to the rules of propriety.[8]

The character of a "man of *jen*" can be cultivated by *chich* or *zhi* (智; knowledge or wisdom),[9] which allows a person to learn to be human by following the virtues of *jen* and *i*. The principles of *jen* and *i* can be found primarily in the parent-child relationship as defined by the concept of *hsiano* or *xiano* (孝; filial piety). Confucius indicates that "Filial piety and brotherly respect are the root of humanity (*jen*),"and "When the root is firmly established, the moral law (*tao*) will grow."[10] In the form of *hsiano*, the parent-child relationship is the basis of *jen* and *i*; parents fulfill their duty of loving, caring for, protecting and directing children, and children respect and obey their parents. The principles of such a relationship extend to other relationships, such as husband-wife or older person-younger person. The duties in each of the relationships are assigned according to the rules of *li*, which contributes to family and social harmony.

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[8] *The Mean*, ch. 20.

[9] *Analects*, 4:2.

[10] *Analects*, 1:2.

The concept of *jen* can also be represented in terms of *chung* (忠; loyalty or conscientiousness) and *shu* (恕; reciprocity or altruism). *Chung* means "the full development of one's originally good mind" and *shu* means "the extension of that mind to others."[11] For Confucius, a man of *jen*, "wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent."[12] Thus, as *jen* implies the balanced and harmonized aspects of the self and society, in parallel to it *chung* can refer to the self and *shu* can refer to others. All such virtues as *i*, *li*, *chich*, *hsiano*, *chung*, and *shu* are crucially related to and are encompassed in the concept of *jen*, which focuses on full humanity within a community.

The Confucian concept of a person is not an isolated individual but is experientially and practically a center of relationships.[13] This human relatedness is illustrated clearly in *wu-lun* (五倫; five relations) as five cardinal rules in the *Book of Mencius*:

> According to the way of man, if they are well fed, warmly clothed, and comfortably lodged but without education, they will become almost like animals. The Sage (emperor Shun) worried about it and he appointed Hsieh to be minister of education and teach people human relations, that between father and son, there should be affection; between ruler and minister, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there should be attention to the separate functions; between old and young, there should be a proper order; and between friends, there should be faithfulness.[14]

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[11] Chan, 786.

[12] *Analects*, 6:28.

[13] Tu, "Confucianism," 143.

[14] *Mencius*, 3A:4.

These rules represent the Confucian emphasis on human interrelatedness and reflect concepts of proper human relationship on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity, which lead to reverence for others, harmony, and proper order in family and society. Yet the idea of *san-kang* (三綱; three bonds), that "the ruler, the father, and the husband are superior to the ruled, the son, and the wife," is also inherent in the Confucian system, though the five human relationships are established on the basis of mutuality.[15] However, the original Mencian teaching, in effect, emphasizes the principles of mutuality and reciprocity in human relationships more than hierarchical social order, though this is implied in the relationships. According to Tu, it is in order to establish stability and harmony of interpersonal relationships in family and society that the Confucians are aware of the necessity of hierarchy.[16] Nonetheless, Confucian ethical principles are still viewed and practiced as hierarchical, patriarchal, and authoritative, so that Confucianism has been generally criticized.

Confucian tradition has deeply influenced Korean culture since the fourteenth century, especially since the Yi dynasty in Chosun (1392-1910) adopted it in the form referred to now as Neo-Confucianism. By the eighteenth century, Korean society was thoroughly Confucianized in its own characteristic way. Confucianization proceeded in indigenous Korean familial and social structures, applying the Confucian meritocratic ideal to the indigenous Korean class structure; Confucianism influenced the Korean

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[15] Chan, 277.

[16] Tu, "Confucianism," 191.

government and political structure, and the Korean family was restructured on the Confucian patrilineal model.[17] This Confucian influence can be seen in rigid and dominant class distinctions (e.g., the noble class and the lowest class) and hierarchical human relationships (e.g., between the classes, between husband and wife, between the young and the elderly, and between parents and children) according to age, sex, learning, and social status in Korean society. The focus on higher education in Korea also reflects a major Confucian influence. The importance of funeral and mourning rites and ancestor worship in Korea may show the most characteristic Confucian influence, emphasizing patrilineage and patriarchy.

Although Confucian values are gradually weakening in contemporary Korean society and no longer completely dominate Korean political and social life, they are alive in attitudes toward political and social authority, interpersonal relationships, social class, and education; these attitudes remain Confucian, though in altered forms,[18] and Korean people continue to adhere to Confucian values and practices in their everyday lives. For example, ancestor worship, though weakened or truncated, is still an important part of Korean family life, and filial piety still governs relationships between parents and children in Korea. Although family structures and roles in the family have changed, the

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[17] Jahyun K. Haboush, "The Confucianization of Korean Society," in *The East Asian Religion: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation*, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 84-86.

[18] Michael Robinson, "Perceptions of Confucianism in Twentieth-Century Korea," in *The East Asian Religion: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation*, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 204.

general Confucian norms remain strong in Korea families. In addition, respect for elders and reciprocity in human relations, as well as reverence for education and cultivation, remain important values in Korean life.[19]

Such Confucian cultural traditions are closely related, though not identical, to indigenous concepts and constructs of Korean collectivism. The concept of *uri* can be viewed as the most characteristic to Korean collectivism in terms of its focus on harmony within the group and interpersonal relationships. *Jeong*, on which *uri* is based, can be seen as related to the concept of *jen* with regard to interpersonal love and concern according to the way of human-heartedness. The concept of saving one's *chemyeon* can be seen as a specific illustration and social extension of *li*, which implies proper roles and duties on the basis of social norms. *Nunchi* is the concept employed to maintain one's *chemyeon*, and it can also correspond to features of *li*.

Uri as an Indigenous Discourse on Korean Collectivism

Korean culture can be categorized as one of the collectivistic cultures. One of the consistent themes associated with collectivism is an emphasis on the collective or group over individuals. As far as Korean collectivism is concerned, Choi and Choi challenge the notion of the group as the current representation of the basic psychological unit of

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[19] Ibid., 221-225.

collectivism.[20] They argue that the concept of collectivism has been formulated according to the western individualist psychological framework. According to the current literature, "a group" refers to a collection of individuals, which presupposes the western sense of the individual as an exclusively unitary, autonomous, and independent human entity that, in numbers, constitutes the collective as an aggregate of individuals. This western notion shows blindness to cross-cultural differences, and in this case it lacks the contextual framework of Korean society. Therefore, the western notion of group should be reconsidered in specifically Korean psychological terms.

I propose the Korean concept of *uri* as a more integral framework for discourse on Koran collectivism, on the basis of Choi and Choi's argument for "we-ness" discourse. The term *uri* is from the Korean first-person plural pronoun, equivalent to "we" or "us" in English, but denotes an inclusive group. It connotes the specifically Korean experiences of we-ness, because different conceptualizations of we-ness can exist in other collectivistic cultures, as well as in individualistic cultures. For instance, we-ness is an important concept for the Japanese also and may be emphasized more in Japanese than in Korean collectivistic culture. Nonetheless, the concept of *uri* and *wa-re-wa-re* (われわれ; Japanese we-ness) are distinct, despite their similarities. Whereas *wa-re-wa-re* is

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[20] Choi and Choi, "We-ness: A Korean Discourse of Collectivism." 57-63.

hierarchical, conceived in terms of organizational function, trust-centered, and activity-oriented, *uri* is non-distinctive, family-oriented, *jeong*-centered, and abstract.[21]

Choi and Choi conducted an empirical study to examine the specific phenomenological representations of Korean *uri* by comparing the Canadian concept of we-ness.[22] The data comprised descriptive answers to five questions that sixty Korean university students and forty-three Canadian university students were asked. The results suggest that the most prevailing connotations of *uri* are an affective bond shared by the *uri* members, together-ness, and one-ness. The most significant *uri* context is family, followed by friends or the school-related *uri* group. The majority of Korean responses affirm the existence of conformity pressure in *uri* membership but also mention willingness to accommodate or tolerate the inconveniences. In addition, Korean responses indicate a growth of personal closeness, based on intimacy and affection, to a new member of the *uri* group. Overall, the majority emphasize that *uri* membership is necessary to establish a social relationship and that the emotional bond between the *uri* members is important.

The results imply that *uri* as in-group identity underlies the way in which Korean people interact with others. Korean people's relationships with others within the *uri* category are characterized by a strong sense of "our people" and interpersonal affection

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[21] Sang-Chin Choi, "The Third-Person-Psychology and the First-Person-Psychology: Two Perspectives on Human Relations," *Korean Social Science Journal* 25, no. 1 (1998): 250.

[22] Choi and Choi, 67-77.

(e.g., *jeong*), whereas their relationships with others outside of the *uri* category are characterized by rationality, objective social norms, and individual interests.[23] *Uri* does not have to do simply with an aggregate of individuals but entails a certain internal binding force among individuals within the *uri* relationship. Therefore, "the relationally-bound aggregate," through specially arranged relations, is a conceptual core of *uri* as the Korean culture-specific properties of we-ness.[24]

The essential factors that bind people to *uri* within a certain relationalized context are associated with oneness or wholeness, sameness, interdependence, and emotional affects such as intimacy, closeness, love, acceptance, something good, comfort, warmth, etc.[25] In forming an *uri* group or *uri* relation, persons who are included in the *uri* group are received as "we " in an "our-side" mental set, while persons who are not included in the *uri* group are considered to be in a "their-side" mental set and are estranged or excluded.[26] Once the other persons are recognized as *uri* members, their relationships become deeper as their interactions are repeated. The *uri* members in the *uri* group are, then, interconnected to one another homogeneously, experience a certain sameness about

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[23] Sang-Chin Choi and Kibum Kim, "Naïve Psychology of Koreans' Interpersonal Mind and Behavior in Close Relationships," in *Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context*, ed. U. Kim, K-S Yang, and K-K Hwang (New York: Springer, 2006), 357.

[24] Choi and Choi, 67.

[25] Ibid., 79.

[26] Choi, 247.

each other, and expect social interdependence and emotional support. This phenomenon within the *uri* relationship does not happen immediately and openly, but implicitly, gradually and invisibly, because the individual elements are fused to the center of *uri* relations via unidentifiable affective forces within the relations. Choi and Choi conclude that "the occurrence of such not-factually based WE perceptions and expectations are drawn from the aura of we-hood-ness based on the affective power of the WE discourse in Korea."[27]

The most prevalent *uri* relationships are activated through the networks of family, school, and region,[28] in which people identify others as *uri* members. When people are connected by blood lineage, school relations, and regional institutions, they feel closer to one another, assume social interdependence, and give more favor each other within the *uri* relationship. Most frequently and importantly, people form the *uri* relationship in family by sharing common bloodlines. This relationship ranges from the nuclear family to the extended family, more distant relatives, the clan, and the ethnic group. For Korean people, belonging to the same family or clan means that they have a strong feeling of *uri* and specific interactional patterns within the relationship.

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[27] Choi and Choi, 80.

[28] Gyuseong Han and Sug-Man Choe, "Effects of Family, Region, and SchoolNetwork Ties on Interpersonal Intentions and the Analysis of Network Activities in Korea," in *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Application*, ed. U. Kim et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994), 213-215.

School relations are also crucial to forming the *uri* relationship, especially for alumni. Regional relations are formed on the basis of people's common geographical home; they tend to identify their township, county, or province as their "hometown." Once people recognize a connection through these relations, the behavioral pattern typical of *uri* members is exhibited, even when there has been no prior contact through the school or regional networks; when a person comes to know that the other person(s) is (are) from the same hometown or graduated from the same school, the person's attitudes toward them change to kind, caring, protective, comfortable, and informal; the other persons are not treated as strangers any more but as *uri* members, and the *their-side* mental set is switched to the *our-side* mental set. These traditional relation-prone values and attitudes may be currently challenged by the new norms of modernity, because relation-based discrimination remains prevalent due to *uri* relations. Yet the values and attitudes still serve important functions, either formally or informally, in maintaining features of Korean traditional *uri* culture.[29]

Some changes may occur within *uri* as the result of a generation gap or of the influence of other cultures, but it has been the most characteristic feature of the Korean collectivistic culture and is still prevalent in Koreans' everyday experiences. Even if the factual conditions of *uri* are changed, a certain assumed we-hood-ness would remain consistent on the basis of *uri* relationships.

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[29] Han and Choe, 223.

Jeong as the Affective Bond of *Uri*

Jeong can generally be translated as "human affection," but an exactly corresponding concept in English cannot be found. It has much broader meanings and ambiguous nuances; it is affective, but additionally it comprises "the force of inertia of a relationship."[30] It is Korean affectionate attachment: "some kind lingering feeling attached to persons, objects, places, or anything that the *Cheong* [*jeong*]-feeling person has experienced or come into contact with."[31]

The prototype of *jeong* can be found in family relationships, in particular in the mother-child relationship: *mojeong* (모정; the word *mo* means mother; a mother's *jeong* for her child). *Mojeong* is a strong feeling of attachment experienced from earliest childhood. Given the mother's unconditional love, care, empathy, and sacrifice, the baby experiences and feels the *jeong* of the mother, which persists into later life. This earliest experience of *jeong* is developed and expands to other forms of *jeong* through the interactions among others: *bujeong* (부정; *bu* means father; a father's *jeong* for his child), *injeong* (인정; *in* means human; humaneness), and *ujeong* (우정; *u* means friend; friendship). *Jeong* exists not only in interpersonal relationships but also in relations with

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[30] Tae-Seop Lim and Soo-Hyang Choi, "Interpersonal Relationships in Korea," in *Communication in Personal Relationships Across Cultures*, ed. William B. Gudykunst, Stella Ting-Toomey, and Tsukasa Nishida (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996), 132.

[31] Sang-Chin Choi and Soo-Hyang Choi, "*Cheong* [*Jeong*]: The Socio-Emotional Grammar of Koreans," *International Journal of Group Tensions* 30, no. 1 (2001): 69.

nonhuman objects such as an animal, book, house, or place. People have *jeong* with these objects, specifying a *jeong-deun* (정든; *jeong*-felt or *jeong*-laid) dog, book, or hometown.

According to Choi and Choi's investigation of *jeong*,[32] it occurs and is developed under specific conditions. First, "*jeong*-feeling persons" need to spend a relatively long period of time to have a history of sharing experiences with "*jeong*-felt persons" (persons for whom *jeong* is felt) or *jeong*-objects. Secondly, the *jeong*-feeling persons also need to share experiences of co-residence with *jeong*-felt persons or objects; living close to one another allows them to have frequent contacts with one another and to share good and bad times together, which facilitates the occurrence of *jeong*. When persons see each other living closely all the time, regardless of the nature of their relationship, they tend to have *jeong*; their *jeong* becomes deep and does not fade away with ease.

The third component is "heartedness-personality" in the *jeong*-felt persons or objects, such as warmth, comfort, intimacy, caring and feeling at ease. If the person does not have a favorable personality, the historical and spatial components are not useful for the occurrence of *jeong*. Lastly, the ability to disregard the other's defects unconditionally is important for the occurrence of *jeong*. This ability includes complete understanding, acceptance and trust of the others. As the four components are inextricably interrelated, *jeong* can be fully understood on the basis of a combination of

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[32] Ibid., 70-80.

all of them. These elements of time, space, personality, and relationship constitute the basic experiences of *uri*.

An additional condition necessary for *jeong* to develop is experiencing and sharing not only joys but also sorrows, times of trouble, hard times, and problems together. The more people share negative or difficult experiences, the more they affirm their oneness or togetherness as *uri*-identity. Another condition that can be added is similarities that appear at the earlier stage of the formation of *jeong*. Similarity in terms of family background, geographical location, school association, personality, behavior, a hobby, an idea, or physical characteristics evokes *uri*-feelings and provides a situational component of *jeong*.

"*Cheong* [*jeong*]-full persons"[33] (persons full of *jeong* or person with bountiful *jeong*) are characterized, first of all, as altruistic, sympathetic, and caring; they are willing to help others and show considerable concern for others' feelings, problems, and general situations. However, if this altruistic and sympathetic tendency can be characterized only as the western version of altruism and charity that implies rationality and concern for the rights of human beings, it does not sufficiently identify a person as full of *jeong*. Korean people are grateful for the western kind of charity and help, but they do not necessarily feel full of *jeong* about such help. Rather, other important factors are needed in order for the altruistic acts to be perceived as *jeong*-full acts: tenderness and "foolish kindness." When a person acts in an altruistic way while appearing unskillful, unsophisticated and

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[33] Ibid., 78.

even foolish, s/he is felt to be *jeong*-full. *Jeong* represents the culture-specific way of being humanistic yet seeming irrational, which is the basis of the social relationships of *uri*.

Conversely, a person to whom it is difficult to attach feelings of *jeong* is characterized as hypocritical, arrogant, selfish, calculating, self-centered, indifferent, cool-headed, independent, and perfectionist, even in behaving altruistically. Among these characteristics, hypocrisy, arrogance, and selfishness in particular evoke negative feelings about the helper or giver. Characteristics such as indifference and independence are not necessarily negative in themselves but can be characteristic of individualism, and Korean people regard it as difficult to develop *jeong* for such people. They might come under the heading of "*Cheong* [*jeong*]-less persons."[34]

Jeong is the most essential psychological characteristic of Korean interpersonal relationships, especially within the *uri* relationship. It is the affective bond that unites and integrates *uri* members together and constitutes the basis of *uri* relations; *jeong* is created when interconnected individuals experience *uri*. According to Choi, *jeong* and *uri* are two sides of a psychological reality. When *jeong* is presupposed, the *uri*-identity is recognized, and *jeong* is a quality experienced in the *uri* relationship. In other words, *uri* cannot develop without *jeong*, and *jeong* cannot develop without *uri*.[35] Therefore,

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[34] Ibid., 79.

[35] Choi, 249.

jeong is a central concept in the formation and maintenance of social relationships on the basis of *uri*.

Chemyeon as Forming Dynamics of Social Relationships of *Uri*

Chemyeon can generally stand for one's face or social face. Phenomena of "face" are not unique to the Korean culture and not limited to certain types of culture (e.g., East Asian cultures or Confucian cultures) but exist in every culture, functioning as an important and meaningful element of human relationality. Despite its ubiquity, however, face differs considerably in its forms and functions across cultural contexts. In particular, the specific cultural dimensions (i.e., individualism and collectivism) or the culturally specific ways of self-construal (i.e., the independent and interdependent self) crucially influence the conceptualization and content of face. It is not only that face occurs differently in different cultures, but that face itself is a different thing, not only between the individualistic and collectivistic cultures but also within the collectivist cultures, notably countries influenced by Confucianism such as China, Japan and Korea.

Erving Goffman first established a definition of face in a western, individualistic culture:

> The term *face* may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social

> attributes—albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.[36]

Chemyeon seems to fit into the definition but is different in its exact nature. *Chemyeon,* like face, is an image of self, but the western concept of personal self is different from the Korean one within the collective identity of *uri*; *chemyeon* as the Korean image of self represents more-complex relational dynamics than face. A Korean individual can claim it through social interactions, just like face, but many parts of it are not claimed or negotiated but given by society, and s/he protects it by meeting the society's expectations. Additionally, though *chemyeon,* like face, depends on the realization of positive social values, there is "a pass-fail dichotomy" to maintain it, unlike the continuum of values for western face.[37]

Within collectivist cultural contexts, face can be variously conceptualized and comprised. Face involves two concepts in Chinese social relations: *mianzi* or *mien-tzu* (面子; honorific image) and *lian* or *lien* (脸; face). *Lian* stands for "the confidence of society in the integrity of [an] ego's moral character," while *mianzi* represents prestige and honor that are socially emphasized.[38] One tries to accept norms of behavior and community expectations in one's society to avoid losing *lian*, and makes an effort to

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[36] Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 2005), 5.

[37] Lim and Choi, 124.

[38] Hsien C. Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," *American Anthropologist* 46, no. 1 (1944): 45.

obtain the admiration of others through successes to gain *mianzi*. Japanese face can be expressed by idiomatic notions including *mentsu* (めんつ; derived from the Chinese word *mianzi* or *mien-tzu*), *menboku* (めんぼく; social face), *kao* (かお; physiological face), and *taimen* (たいめん; appearance one presents to others), which are often used interchangeably and signify face, honor, reputation, prestige, dignity, or credit. Among these expressions, Akio Yabuuchi proposes that *menboku* (similar to the Chinese concept of *mianzi*) and *taimen* (similar to Goffman's notion of face) are more proper to refer to the Japanese concept of face, leaving *mentsu* as their umbrella term.[39]

The Chinese concept of *lian/mainzi* and the Japanese concept of *taimen/menboku* seem to represent a structure similar to the concept of *chemyeon* in that *chemyeon* involves both positive self-evaluation and social approval or others' evaluations of one's morality and ability, though the latter is more critical. Nonetheless, those concepts are different from one another, as the key concepts for explaining social behaviors in each culture are different. According to Yabuuchi, though the Chinese may be more sensitive to the aspect of social approval of face (connected to the concept of obligation or duty) than Americans, they are more sensitive to the aspect of self-evaluation of face (conducing to ostentation or self-aggrandizement) than the Japanese. Among various attributes of face, social status and formal positions have the greatest weight in Chinese culture and the smallest in U.S. culture; conformity has the greatest weight in Japanese

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[39] Akio Yabuuchi, "Face in Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. American Cultures," *Journal of Asian Pacific Communication* 14, no. 2 (2004): 265.

culture and the smallest weight in American culture.[40] Though no detailed comparisons have been made, it can be assumed that *chemyeon* is idiomatically shaped and structured by Koreans.

Korean *chemyeon* has two dimensions: personalized *chemyeon* and normative *chemyeon*.[41] First, *chemyeon* is considered to exist at the personal and interactional dimension, which is similar to Goffman's concept of face. This type of *chemyeon* refers to a person's integrity and ability, which is not judged by absolute standards but by such relational factors as the person's relative position and authority in different relationships. Persons of higher relational status or interpersonal authority (e.g., superiors, elders, or seniors) may claim more *chemyeon*; subordinates or juniors are very careful to behave well for the sake of their superiors' *chemyeon*. *Chemyeon* is claimed also based on relational factors such as intimacy, which is especially closely related to the dynamics of *uri* relationships. Koreans often do not care about their *chemyeon* outside the *uri* relations (e.g., in front of total strangers), and not within the closest *uri* relationships either. Koreans usually think that they do not need much *chemyeon* in their deep *uri* relations, as far as the state of their relationships is not affected, but they can be greatly sensitive to *chemyeon* even within the close *uri* relationships in significant matters that may affect the quality of these relationships.

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[40] Ibid., 288, 289.

[41] Lim and Choi, 124-128.

The second type of *chemyeon* represents the normative dimension and has to do with the social worth of a person. Normative *chemyeon* is the socially expected quality of a person, as associated with her/his particular status and position in specific social situations. Socially shared structures, with all of their formality and symbolism, give individuals their social worth according to normative *chemyeon*.[42] This form of *chemyeon* can be expressed on the basis of an individual's social status (e.g., as a professor, a parent, or an intellectual), which in each instance is determined in detail by the persons with whom s/he interacts (e.g., students, children, or the public). Saving this *chemyeon* involves both behaviors and symbols. Some people may display intentionally formalized behavior or make excessive efforts in formal and hypocritical behavior. Symbols of normative *chemyeon* have also been established in Korean society; Koreans' preference for brand name products (e.g., clothes, bags), huge houses or expensive cars protects *chemyeon* either by showing off status and economic strength or by disguising actual status or low capability.

Normative *chemyeon* is stipulated by implicit and symbolic value systems as such, but it is also somewhat absolute according to social standards and is given to all distinct social positions. However, since *chemyeon* is strongly associated with high social status, persons of higher social position are given higher normative *chemyeon* and expected to have superior "integrity and personality, authority, possessions, performance,

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[42] Sang-Chin Choi and Kibum Kim, "Chemyeon—Social Face in Korean Culture," *Korea Journal* 44, no. 2 (2004): 34-35.

associations, appearance, general conduct, and so on."[43] This type of *chemyeon* is appraised in "actor-observer relationships,"[44] and thus the opinions of all potential observers are crucial to maintaining normative *chemyeon*. Korean people are usually careful, through watching others' *imok* (이목; ears and eyes), not to damage their *chemyeon.*

The normative type of *chemyeon* is readily lost when persons do not meet social expectations: when they violate the norms of their social status and position; when they fail to show their ability adequately for their social status and position; and when they behave inappropriately for their social status and position.[45] Maintaining normative *chemyeon* is one of the major objectives of social interaction for Koreans. Choi and Kim categorize behavioral patterns for the maintenance of *chemyeon* into keeping *chemyeon* and protecting *chemyeon*.[46] Keeping *chemyeon* involves behaviors designed to confirm that one has personal integrity and ability suitable to one's social status and position. "*Chemyeon* keeping activities" include visiting others and giving gifts, regularly inviting others to one's home and going as a guest to others' homes, and showing up at others' weddings or funerals with congratulatory or condolence money. These activities are

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[43] Lim and Choi, 127.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Sang-Chin Choi and Suk-Jae Lee, "Two-Component Model of Chemyon-Oriented Behaviors in Korea: Constructive and Defensive Chemyon," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 33, no. 3 (2002): 333.

[46] Choi and Kim, "Chemyeon—Social Face in Korean Culture," 37-38.

common among Koreans.[47] Another pattern of maintaining *chemyeon* is protecting *chemyeon* in order to minimize the degradation, devaluation, and misperception of one's personal integrity and ability. When one's integrity and ability are threatened, one may sometimes try to overprotect one's *chemyeon* by intentionally establishing or manipulating *chemyeon*:[48] by buying expensive houses or cars one can hardly afford, by having one's children marry people whose background is admirable, or by having them take up occupations that meet social expectations.

The ways in which normative *chemyeon* is maintained often affect the dynamics of the *uri* relationships. When *chemyeon* is damaged, what is threatened is not only the individual's *chemyeon* but also the whole *uri* group; maintenance of one's *chemyeon* connotes maintenance of the whole *uri* group's *chemyeon*, and vice versa. Korean people try to preserve others' *chemyeon*, particularly in the *uri* relationship, by acting in certain ways, which often result in maintenance of their own *chemyeon*; they ignore negative characteristics of others, or show off or exaggerate positive sides of others' social status and positions. They sometimes disregard their own *chemyeon* if this means promoting or supporting others' *chemyeon*, and they try to enhance their social status or positions to save others' *chemyeon*. This mutual saving of *chemyeon* contributes to favorable interaction in the *uri* relationship.

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[47] Lim and Choi, 128.

[48] Choi and Kim, "Chemyeon—Social Face in Korean Culture," 48.

Nunchi as the Major Operating Mechanism in Maintaining *Chemyeon*

Nunchi is a Korean interactional communicative pattern, which also can be called other-awareness or situational sensitiveness. It may be compared to western tact, or called Korean tact. It can be associated with attribution theory in that both *nunchi* and attribution theory are concerned with how people perceive the behavior of themselves and of others through inferring interactants' motives and needs, and hence the goals of interactional acts.[49] Tact in western terms is an element of communicative proficiency or efficiency that enables interactants to interpret their messages or behaviors explicitly and precisely. Westerners use this interpretative process of figuring out the real meaning, an activity that is called "reading between the lines,"[50] much as Koreans use *nunchi*. However, the western notion of tact or attribution theory cannot fully account for the culture-specific indigenous properties of *nunchi*.

Sang-Chin Choi and Soo-Hyang Choi describe the differences between *nunchi* and the attribution process conceptualized by current western social psychology.[51] First, *nunchi* presupposes a pre-existing relational basis among interactants, while attribution theory deals with interactions among those who do not know one another. *Nunchi*

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[49] Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1958).

[50] Lim and Choi, 130.

[51] Sang-Chin Choi and Soo-Hyang Choi, "The Conceptualization of Korean Tact, Noon-Chi," in *Innovations in Cross-Cultural Psychology*, ed. S. Iwawaki, Y. Kashima, and K. Leung (Amsterdam: Swets & Seitlinger, 1992), 49-50.

involves the need not to jeopardize the existing social relationships between interactants but rather to establish or maintain smooth relationships. Secondly, attribution theory takes behavior as a basic unit of analysis, following a scientific or positivistic methodological framework, and the target behaviors are pre-defined and quite explicit. *Nunchi* interactions, in contrast, have a holistic approach in which a diverse set of communicative methods, including non-verbal ones such as facial or body expressions, are utilized. The essence of *nunchi* interactions consists of the interactional dynamics, which cannot be observed from isolated, pre-defined behavioral patterns or interactional acts, but take the form of a process, in interactants' continuous interactions with one another. *Nunchi* interactions are best characterized by their interactional dynamics as generated by the relational context, in which interactants' acts are constantly negotiated through their subjective view of the situation.

According to Choi and Choi, therefore, *nunchi* can be defined as "an interactional situation in which the interactants opt for covert, implicit or indirect communicative exchanges."[52] A *nunchi* interaction consists of "executing" *nunchi* or "figuring-out" *nunchi*; a *nunchi* situation arises when an interactant executes a *nunchi* act through an indirect communication and leads the other party or parties to recognize it, or when s/he or they figure out whether it has been released by the other party and what it means.[53] Yet, these two types of *nunchi* acts do not paint a full picture of *nunchi* interactional

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[52] Choi and Choi, "The Conceptualization of Korean Tact, Noon-Chi," 51.

[53] Ibid.

dynamics; there are one-way *nunchi* situations and two-way *nunchi* situations, both with complicated dynamics. One-way *nunchi* situations occur when interactants are not aware of the *nunchi* intentions of the other party, and also when they unnecessarily try to figure out *nunchi* when there are no *nunchi* intentions executed by the other party. On the other hand, two-way *nunchi* situations can occur when both parties are engaged in *nunchi* executing acts, when both parties set out on a nunchi figuring-out process, and when *nunchi* executing acts coincide with *nunchi* figuring-out acts in a reciprocal interaction. The last of these two-way *nunchi* situations is most characteristic. However, *nunchi* situations are not defined or fixed patterns, but rather are generated, constructed, and re-constructed according to interactional contexts.[54]

Nunchi situations can be attributed, to some extent, to the Korean reserved, passive, and inhibited communication style; Koreans tend not to expose their thoughts openly and directly to others, and their inner feelings, desires, and interests are often hidden. They prefer not to express their motives and meanings explicitly, especially when the meanings might make the situation uncomfortable. Rather, they believe that implicit, indirect, often non-verbal or signaled meanings can be essential to communicating favorably with one another and to figuring out others' intentions.[55]

Consequently, *nunchi* interactions are involved in the unseen or symbolic signification process behind the surface level of signification. Choi and Choi explain this

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[54] Ibid., 55-57.

[55] Lim and Choi, 130.

as dual signification processes of *nunchi*—on-stage signification (i.e., the surface level) and bracketed signification (i.e., the symbolic level), and they illustrate how these two levels function.[56] Let's suppose party A says, "What time is it now?" when s/he wants party B to leave her/his office, and party B replies, "Oh, it's already 4 o'clock... I'd better leave now... I've an appointment at 4:15." Party B figures out party A's *nunchi* executing act. A asks B the time and B replies to A by providing the information at the on-stage level of signification, but A conveys her/his intention to tell B to leave, and B accordingly understands A's *nunchi* intention at the bracketed level of signification. Thus, *nunchi* processes are based on the surface level of signification, i.e., on the conventional usage of language, yet the surface level alludes to the important symbolic system in which *nunchi* can operate.

The symbolic meanings of a given *nunchi* act are, however, identified only in a specific interactional context; interpersonal variables such as hierarchical relations between interactants, the extent of their closeness, and their interactional history are essential to understanding the meanings. Therefore, "the locus of *Noon-Chi* [*nunchi*] interaction does not lie in each of the interactants, nor in both of the interactants, but 'between' the interactants."[57] This "in-between" nature of *nunchi* interactions accordingly implies the main purpose of *nunchi*; it is to establish or maintain favorable and smooth relationships; it is to attain "a context-bound mutual favorableness; a

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[56] Choi and Choi, "The Conceptualization of Korean Tact, Noon-Chi," 57-59.

[57] Ibid., 60.

conflict-free or problem-proof social interaction."[58] This in-between relational basis of *nunchi* can be best identified within the context of the *uri* group.

Nunchi interactions involving *uri* dynamics are closely related to the nature of *chemyeon,* maintaining favorable social interactions in the *uri* context. That is, the *nunchi* interaction processes to avoid unpleasant situations effect the *chemyeon* saving of both interactional parties in the relational contexts of *uri.* In the previous illustration of a *nunchi* situation, by executing the *nunchi* act party A can maintain her/his *chemyeon,* which might be damaged by her/his lack of tolerance or generosity to party B; by figuring out the *nunchi* act of A, B does not lose her/his *chemyeon,* which might be threatened if s/he is careless of A's work time. *Nunchi* consequently fills a major function in maintaining *chemyeon.*

In sum, on the basis of *uri* and *jeong* in Korean collectivism, *chemyeon* deeply pervades the social context and affects social relationships. *Chemyeon* is crucially related to the Confucian understanding of *jen* (humanity), in which people behave according to *li* (propriety). When *li* is violated, one's *chemyeon* is lost and one feels ashamed. In other words, if people do not behave according to basic norms of *li,* it results in feelings of shame; this consequently violates the principle of *jen.* In this context, two kinds of shame are implied: shame experienced when one realizes that one's behavior violates the *chemyeon* standard; and shame experienced when others disapprove of one's behavior that violates the *chemyeon* standard. The former was emphasized more than the latter in

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[58] Ibid., 51.

traditional Confucian teaching, and the former has been considered more important than the latter in Korea, but today the latter prevails over the former.[59] In either type of shame experience, loss of *chemyeon* plays a critical role in the psychological dynamics of *uri* relationships. *Nunchi* can provide certain communicative strategies apt to preserve *chemyeon* in given interactional situations, most importantly within the *uri* context. These *chemyeon*-saving or -maintaining effects of *nunchi* accordingly can provide protection against shame that would come from the loss of *chemyeon*. In the next chapter, I will integrate these constructs into Kohut's frameworks in interpreting the Korean experience of shame.

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[59] Choi and Kim, "Chemyeon—Social Face in Korean Culture," 32-33.

CHAPTER FOUR

AN INTEGRATED EXAMINATION OF SHAME AND THE KOREAN SELF

In this chapter, I will interpret the Korean shame experience from an integrated perspective of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology. I will critically apply theories of Kohut's self psychology concerning shame to the Korean *uri* culture, and refine them by integrating Korean psychological constructs into his frameworks. I will focus on shame experiences in Korean adulthood and in normal contexts.

Shame as a self-conscious emotion is differently experienced according to the nature of consciousness of the self in different cultures. Therefore, the notion of self-consciousness in shame as formulated by self psychology needs to be expanded in line with the experience of the self and self-selfobject relationships of Korean people. This expanded conceptualization of self-consciousness in shame will form an important framework for my argument, will refine or reconstruct Kohut's theories of self psychology for application to Korean culture, and will yield a basic tool to analyze the Korean experience of shame.

To this end, first, drawing on Andrew P. Morrison's modification of Kohut's theories with regard to the ideal self as related to shame, I will suggest the role of the self both as the subject and the object in the Korean experience of self-consciousness in

shame. Secondly, I will focus on objective self-awareness of the Korean self under the social standards, ideals, and goals of the *uri* culture, on the basis of Francis J. Broucek's extension of Kohut's formulations. Thirdly, I will also discuss intersubjectivity in the Korean shame experience, in which reciprocal and mutual self-selfobject relationships are significant in the *uri* culture; I will point out that Kohut does not focus on intersubjective functions of selfobjects in self-selfobject relationships. Based on this expanded conceptualization of self-consciousness in shame, I will analyze the shame experience of the Korean self as relational-contextual mind, especially in terms of the Korean conception of *chemyeon*.

Korean Self and Selfobject in the *Uri* Culture

Korean Self

An explanation of the Korean concept of the self can draw broadly on the notion of the interdependent self, in contrast to that of the independent self that has apparently been used in the basic psychological representation, as discussed earlier. The cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz's definition of a person represents the western concept of the self as an independent unit: "a bounded, unique, more or less integrated, motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes

and against its social and natural background."[1] In contrast to this separate and bounded self, the interdependent self is embedded within a socio-cultural context. Roland categorizes the two types of the self as "I-self" and "we-self" from a cross-cultural psychoanalytic perspective,[2] and these can correspond to the independent self and the interdependent self, respectively. The Korean self can be characterized as we-self; this concept is extremely useful for providing a psychoanalytic and social delineation of Korean realities in challenging and modifying Kohut's formulations of the self.

Roland contrasts the we-self with the individualistic I-self, particularly focusing on the familial self. The familial self means a basic inner psychological organization that enables people to function well within the hierarchical intimacy relationships of the extended family, community, and other groups; by contrast, the individualized self means the predominant inner psychological organization of North Americans that allows them to function in a highly mobile society where considerable autonomy is granted.[3] He describes the familial self on the basis of several important subcategorizations: the first one is "symbiosis-reciprocity," which involves intensely intimate relationships and emotional connectedness and interdependence, in contrast to separation-individuation. In

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[1] Clifford Geertz, "'From the Native's Point of View': On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," in *Cultural Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion*, ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 126.

[2] Alan Roland, *In Search of Self in India and Japan: Toward a Cross-Cultural Psychology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[3] Ibid., 7-9, 223-227.

this symbiosis-reciprocity, outer ego boundaries are highly permeable, while the inner boundary is maintained, which allows for constant empathy and receptivity toward others. Conversely, the individualized self has a strong sense of "I-ness" characterized by self-contained outer ego boundaries with sharp distinctions between the self and others, and between the self and nature.

The second subcategorization involves "narcissistic configurations of we-self regard," a phrase which denotes that the experiential structure of the self is situated around we-ness and that issues of self-esteem are experienced in terms of a we-self; in contrast, "narcissistic structures of self-regard" is a more independent experience of the individualized self. We-self regard is derived from strong identification with the reputation and honor of the family and other groups and with others in hierarchical relationships. It can be experienced in non-verbal mirroring throughout life and in culturally encouraged idealization of elders. Thirdly, the familial self encompasses a "socially contextual ego-ideal"; the ego-ideal for the we-self is likely to be much stronger than the superego, whereas the opposite is true of the individualized self; this ego-ideal is contextual or situational rather than abstract; it is consistent with culturally based principles or norms of the society and with culturally defined reciprocal responsibilities and obligations of different groups and hierarchical relationships.

The above is a good description of the Korean structure of the self, especially in terms of *uri*, and a good representation of the indigenous psychology of Koreans' daily lives. In the *uri* culture, the Korean self can be characterized by its symbiosis-reciprocity, particularly in *jeong*, which is the most important part of the Korean conception of self,

as it binds *uri* members together; and it can be characterized also by permeable outer ego boundaries along with the conserved inner boundaries, particularly in *chemyeon* and *nunchi*. These psychological structures show the relational mode (*jeong*) and the co-existence mode (*chemyeon* and *nunchi*) as specific aspects of the Korean interdependent self, as discussed earlier according to Uichol Kim's argument. We-self regard and the socially contextual ego-ideal are also entailed in these constructs of *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi*. But to get to the heart of the concept of the Korean self, I will investigate indigenous characteristics of the Korean self and their psychological processes in their own terms, drawing on Sang-Chin Choi and Kibum Kim's studies.[4]

Jagi and *Na*

Choi and Kim demonstrate differences between the western and the Korean concept of the self by comparing *self* with *jagi* and *I* with *na*.[5] The western concept of the self denotes *I* and the ontological being intrinsic to *I*; in Kohut's formulations, the self is a psychological system that organizes the subject experience of *I*. Westerners are meant to identify, develop, and organize their own selves, and they are continuously reinforced for discovering their selves. The self is seen as something like an entity that

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[4] Sang-Chin Choi, *한국인 심리학* [Psychology of the Korean People] (Seoul: Choong-Ang University Press, 2000), 121-139; Sang-Chin Choi and Kibum Kim, "A Conceptual Exploration of the Korean Self in Comparison with the Western Self," in *Progress in Asian Social Psychology: Conceptual and Empirical Contributions, vol. III*, ed. K-S Yang, K-K Hwang, P. B. Pedersen, and I. Daibo (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 29-42.

[5] Choi and Kim, 30-33.

can be objectified, observed, and introspected. When this concept of the self is applied to Koreans, they may translate *self* as *jagi* (자기; this literally means one's own body); it is not possible to find a Korean word equivalent to the English term *self*. *Jagi* is usually used as equivalent to *I* in Koreans' daily conversation, yet the extent to which and the contexts in which it is actually used are very limited. For example, when it is used in combination with predicative words that indicate psychological activities such as *jagi*-shaping and *jagi*-finding, it might be supposed that a proper English translation is *self*-shaping or *self*-finding. But Koreans do not say "I am finding my *jagi*," or "I am shaping my *jagi*"; there is no idiomatic expression for identifying or making a self outside a context. "Being oneself" or "selfing"[6] is an exotic concept to Koreans and does not even exist in the Korean language. Therefore, according to the Korean usage of the word *jagi*, the western concept of the self is alien to Koreans, although both terms *self* and *jagi* can be inferred from the meaning of *I*.

Another Korean word translated as *I* in English is *na* (나; I), which can be synonymous with *jagi* but is more frequently used in Korean daily language. *Na* generally indicates what the English term *I* means, but context is crucial in showing the word's relation to the self. According to Choi and Kim's study, the concept of *na* is

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[6] Dan P. McAdams introduces the term *selfing* as the individual process of being her/himself: "to self . . . is to apprehend and appropriate experience as a subject, to grasp phenomenal experience as one's own, as belonging 'to me.' To self, furthermore, is to locate the source of subjective experience as oneself." (Dan P. McAdams, "The Case for Unity in the (Post) Modern Self: A Modest Proposal," in *Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues*, ed. R. D. Ashmore and L. Jussim [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997], 56.)

situated around personality and relationships; Korean descriptions of *na* are more through others' perception than through self-perception, in terms of socially desirable personality traits such as sincerity, truthfulness, emotional stability, and consideration. They suggest, "The Korean *na* has its root in a socially desirable personality that is of service to harmonious social relationships."[7]

Highly valued is a propensity to use *uri* in speech rather than *na*. Koreans frequently use *uri,* as corresponding to the meaning of *we,* instead of *na,* even in situations for which *na* is suitable: *our* school instead of *my* school, and even *our* wife instead of *my* wife. Several reasons can be suggested for this reserved attitude toward *I*; as discussed earlier, Koreans' identity, defined as the fused state of "I-merged-we-ness"[8] on the basis of *jeong*, is inherently embedded in the *uri* culture. Thus, Koreans tend to lack the cognitive power to recognize others as well as themselves as separate, individuated entities, but rather experience them all in oneness and wholeness. They are fused to "the central power of the assumed-we-hood-ness."[9]

This in-between-ness of the Korean self can be apprehended in eastern epistemology. Richard E. Nisbett et al., in discussing the different frames of the individualism/collectivism distinction, claim that East Asians are generally more inclined

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[7] Choi and Kim, 33.

[8] Sang-Chin Choi, "The Nature of Korean Selfhood: A Cultural Psychological Perspective," *The Korean Journal of Social Psychology* 7, no. 2 (1933): 26.

[9] Ibid., 27.

toward holistic ways of thinking, whereas westerners use analytic thought more.[10] Julie Spencer-Rodgers and Kaiping Peng maintain that this East Asian thinking is grounded on naïve, culture-specific dialecticism that emphasizes the dimensions of contradiction, change, and holism.[11] In this dialecticism, reality is seen as fluid and ever-changing, with all phenomena composed of two opposite elements (yin/yang) in contradiction. Moreover, they point to the principle of holism, that "nothing is isolated or independent" and that "the part cannot be understood except in relation to the whole"; all phenomena in the universe are interrelated, since change and contradiction are ever present.[12]

According to Spencer-Rodgers and Peng, this naïve dialecticism influences the East Asian self-concept. The principle of change yields greater fluidity, flexibility, and malleability. The principle of contradiction can be evidenced in inconsistent beliefs about the self and incongruity between attitude and behavior. The principle of holism implies that the individual self is conceptualized in relation to others and as an inseparable part of groups or community as a larger whole.[13] It can indeed be argued that naïve dialectical thinking is prevalent in the Korean cultural system, and its effects on the

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[10] Richard E. Nisbett et al., "Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition," *Psychological Review* 108, no. 2 (2001): 291-310.

[11] Julie Spencer-Rodgers and Kaiping Peng, "The Dialectical Self: Contradiction, Change, and Holism in the East Asian Self-Concept," in *Culture and Social Behavior: The Ontario Symposium, vol. 10*, ed. R. M. Sorrentino, D. Cohen, J. M. Olson, and M. P. Zanna (Mahwah: Lawrence ErlBaum Associates, 2005), 228.

[12] Ibid., 229.

[13] Ibid., 229-230.

concept of the Korean self can be found in many connections. It can be suggested that symbiosis-reciprocity of selfhood and otherness in the *uri* relationship and *jeong* has to do with the notion of holism, and that permeable outer ego boundaries and the conserved inner boundaries in *chemyeon* and *nunchi* have to do with the principle of change. Regarding the principle of contradiction, Koreans' contextual-specific and social self-descriptions can be involved. Incheol Choi and Yimoon Choi's research indicates that Koreans view themselves differently across situations and contexts, and this suggests that the concept of the Korean self is multifaceted and variable; this may be related to Koreans' inconsistent beliefs about the self.[14] Additionally, Koreans' attitudes that are inconsistent with their behavior, attitudes often found in relation to *chemyeon* and *nunchi*, can also represent the dialectical principle of contradiction.

Another reason for Koreans' reserved attitude toward *I* is their pervasive tendency to view individualism as almost identical to egoism. This tendency may have been impacted by Buddhism as well as Confucianism, in both of which it is thought to be selfish and unethical to attach oneself to *I*, and desirable to understand oneself as an interdependent part of the whole, the cosmos. In Korean culture, people are seen as negatively "individualistic" (self-centered) if they emphasize *I* in social interactions. Furthermore, emphasis on the I-ness of oneself is interpreted as social exclusion or rejection of others; "being others" in Korean culture connotes being persons excluded

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[14] Incheol Choi and Yimoon Choi, "Culture and Self-Concept Flexibility," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28, no. 11 (2002): 1509.

from *uri* relations. Under these circumstances, Koreans tend to and are also encouraged to deemphasize and draw little attention to their I-ness. As Choi and Kim maintain, however, it should be noted that a weak tendency to emphasize *I* does not mean that Koreans do not possess self-schema, self-reflection, or self-experience.[15] Koreans do not lack their own self-identity but possess "different" self experiences from the western ones of the I-self.

Relational-Contextual Mind-Self

As the western term *self* cannot exactly translate into Korean, Choi and Kim propose the term *mind* as the Korean concept that is similar in function to *self*[16]: *maeum* (마음; Korean subjective heart, mind). In Korean *uri* relations, *maeum* is the most important medium of interaction, since *uri* members can communicate through their *maeum* on the basis of *jeong* even without verbal expression of it. *Maeum* is closely related to *simjeong* (심정; felt mind, state of mind), which is a compound word consisting of the Sino-Korean *sim*(심; 心; heart) and *jeong* (정; 情; affection). *Simjeong* is the state of identity feeling with the other that occurs in the relationship of *jeong*, and a state of mind in which the other's *maeum* can be fully understood.[17] This state of mind plays a pivotal role in the process of understanding and interpreting each other's *maeum* in *uri*

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[15] Choi and Kim, 31.

[16] Ibid., 33.

[17] Choi, "The Third-Person-Psychology and the First-Person-Psychology: Two Perspectives on Human Relations," 252.

relations; *simjeong* carries *maeum* and is read through *maeum*. Koreans are sensitive to the *maeum* behind behaviors, which is very important for their intersubjective relationships in *uri*. In everyday Korean expressions, *maeum* and *simjeong* are used as exchangeable terms and understood as equivalent to mind.

This *simjeong* interaction of *maeum* is illustrated well in the following example of a fictional argument:

> (Person A has made a request of his friend person B, with which person B has not complied.)
> A: Why didn't you do it? It wouldn't have been a big problem for you, and you could have done it without any great trouble. I'm very disappointed.
> B: Yes, I know your "Shim-Cheong [*simjeong*]," but you also have to take my "Shim-Cheong [*simjeong*]" into consideration. I don't mind helping you at all, and I really made an effort to do so, but I wasn't as easy as you thought.
> (There follows an explanation of the difficulty, after which A accepts the apology of B.)
> A: I understand your "Shim-Cheong [*simjeong*]," but you also have to understand my "Shim-Cheong [*simjeong*]." It was really important for me and apart from you I don't have anyone with whom I can discuss this problem.[18]

As this example shows, the request for or the expectation of the understanding of each other's *simjeong* is frequently stated in normal Korean conversation, which presupposes the assumed we-hood-ness. Emphasizing the subject's *simjeong* is not an emphasis on the individual's cognition but on her/his identity in connection to intersubjective experiences felt in mind or *maeum* in the given relationship. Therefore, it is in the notion of *maeum* or *simjeong* that Korean selfhood as Korean mind can be found.

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[18] Sang-Chin Choi and Chung-Woon Kim, "'Shim-Cheong' Psychology as a Cultural Psychological Approach to Collective Meaning Construction," *Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology* 12, no. 2 (1998): 86.

The term *maeum* is used in the Korean cultural context to cover the whole range of content and function of the mental world of individuals, including intentionality, spirit, and thinking. However, it most frequently indicates consciousness or a state of consciousness involving intentionality in certain contexts, including motivation, emotion, intention, and mood: "hurt mind," "mind in pain," "mind not in good mood," "motivated mind," "to have no mind to do," "lenient mind," "determined mind," and so forth.[19] As Choi and Kim point out, this *mind* for Koreans can be viewed as corresponding to *self* in that "*mind* for Koreans is established over a long period of time and plays a crucial role in determining what behavior is selected and what that selected behavior is oriented toward."[20]

Despite the partial correspondence of *mind* to *self*, an objectifiable, analyzable, observable concept of the self is not the case for *maeum*. Choi and Kim suggest that "Korean *mind* is given the quality of agency or potency and interpreted in the form of existence and state," whereas "western *self* is given the quality of entity and structure."[21] In the concept of the self as an entity, there is a clear boundary between one's self and others' selves; and further, the self is structured like a material framework as a stable and reliable reference to reflective evaluations of behaviors and thoughts. Mind, however,

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[19] Choi and Kim, "Naïve Psychology of Koreans' Interpersonal Mind and Behavior in Close Relationships, 359-360.

[20] Choi and Kim, "A Conceptual Exploration of the Korean Self in Comparison with the Western Self," 34.

[21] Ibid.

lacks such characteristics (embedded in material objects) as a clear boundary between two objects, self-evident existence, and adequacy for objective analyses. Mind is changeable and unstable, and understood in the abstract form of disposition, and it is thus hard to grasp; it is a set of representative and principal dispositions extracted and inferred from behaviors and thoughts. In this vein, the Korean self is "inferential mind-self," in the process of drawing self-portraits, whereas the western self is "referential entity-self," requiring articulation and identification.[22]

In Korea, improving one's own mind up to the socio-culturally idealized level is highly valued and encouraged; Buddhism emphasizes identification with the universal real self as its ideal, which can be achieved by getting rid of selfish mind; Confucianism conceives that self-discipline is designed to sustain and nurture one's given human nature. Thus, it is not important for Koreans to achieve self-actualization, but control over the mind is critical in order to refrain from self-interest or self-seeking. Under the influence of these intellectual traditions, the individual mind is supposed to be congruent with social norms, ideals, and goals. A pervasive belief that persons of maturity should possess a mind consistent with that of public persons leads Koreans to internalize socio-cultural values and ideals as their idealized self. Consequently, self-actualization for Koreans is "social self-actualization or success in life."[23] Therefore, the western type of ontological self involving uniqueness, autonomy, and independence is not much sought

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[22] Ibid., 36.

[23] Ibid., 35.

after; instead, it is more important to keep the mind appropriate to relational and contextual situations. This relational-contextual aspect of the Korean mind-self can be depicted in contrast to the western self as follows:[24]



Westerner's self Korean's self

As the figure shows, the Korean concept of the self is relational and contextual, requiring flexibility and adjustment, whereas the western self represents an individual's existence independent from others and considered constant across relations and situations. This individualistic I-self is embedded in Kohut's schema of the self as an independent center of initiative and agency, though his focus on selfobject functions demonstrates his concern with the interpersonal. Kohut's emphasis on the initiative, spontaneity, and creativity of a cohesive self also corresponds more to an individualistic culture's emphasis; self-cohesion for him is a healthy sense of self, and a lack of self-cohesion, i.e.,

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[24] Ibid., 37.

self-fragmentation, may result in problems or disorders of the self. Under this schema, the self of Koreans, with permeable boundaries, interdependence and shared mind, may easily appear unhealthy. However, whether this is generally true can be evaluated only by existing psychological theories based on the western cultural context; Koreans' experience of a fused unit of mind may well be a healthy part of the self in the Korean cultural context. Kohut's schema, therefore, needs to be broadened to cover the experience of the Korean self.

Korean Self-Selfobject Relationships

Self-selfobject relationships in the Korean culture can be significantly different from the formulations in self psychology. I draw on the work of Roland, who argues for the influence of culture on self-selfobject relationships, comparing the psychology of North Americans with that of Asians in terms of I-self and we-self.[25]

As the Korean self initially develops with less psychological distance between the self and other than does the individualistic I-self, both self-mirroring and idealized selfobject relationships are more intense and pervasive, with more highly empathetic attunement in Korean life than in western life. As Roland indicates about Asian life in general, Koreans live in "very close, long lasting family and group intimacy relationships

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[25] Roland, *Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis*, 101-116.

that depend on enormous interpersonal sensitivity,"[26] especially in the *uri* relationships on the basis of *jeong*. This type of symbiotic relationship can be examined, first of all, in the Korean mother-child relationship starting at the prenatal stage and continuing throughout life.

In traditional Korea, the mother-child relationship starts from *taegyo* (태교; prenatal care), with rigorous guidelines for pregnant women outlining desirable and undesirable attitudes, emotions, and behaviors during pregnancy. These guidelines are based on a belief that a mother's experience during her pregnancy will directly and significantly affect the baby inside her womb; this experience therefore heightens awareness of the unique psychological and biological bonds between the mother and the baby.[27] *Taegyo* creates a strong psychological and emotional bond, *jeong*. Korean parents provide unlimited and constant *jeong* toward their children, and they are closely and intrinsically tied to their children through *jeong*; they identify with their children as themselves, and the children's needs for emotional and existential dependency are satisfied by their parents' *jeong*. This symbiotic self-selfobject tie contrasts with a western type of self-selfobject relationship oriented toward separation or individuation of the child. In Kohut's formulations, a certain degree of separation of mother from child is implied in the process of transmuting internalization, which should occur under

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[26] Ibid., 103.

[27] Kim, *Individualism and Collectivism: A Psychological, Cultural and Ecological Analysis*, 43-44.

conditions of optimal frustration in order for the child to become the major agent of self-regulation. In contrast, highly attuned empathy in Korean self-selfobject relationships can be conveyed through *jeong* and emphasize the fulfillment of dependency needs. In addition, it can often be conveyed without exact verbal articulations, in *simjeong* communication through their shared *maeum*.

Also, self-selfobject relationships for Koreans are based on the idealization and mirroring in *uri* relationships. The Korean self tends to be more attuned to the norms and guidance of elders or seniors in the family or other community in *uri* relations who have superior personal qualities suited to their hierarchical status or social position; grandfathers or fathers can usually be idealized selfobjects (and also mirroring selfobjects) for family members; older siblings for younger siblings, school seniors for juniors, teachers for students, pastors for congregation members, and so forth. Particularly within *uri* relationships, an *uri* group itself, such as *uri* family or clan, *uri* school, or *uri* church, can be an idealized selfobject for the *uri* group members. Thus, the honor and reputation of the family or *uri* group are crucial for Koreans' idealized selfobjects relationships; they impact on the Korean self's idealization according to the status or position of the group to which the members belong. The *uri* group itself also serves a mirroring selfobject function by providing a social role to sustain the members. More specifically, the self-selfobject relationships in *uri* contexts represent a strong tendency toward the twinship or the alterego experience, which may be more a basic selfobject experience to Koreans than either being mirrored or idealizing. When Koreans

recognize a feeling of belonging to *uri*, oneness, sameness, and wholeness with others through *jeong* are experienced.

Last but not least, Korean self-selfobject relationships are reciprocal, which contrasts with the formulations of self psychology. As Roland points out, self psychology rarely acknowledges the need for reciprocal selfobjects, usually emphasizing the need for the selfobject from an individual standpoint, and therefore a psychology of reciprocal self-selfobject relationships is needed.[28] In Korean cultural hierarchical self-selfobject relationships, however, reciprocal expectations are built; superiors, elders, or seniors can be mirroring and idealized selfobjects for subordinates by being nurturant, supportive, and caring, and by being idealized; subordinates, in turn, can be also selfobjects for superiors by being obedient, receptive, dependent, and asking. In the mother-child relationship, mothers can clearly become selfobjects for the child by mirroring or being idealized; but they can also be mirrored, and so their self-esteem can in turn be enhanced by the child's being healthily nurtured. This kind of reciprocal self-selfobject relationship, i.e., reciprocal expectations of being caring and being dependent, can frequently be found within *uri* relations. If these expectations for highly empathetic selfobjects are not met in *uri* relationships, Koreans often feel regretful, offended, or even betrayed, and these feelings arise more often among closer *uri* members.

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[28] Roland, *Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis: The Asian and North American Experience*, 107.

Self-Consciousness in Shame

Self as the Object

The role of the self in self-consciousness in shame needs to be reconsidered in a Korean context. As discussed in Chapter One, Morrison's modification of Kohut's framework concerning shame, which accommodates failure of the self to live up to its ideals, implies a comparison of the self to some kind of standard. The concept of shame as a self-conscious emotion can therefore be considered in terms of the role of the self not only as the agent but also as the object; shame is an experience of the self (as the object) by the self (as the agent). Helen B. Lewis writes about the functions of the self in shame and views the internalized other as the source, and the self as the object, of scorn, contempt, and ridicule.[29] This view of shame is explained well by Tangney et al.: "In shame, the self is both agent and object of observation and disapproval, as shortcomings of the defective self are exposed before an internalized observing 'other.'"[30] The notion of the self as the object has to do with self-awareness, which entails an individual's self-evaluation based on any standards that are relevant to what they s/he wants to be. Ernest R. Hilgard's metaphor of mirrors in a barber shop is adequate to represent this notion of self-awareness. In his analogy, one can view oneself as between the two mirrors of a

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[29] Helen B. Lewis, 87-88.

[30] June P. Tangney et al., "Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70, no. 6 (1996): 1257.

barber shop, with each image viewing each other one; the self takes a look at itself taking a look at itself.[31]

However, this notion of the self as the object implies a role of the other, and hence one can posit self-consciousness within the social context; self-consciousness can be connected with interpersonal interaction, communication, and the appraisal of others. This applies to shame; one sees oneself through the eyes of others in the shame experience. Tangney writes that shame is clearly linked to interpersonal relationships and involves a sense of exposure (feeling observed by others) and a concern with others' opinions.[32] Thus, according to Tangney et al., it is a necessarily public experience: "Shame is an affective reaction that follows public exposure (and disapproval) of some impropriety or shortcoming."[33] Shame, in this sense, can be seen as the premier emotion in social interaction. Shame can arise when there is a threat to social bonds, and, at the same time, shame can occur in seeing ourselves from the point of view of others.

The developmental researcher Michael Lewis also writes that the self becomes the object as well as the subject of shame; the self is exposed to itself, and hence the self is capable of viewing itself. He presents a cognitive attribution model of shame on the basis

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[31] Ernest R. Hilgard, "Human Motives and the Concept of the Self," *American Psychologist* 4, no. 9 (1949): 377.

[32] June P. Tangney, "Shame and Guilt in Interpersonal Relationships," in *Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride*, ed. June P. Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 118.

[33] Tangney et al., 1256.

of the proposition that shame is the consequence of the self's failure in regard to a standard, goal, or rule. He suggests, first, that shame arises from one's evaluation of the negative evaluation of others in terms of the self's failure to adhere to standards, rules, or goals; and secondly, that shame results from the self's evaluation of that failure, a global evaluation of the self in relation to the self: "The uniqueness of shame . . . is its relationship to a self that can reflect on itself."[34]

This self-reflective nature of consciousness is cogently presented in the social psychologist Charles H. Cooley's classical analogy of the "looking glass," in which the presence of others in the mirror is added, in contrast to the analogy of Hilgard.[35] For Cooley, others are the looking glass for oneself, and the self is reflected through others. This looking-glass self is employed in three steps: first, we picture our appearance to ourselves; secondly, we use the reactions of others to interpret how others visualize us; thirdly, we develop our own concept of the self on the basis of our interpretations. Thus, the looking-glass self is the reflection of ourselves in the eyes of others. Cooley theorizes that our self is identified through an interaction between how we see ourselves and how others see us.

It may be, as self-psychologists argue, that an external observer is not necessarily involved in the shame experience of the self, but the notion of comparison between the

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[34] Michael Lewis, 33-34, 42.

[35] Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), 179-185.

self and some standard that consists of an internalized other presupposes the self's perception of another's (real or potential) perspective on itself. In other words, although shame may not need an actual observing audience to witness one's shortcomings, one can imagine how one's self would appear to others; s/he can feel as if others will appraise her/him. Therefore, I propose that shame as a self-conscious emotion can be conceptualized by a more inclusive perspective, as an experience of the self by the self through one's awareness of the eyes of others, regardless of whether the presence of an audience is real or imagined.

An extension of Kohut's theories of shame with regard to the ideal self provides such an inclusive understanding of self-consciousness. This expanded conceptualization is particularly strongly related to the notion of shame in the Korean experience.

Objective Self-Awareness

The notion of the self as the object facilitates a perspective on self-consciousness from an angle of objective self-awareness. Michael Lewis views shame as a self-conscious emotion, states of which come about through self-reflection. He focuses on issues of self-awareness in explaining that different modes of consciousness are evoked by different situations: when I know that I know and when I know but I do not know that I know. According to him, although we use the term consciousness in the sense of knowing in both situations, the former situation is usually referred to as conscious, and the latter is usually referred to as unconscious; he notes that particularly in the former

situation, we have objective self-awareness.[36] He distinguishes subjective and objective self-awareness:

> [U]sing the term *objective self-awareness* to mean the organism's act of turning attention toward the self, to what the self knows, to what plans or desires the organism has; I use the term *subjective self-awareness* to mean processes and systems that know about the world but to which we do not or cannot pay attention.[37]

He contrasts objective awareness with subjective awareness on the basis of the directional nature of consciousness: we have objective self-awareness when we are the objects of the consciousness that is directed inward; and we have subjective self-awareness when we are the subjects of the consciousness that is directed toward external objects. In this sense, the term objective self-awareness for him refers to a unique feature of consciousness.

Lewis indicates that these different modes of awareness have to do with different aspects of selves, and defines three modes of self in knowing: sensorimotor affective ways of knowing, representational knowledge, and abstract knowledge.[38] The period from birth to eight months is the period dominated by sensorimotor affective knowledge of the self involving reflexes, behavior patterns or ways of knowing learned from interactions with the child's social and object environment. At about eight or nine months, representational self-knowledge begins to emerge. In this period, the child has

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[36] Michael Lewis, 41.

[37] Ibid., 42.

[38] Ibid., 50-54.

an elaborate representational knowledge of her/his own actions, those of others, an ability to differentiate, and knowledge about interaction. However, this self-knowledge is representational, and as such, is subjective: the child has "an *I* but not yet a *me*."[39] The objective self emerges only with abstract knowledge, from about the second half of the second year on. Abstraction allows the child to categorize both objects and people, to think about both past and future events, and to develop the further abstraction of cognitive abilities.

By the end of the second year, all three modes of self-knowledge have developed. Lewis writes about his empirical studies, "Our results indicate that true objective self-awareness as defined by self-referential behavior does not emerge until the second half of the second year of life."[40] The adult forms of the three modes of self-knowledge are categorized into the subjective (the reflexive and the representational knowledge) and objective self (the abstract knowledge): "consciousness, the me, the objective self as opposed to unconsciousness, the I, the subjective self."[41] The adult subjective self includes the reflexive and the representational levels of subjective self-awareness, which allow for bodily self-regulation and learned behavior; adult objective self-awareness corresponds to abstract self-knowledge, which allows for the consciousness of ourselves.

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[39] Ibid., 53.

[40] Ibid., 46-47.

[41] Ibid., 37.

Concerning the capacity for self-reflection, according to Lewis, self-conscious emotions require a self both to produce the emotional state (the subjective self) and to experience it (the objective self); hence emotional states operate at the level of subjective self-awareness, and experiences of the states correspond to objective self-awareness. Therefore, subjective self-awareness has to do with shame states, and objective self-awareness has to do with experiences of shame states. In other words, to experience one's feeling state of shame, objective self-awareness is required; to be in a state of shame one must compare one's action against some standard, either one's own or others'.[42]

Francis J. Broucek, a contemporary self-psychologist, also explores the relationship between shame and objective self-awareness.[43] By objective self-awareness, he means "an awareness of oneself as an object of observation for others and, through the mirroring of the observing others, taking oneself as an object of reflection (objectifying oneself)."[44] As mentioned above, Lewis believes that shame is not possible before the development of objective self-awareness at around eighteen to twenty-four months. Whereas Lewis argues that the development of objective self-awareness is essential for

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[42] Ibid., 29.

[43] Francis J. Broucek, *Shame and the Self* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), 37-49; "Shame and Its Relationship to Early Narcissistic Developments," *The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 63, no. 4 (1982): 369-378.

[44] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 37.

the emergence of shame, Broucek views objective self-awareness as a development that brings about certain very important changes in the nature of shame experience.

Broucek believes that primitive shame experiences may occur in a state of primary communion prior to the development of objective self-awareness. However, these early shame experiences do not involve ideation about the self, because primary communion is not an "object" relationship yet; there is a sense of self but no objective self, and a sense of the other but no objective other. He proposes the term primary communion instead of the term primary narcissism, as he rejects the concept of primary narcissism that presupposes an infant's supposed lack of self and other differentiation. According to him, the term primary communion presupposes "an infant fundamentally related to a primary caretaking other by way of an innate understanding of the affective code and the utilization of that understanding to bring about mutual affective attunement with the caretaker."[45] He develops the notion of the indwelling self as the earliest sense of self with regard to the earliest manifestations of shame-related experience: "[T]he earliest sense of self grows out of the experience of efficacy, fulfilled intentionality, and the joy and excitement attendant on that experience,"[46] all of which emerge in the context of intersubjectivity or shared consciousness. This sense of self is the basis of our identification with our body, which is immediate and preconceptual; "it is what provides

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[45] Francis J. Broucek, "Shame: Early Developmental Issues," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1997), 54-55.

[46] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 27.

us with the experience of 'indwelling,' the experience of the 'lived body' rather than the body as part of the object world."[47] Broucek views shame as part of the earliest interpersonal experience, and states that shame reflects failed interpersonal efficacy, which is primarily related to the still-face gaze of the other (the caregiver); "The still-face gaze is the prototype of what will become the objectifying gaze, the gaze that denies or ignores one as a subject or self and recognizes only one's surface behavior or material aspects."[48]

The end of the primary communion comes with the emergence of objective self-awareness. At the time of acquisition of objective self-awareness, our experience of ourselves becomes split into the immediate or private, and the public mode that is the state of objective self-awareness; here lies Broucek's notion of primary dissociation in contrast to primary communion:

> Following the acquisition of objective self-awareness the experience of the self becomes inexorably split into the immediate I and the mediated, objectified me, and one's experience of the other is split into the other who relates himself to me in such a way as to maintain my subjective sense lf self (and to whom I feel emotionally connected) and the other who objectifies me and becomes a potential source of shame (and whom I, in turn, objectify and disconnect from).[49]

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[47] Ibid., 37.

[48] Ibid., 36.

[49] Ibid., 41.

These dissociative experiences involve a sense of self that is disturbed by a sudden feeling of being objectified and being placed outside, which leads to a loss of the subjective, connected, and indwelling sense of self; and shame may follow.

After the acquisition of objective self-awareness, the child experiences being looked at either in a way that supports her/his affective initiatives, excitement, and indwelling sense of self, or in a way that objectifies her/him and activates shame. Kohut's concept of adequate mirroring entails the former way of being looked at. Broucek and Kohut both talk about early shame experiences prior to objective self-awareness; they both emphasize the empathetic responsiveness of the caregiver. Nevertheless, Kohut does not focus on the latter type of objectification with regard to shame.

As Broucek indicates, with the advent of objective self-awareness, the loss of primary communion gives rise to a sense of fault or imperfection in both self and other. To repair that fault, the child attempts to establish a compensatory sense of self by forming the ideal self. Broucek states:

> Objective self-awareness has a derealizing and a depersonalizing function in that it turns the child away from what he immediately is, in order to direct him toward what he sees and imagines himself to be, or *could be*. The individual is thus transformed from an effective, centered being to a being entranced by an imaginal self or an ideal self.[50]

Objectifying her/himself, the child acquires the ability to compare her/himself with others, and shame thus has to do not only with experiencing oneself being treated as an object in

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[50] Ibid., 42.

an interpersonal mode, but also with presenting oneself as an object in a subjective mode. Therefore, the formation of an image of the self and an ideal of the self are both made possible by objective self-awareness. However, Broucek notes that one tries to view oneself through the mirroring gaze of the significant others, since it is largely impossible to directly view oneself as an object: the "confiscation" of the child's immediate self by the self visible in the mirror prefigures the confiscation by the others who look at the child.[51]

According to Broucek, Kohut's idealized selfobject is needed to rescue the child from shame after objective self-awareness and to strengthen her/him in pursuit of her/his ideal self.[52] It seems to me that this view of Broucek represents his close agreement with Morrison's modified version of Kohutian frameworks of shame. Morrison views shame as a response to the failure of a compensatory self structure, to a defect in the ideal self, and to the failure of the selfobject to provide adequate mirroring responsiveness for the grandiose self; he finally argues that the ideal or goal of the self is reunion and merger with the idealized object, or autonomy, independence, and perfection. Broucek also presents shame as a response to selfobject failure, i.e., to maternal failure in providing adequate mirroring, and concludes that the longing for the reestablishment of primary communion is crucial for the shame experience that follows upon the acquisition of objective self-awareness.

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[51] Ibid.

[52] Broucek, "Shame: Early Developmental Issues, 56.

However, the concept of the ideal self of Morrison is somewhat different from that of Broucek. Morrison's idea of shame involving the ideal self is likely to have to do with the argument that objective self-awareness is required in experiencing shame, in that shame for him is related to self-critical judgments, as in Lewis's position. In effect, Morrison conceives, concerning Kohut's frameworks, that mirroring selfobject failure leads to flooding exhibitionism and grandiosity, and that the selfobject itself is needed again, which elicits shame, and therefore he relates this selfobject failure and this need for the selfobject to failure to attain the ideal self. Although Morrison integrates Kohut's conceptualization of shame into his notion of the ideal self, he is certainly concerned with the ideal self in terms of a reflection of the subjective sense of the self on the basis of a certain sense of comparison. On the other hand, Broucek offers the term "idealized self"[53] and talks about this self's exaggerated compensatory elaborations of a fantastic and grandiose nature in the formation of the ideal self. That is, though idealization always involves the formation of the ideal self, the child who experiences shame after the acquisition of objective self-awareness can have a stronger need to aggrandize himself in the form of the idealized self. Broucek notes that Kohut labels this idealized self as the grandiose self, and states his own preference for the term idealized self over grandiose self. The idealized self for Broucek is thus an imaginative or fantastic self-image oriented toward the ideal self, whereas the ideal self for Morrison presupposes some values or standards upon which one judges oneself.

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[53] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 58-59.

Therefore, Morrison's ideal self that elicits shame requires objective self-awareness, since shame generation depends on comparing the actual self with ideals, which requires looking at the self as an object. Even if Morrison's notion is that the ideal self predates objective self-awareness, he is not concerned with the shame experience prior to objective self-awareness in the way that Kohut and Broucek are. In this connection, I focus on Broucek's notion of the dynamics between the shame experience prior and posterior to objective self-awareness. My position is closer to his, which broadens Kohut's frameworks of the grandiose self and Morrison's modification of the ideal self as well, in apt ways for application to Korean shame experiences. It is a notion that allows for the Korean adult experience of shame after objective self-awareness, an experience that depends on objectifying the Korean self and forming the idealized self or the grandiose self largely according to social standards, ideals, or goals indigenous to the Korean *uri* culture, to which the functions both of Korean mirroring and idealized selfobjects are important.

Intersubjectivity

As seen in Broucek's discussion, the child's perception of a sense of inefficacy in the earliest experience of shame is due to a failure to maintain or extend an interpersonal engagement with a caregiver. In later development, the child is aware of her/himself as an object of reflection and objectifies her/himself through mirroring by others, and has a stronger need to reestablish the primary communion, a need which triggers shame. The

intercession of others is thus necessary to the shame experience. Silvan S. Tomkins, whose work influences interpersonal affect theories, illustrates the interpersonal sources of shame:

> If I wish to look at you but you do not wish me to, I may feel ashamed. If I wish you to look at me but you do not, I may feel ashamed. If I wish to look at you and at the same time wish that you look at me, I can be ashamed. . . . If I would like to share my ideas, aspirations or my values with you but you do not reciprocate, I am ashamed. If I wish to talk and you wish to talk at the same time, I can become ashamed.[54]

Tomkins indicates that shame is triggered in interpersonal situations, and this view is elaborated by Donald L. Nathanson. Nathanson, a psychiatrist, focuses on the interpersonal manifestations of shame and argues for the social aspects of shame. He suggests that shame, as a product of interpersonal interaction with significant others, plays an important role in the dynamics of intimate relationships.[55]

Gershen Kaufman, also drawing on Tomkins' work, maintains that shame originates interpersonally and occurs primarily in significant relationships. He emphasizes the "interpersonal bridge"[56] as a form of emotional bond which ties people together in our basic need for relationship with others. According to him, when this

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[54] Silvan S. Tomkins, *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, vol. 2: The Negative Affects* (New York: Springer, 1963), 192.

[55] Donald L. Nathanson, "Shaming Systems in Couples, Families, and Institutions," in *The Many Faces of Shame*, ed. Donald L. Nathanson (New York: The Guilford Press, 1987), 246-270.

[56] Gershen Kaufman, *Shame: The Powering of Caring* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1985), 12-13.

interpersonal bridge with the other is broken, i.e., when our expectations of the other are unexpectedly exposed as wrong, shame is generated. Later, this shame experience can be internalized and attached to the self without an inducing interpersonal event. The self internalizes the shame experience through imagery or scenes that have become imprinted with affect. This internalization is based on the following interpersonal needs: need for relationship, need for touching/holding, need for identification, need for differentiation, need to nurture, need for affirmation, and need for power.[57] This internalization of shame is a major source of one's identity. Shame thus greatly affects the dynamics of interpersonal relations and particularly threatens interpersonal relationships as emotional bonds in society as well as one's self identity. People who experience shame tend to hide and mask their selves from others, and this can result in becoming isolated. Lynd considers shame as an isolating, alienating, incommunicable experience; "Loss of trust, exposure, failure, the feeling of homelessness—these experiences of shame—become still more unbearable if they lead to the feeling that there is no home for anyone, anywhere."[58]

The significance of interpersonal relationships in the experience of shame is embedded in Kohut's self psychology; his focus on self-selfobject relationships implies a dimension of connectedness with significant others that provides continuing affirmation

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[57] Gershen Kaufman, *The Psychology of Shame: Theory and Treatment of Shame-Based Syndromes* (New York: Springer, 1989), 58-84.

[58] Lynd, 56, 67.

of the self. However, in terms of self-selfobject relationships, Kohut is primarily concerned with the self's supraordinate position and posits selfobjects in the service of the self as used for the fulfillment of the self's needs. This means that Kohut emphasizes "the 'self' side of the equation of the self's interaction with its objects."[59] Andrew P. Morrison and Robert D. Stolorow also write, "Kohut focused too exclusively on the development of self-experience and less than adequately attended to the interactive other."[60]

Concerning the shame experience, Kohut focuses only on unmirrored grandiosity of the self, in which a narcissistic emphasis is situated on the self as the performer rather than on its object. He states, "The object is important only insofar as it is invited to participate in the child's narcissistic pleasure and thus to confirm it."[61] Kohut disregards the role of the ideal self in his explanation of shame, though he notes the importance of selfobject failure in the generation of shame, which leads to the revival of the idealized parent imago in his compensatory structure of the self. In effect, the idealized selfobject represents the self's affiliation with objects, but Kohut does not focus on the idealized other regarding shame. It seems thus that something is omitted in his formulations with

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[59] Morrison, "The Eye Turned Inward: Shame and the Self," 274.

[60] Andrew P. Morrison and Robert D. Stolorow, "Shame, Narcissism, and Intersubjectivity," in *The Widening Scope of Shame*, ed. Melvin R. Lansky and Andrew P. Morrison (Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1997), 76.

[61] Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism, 438-439.

regard to intersubjective implications of interpersonal relationships in the experience of shame.

Broucek, who conceives of an idealized self reflecting self-consciousness or awareness of its need for the other, i.e., selfobject need, takes account of the intersubjective nature of shame. Broucek states, "Shame is clearly elicited by an intersubjective disjunction based on absent complementarity or reciprocity that results in a sense of rejected desire and rejected affectivity, failed intentionality, and inefficacy;"[62] this intersubjective disjunction is the rupture of the interpersonal bridge, to use Kaufman's term. It results in the child's acquiring a painful sense of being viewed as an object rather than as a subject. According to Broucek, before the acquisition of objective self-awareness, if we are provided with completely adequate parental responsiveness, we exist as "pure subjects."[63] After we are aware of ourselves as objects for others, we don't want to be regarded as mere objects but at least as "SUBJECT-objects," which means we wish that "the 'subject' aspect of our dual nature for the other will be primary in the other's response to us."[64] The parent as mirror should thus reflect the child as both subject and object and emphasize the subject aspect of her/him. This allows us to affirm that "we exist together with the other in a field of shared affective experience and overlapping consciousness rather than as disjunctive consciousness, surveying each other

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[62] Broucek, "Shame: Early Developmental Issues," 48.

[63] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 46.

[64] Ibid.

as mere objects."[65] In short, shame can be experienced when one tries to relate to the other as a subject but feels objectified.

In terms of the intersubjective implications of self-other relationships, George E. Atwood and Robert D. Stolorow shed light on a new psychoanalytic paradigm, "the interaction of two subjectivities—that of the patient [child] and the analyst [caretakers]."[66] They call it intersubjectivity theory, and it is focused on the interplay between the different subjective worlds of the observer and the observed. They view psychoanalysis as a science of the intersubjective, in which the observer is also the observed. They propose that "the developing organization of the child's experience must be seen as a property of the *child-caregiver system of mutual regulation*."[67]

Similar concerns can be found in Kohut's concept of the self-selfobject relationship, in his discussion of the introspective-empathetic mode of observation.[68] He claims that Freud's psychoanalytic position is that of the classical nineteenth-century scientist, emphasizing the clear distinction between observer and observed, i.e., the ideal of scientific objectivity. This basic stance greatly influenced the formation of the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis; that is, "the leading theoretical ideal of analysis

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[65] Ibid.

[66] George E. Atwood and Robert D. Stolorow, *Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology* (Hillsdale: The Analytic Press, 1984), 41.

[67] Stolorow and Atwood, 23.

[68] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 66-68.

was total objectivity, i.e., the removal of the influence of the observer on the observed"; classical analysis sees "the analyst only as the observer and the analysand only as the field that the observer-analyst surveys."[69] Kohut demonstrates that a more broadly based scientific objectivity—an objectivity that includes introspective-empathetic observation—is required and provided in self psychology; the analyst's influence is acknowledged and examined as "an intrinsically significant human presence,"[70] and the observer and the observed are considered as a unit.

According to Atwood and Stolorow, though Kohut contributes to the recognition that self-experience is always achieved through the felt responsiveness of others within an intersubjective context, their concept of an intersubjective field differs from Kohut's concept of a self-selfobject relationship. Stolorow articulates two key differences:[71] first, an intersubjective field is a system of "reciprocal mutual influence." Not only does the patient (child) turn to the analyst (caregivers) for selfobject functions, but the analyst also turns to the patient for selfobject functions. Therefore, an intersubjective field has to do with "a self-selfobject/selfobject-self relationship" rather than a self-selfobject relationship. Secondly, the subjective world is a construct that covers "more experiential territory than self," and thus the intersubjective field is broader and more inclusive than

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[69] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 37.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Robert D. Stolorow, "Subjectivity and Self Psychology," in *The Intersubjective Perspective*, ed. Stolorow, Robert D., George E. Atwood, and Bernard Brandchaft (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1994), 37-38.

the self-selfobject relationship. In other words, the intersubjective field includes experiential dimensions other than the selfobject dimension; it is broad enough to encompass all the diversity and multidimensionality of the patient's and analyst's experiences simply through a selfobject transference bond. The larger system is involved in the reciprocal mutual interaction between the patient's transference and the analyst's transference.

Although his contribution is important, Kohut discusses parents simply in terms of their failure to provide selfobject functions for the child, and not in terms of their use of the child as their own selfobject; he does not focus on experiences of selfobjects as others, but on the primacy of experiences of the self. As noted earlier, Kohut's failure to pay sufficient attention to the roles of others may be in consequence of his reluctance to consider his framework a relational theory, and of his preference for preserving the link to the intrapsychic theory. Atwood and Stolorow suggest that a solution can be found in the intersubjective perspective. Psychoanalysis for them is not conceived as a science of the intrapsychic within one isolated "mental apparatus," and not as a social science investigating the "behavioral facts," but as a science of the intersubjective.[72] In this view, the gap between the intrapsychic and interpersonal realms is closed, as "the concept of an intersubjective system brings to focus *both* the individual's world of inner experience *and*

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[72] Atwood and Stolorow, 41.

its embeddedness with other such worlds in a continual flow of reciprocal mutual influence."[73]

To sum up, an interpersonal dimension of self-selfobject relationships within the intersubjective field implies a self-selfobject/selfobject-self relationship, which can cover both a psychology of the intrapsychic and an interpersonal or social psychology. This perspective of intersubjectivity provides a broad understanding of shame, into which I propose that Kohut's formulations should expand. Shame related to objectifications and thus to the idealized self, in Broucek's language, represents an interpersonal relationship between the self and others. This shame can be engaged with in intersubjective realms, in which both the self and the selfobject inform each other's experience regarding the selfobject needs not only of the self but also of the selfobject.

This intersubjective view of shame entails a challenge to "the myth of the isolated individual mind," a central myth that pervades contemporary western culture and has been built into the foundational assumptions of psychoanalysis.[74] According to Stolorow and Atwood, the myth has to do with "a mode of being in which the individual exists separately from the world of physical nature and also from engagement with others."[75] In contrast to the myth, a relational mode of being is largely embedded in Korean culture, and hence the intersubjective view of shame is apt for a cultural interpretation of the

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[73] Stolorow and Atwood, 18.

[74] Ibid., 7.

[75] Ibid.

Korean shame experience, in which the reciprocal-mutual interaction between the self and selfobject plays a crucial role, especially in terms of the structure of *uri.*

Shame of the Korean Self in the *Uri* Culture

Shame Experiences in *Chemyeon*

As the Korean self as relational-contextual mind entails the existence of self-consciousness in *uri* contexts, the Korean experience of shame involves objective self-awareness in interpersonal relationships, in which the self becomes both subject and object. In shame, Koreans are concerned about the opinions of others or social values or ideals in the blurred boundaries of the self. That is, shame may occur in a negative evaluation of oneself, which can be elicited by others, or can be anticipatory through thinking of what others are thinking or might think about oneself, largely according to social standards and ideals. Shame for Koreans thus plays an important role in the dynamics of intimate relationships, especially of *uri* relationships, because it may result from the failure of the self in its obligations and responsibilities to significant others, and often results in exclusion. Such shame experiences can be illustrated particularly well in the Korean structure of *chemyeon*; loss of *chemyeon* is inherent in shame. The most common word in Korean for shame is *changpi* (창피); but two specific types of shame involving *chemyeon* are *yeomchi* (염치; self-shamed *chemyeon*) and *suchi* (수치; other-

inflicted *chemyeon*). *Suchi* is more prevalent than *yeomchi* in contemporary Korean society.[76]

David Y. Ho et al. explain self and face as reciprocal constructs in shame as a self-conscious emotion in the extended sense I suggested earlier, and this has a cogent connection to the Korean concept of face, *chemyeon*. According to them, face may first be defined in terms of aspects of one's self that a person reveals to others, including one's self-perceptions; face is a self presented to others. Secondly, face may be defined in terms of one's social image as publicly perceived by others, including their perceptions of one's self-perception; face is a self seen through the eyes of others. In both concepts of face, the consciously reciprocal social presence of others is implied; it is assumed that one's own presence is taken into consideration by others, and also that others assume that their presence is considered by oneself. Thus, all actors are both percipient subjects and objects of perception, and face mirrors the self both as subject and object.[77] In this vein, the Korean conception of *chemyeon* reveals an extended sense of self-consciousness, i.e., objective self-awareness, in shame.

When we lose *chemyeon*, we feel ashamed; we feel shame when we experience a discrepancy between our idealized self or grandiose self and our objective self-awareness, a discrepancy between our belief or expectation of the self and the objective reality

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[76] Choi and Kim, "Chemyeon—Social Face in Korean Culture," 33.

[77] David Yau-Fai Ho, Wai Fu, and S. M. Ng, "Guilt, Shame and Embarrassment: Revelations of Face and Self," *Culture and Psychology* 10, no. 1 (2004): 79-82.

through the eyes of others. In order to avoid shame, saving *chemyeon* is important for Koreans, and what others might think of them and how they fit in are of great concern for them. *Chemyeon* causes Koreans to conform modestly in many situations and to agree publicly for the purposes of social harmony. Social status or position associated with *chemyeon* is an important factor in social interactions, which variously shapes the experience of shame. The higher the status or position of the shamed person within the group, the more intensely the person is likely to feel shame, as the person of higher social status or position is given higher *chemyeon*. This differentiation is demonstrated appropriately in Ha's formulations of *injeong* (인정; acceptance or approval) and *gongyeong* (공경; respect or honor).[78] It seems to me that such differentiation can be manifest in mutual selfobject experiences; in a person of inferior status, *injeong* from a superior in status as a selfobject function may be the desired response, whereas in a person of superior status, *gongyeong* from an inferior in status as a selfobject function may be the desired response. Shame can be felt when enough *gongyeong* is not given to someone superior in status, and when enough *injeong* is not given to someone inferior in status; yet there are many variations of experience that depend on one's status or position.

For Koreans, ego boundaries between the self and others are more permeable in shame; we can feel ashamed of others, particularly others with whom we share a close emotional connection in *uri* relations, in which a more intense feeling of shame can be

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[78] Ha, 1117.

experienced. Typically, an individual's shame is also her or his family's shame or an *uri* group's shame. Sungeun Yang illustrates this:

> . . . a middle aged man who had been drinking at night left the family's Seoul apartment at dawn to go for a walk. Soon after, his wife and daughter were awakened by a call from the building security guard that their husband/father had fallen down in his drunkenness and was injured. They hurried downstairs, helped him up, and brought him back to the apartment. Long afterwards, in their shame, they continued to avoid the security guard.[79]

In this example, the shame was not only that of the man but also of the other members of his family, even though the members did not deserve shame in regard to the security guard, since they had nothing directly to do with the man's becoming drunk.

When an individual is shamed and loses *chemyeon*, the entire family or group loses respect and status in the community. A child's failing is typically seen as a failing of her/his parents, and the parents feel ashamed; in this mode of shame, mutual self-selfobject relationships can be formulated between the individual and the family or other group to which s/he belongs. For instance, when an adolescent fails a college entrance exam, s/he feels individual shame at failing and also feels shame over "the shame caused parents and other family member by the failure,"[80] which leads to loss of *chemyeon* of the family. The parents feel shame that the child failed and are also ashamed of the child's being ashamed, i.e., loss of *chemyeon* of the child becomes loss of *chemyeon* of the family. Conversely, the family or other group's loss of *chemyeon* can impact on shame

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[79] Sungeun Yang and Paul C. Rosenblatt, "Shame in Korean Families," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 32, no.3 (2001): 363-364.

[80] Ibid., 366.

of individuals who belong to it. The family's past or present low status, either socially or economically, tends to be considered as negatively affecting one's own merits; it can elicit shame in an individual. Traditionally, a good family means one with no shameful record: "no divorce, no mental illness, no failures in getting into college, no children in the family who are disabled, no extramarital affairs,"[81] and so forth. A shameful history is likely to be hidden to protect one's own and the family's *chemyeon*, yet the necessity of keeping secrets also leads to shame.

Therefore, Koreans try to maintain not only their own *chemyeon* but also others' *chemyeon* by keeping harmonious relationships and by minimizing conflicts to avoid the shame experience. This Korean system of shame regarding *chemyeon* contributes to the development and activation of *nunchi* behavior. Because of *chemyeon*, persons in interaction are likely "to confront subtle conditions where the overt expressions of one's inner mind and emotionalities are better to be avoided."[82] Under these conditions, *nunchi* provides implicit, indirect, and often non-verbal modes of interpersonal and situational interaction. *Nunchi* interactions function for protecting *chemyeon*, which leads to protection against shame. This occurs through reading inner mind and emotionality in the dynamics of *simjeong*—an interaction between *maeum* and *maeum* through *jeong*—in order to make interactions smooth. *Nunchi* can, in short, play an important role in

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[81] Ibid.

[82] Choi, "The Nature of Korean Selfhood: A Cultural Psychological Perspective," 28.

facilitating mutual selfobject functions in terms of the Korean experience of shame in the structure of *chemyeon*.

Korean Self-Esteem in Shame

Kohut identifies a propensity for shame as central to problems with self-esteem. According to Lynd, "Shame is defined as a wound to one's self-esteem, a painful feeling or sense of degradation excited by the consciousness of having done something unworthy of one's previous idea of one's own excellence."[83] Shame is thus a source of low self-esteem. Self-esteem has been defined as a set of positive evaluations of the self, which has been considered as a relatively unified psychological structure. In recent years, however, researchers have shown that this traditional notion of self-esteem may be differently formulated according to the concept of the self across cultures. According to Steven J. Heine, motivations for self-evaluation can appear in different forms according to the cultural roots of the self; e.g., self-enhancing for the North American self and self-critical for the East Asian self.[84] Research on cross-cultural differences in the evaluation of the self along these lines has also been conducted by Kitayama et al.;[85] similarly,

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[83] Lynd, 23-24.

[84] Steven J. Heine, "Self as Cultural Product: An Examination of East Asian and North American Selves," *Journal of Personality* 69, no. 6 (2001): 897-900.

[85] Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel R. Markus, Hisaya Matsumoto, and Vinai Norasakkunkit, "Individual and Collective Processes in the Construction of the Self: Self-

Jungsik Kim et al. claim that the independent self and the interdependent self would differently evaluate the self through self-enhancement and self-effacement, respectively.[86]

The North American independent self as a relatively bounded and autonomous entity can be characterized as finding, affirming and positively expressing internal attributes of the self that is viewed as the source of action and the center of control. This positive view of the self "confirms for the individual that they posses the requisite characteristics to fulfill the cultural tasks of being a self-sufficient and autonomous being."[87] The majority of North Americans view themselves in highly positive terms, and evaluate themselves not by adopting an objective or unbiased view but by taking credit for their successes and explaining away their failures. This orientation of the independent self is referred to as self-enhancement, i.e., "attending, elaborating, and emphasizing positively valenced aspects of the self."[88] Self-enhancement bias constitutes the idea of the self as a good and well-functioning agent; self-esteem is taken as an indicator of psychological health in the North American culture.

Enhancement in the United States and Self-Criticism in Japan," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, no. 6 (1997): 1245-1267.

[86] Jungsik Kim, Min-Sun Kim, Karadeen Y. Kam, and Ho-Chang Shin, "Influence of Self-Construals on the Perception of Different Self-Presentation Styles in Korea," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 6, no. 2 (2003): 89-101.

[87] Heine, 897.

[88] Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel R. Markus, Hisaya Matsumoto, and Vinai Norasakkunkit, 1260.

In contrast, in the East Asian culture of the interdependent self, individuals are connected to each other via relationships, in which their roles are inherent and based on social standards. These relationships constitute a hierarchy in which the individual has fixed cultural obligations and duties towards others in the group in fitting into and adjusting to the relationships. It is therefore important for the interdependent self to engage in self-criticism, identifying the shortcomings, deficits, or problems that prevent it from fulfilling its roles according to the standards of excellence shared in the relationships. People in East Asian culture tend to evaluate themselves less positively than those in North American culture, and their evaluations of the self are more affected by failures than by successes.[89] For example, they explain their successes in terms of great effort or luck and explain their failures in terms of a lack of abilities or talents; even if they evaluate themselves positively, they are more likely to do so in the form of negation: "I am not that selfish." This orientation is termed self-criticism, i.e., "attending, elaborating, and emphasizing negatively valenced aspects of the self";[90] similarly, Kim et al. identify this tendency as self-effacement.[91]

However, as Kim et al. claim, the fact that the self-criticism or self-effacement bias pervades in the East Asian culture does not mean that people in the East Asian culture are not interested in maintaining a positive self-image; the difference is that "self-

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[89] Heine, 899.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Jungsik Kim, Min-Sun Kim, Karadeen Y. Kam, and Ho-Chang Shin, 90.

effacement may serve to construct the positive self as effectively as self-enhancement does for North Americans."[92] In other words, people in both cultures need to maintain a positive self-image, but this need can be represented in different forms. Therefore, the notion of self-esteem defined as the total of positive evaluations of the self is congenial to the North American independent self. It cannot be suggested that interdependent individuals do not have self-esteem or that their tendency toward self-criticism is indicative of low self-esteem, but that the western kind of self-esteem may be less important among interdependent individuals. It is clear that people in East Asian culture can achieve self-esteem by effacing the self, whereas people in the North American culture do so by enhancing the self: "What the esteemed inner attributes of the self are to independent selves may be what the esteemed social relationships are to interdependent selves."[93]

The Korean interdependent self as relational-contextual mind in the *uri* culture involves evaluation of the self through self-criticism or self-effacement. Koreans are encouraged to be aware of a consensual standard of excellence in an *uri* context that promotes harmony and unity in their relationships, and are encouraged to build critical appraisal of the self and self-discipline on the basis of this standard; this affirms their identity and self-esteem, which depend on their conceptualization of the self as embedded in the honor and reputation of the family or the *uri* group. Koreans' concern for

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[92] Ibid.

[93] Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel R. Markus, and Hisaya Matsumoto, 454.

maintaining their self-esteem in social relationships shows particularly in their great concern for maintaining their *chemyeon*. Self-esteem for Koreans can be called "we-self-esteem," as Roland suggests in relation to the concept of the we-self.[94] The we-self is a notion through which many aspects of Korean self-esteem can be accounted for.

Korean self-esteem as we-self-esteem is related to Korean self-selfobject relationships: highly attuned empathetic self-selfobject relationships are reciprocal in *uri* relationships, and particularly in Korean cultural hierarchical relationships. In reciprocal expectations of being caring and being dependent, the self-esteem of each party is greatly tied up with that of the other; superiors are expected to be attuned to the needs of subordinates, offering care and support and allowing themselves to be idealized, which enables subordinates to maintain their own self-esteem; in turn, subordinates are empathically attuned to the needs of superiors, showing dependency, respect, and receptivity, which enhances the self-esteem of superiors. The Korean attitude of deference, receptivity and politeness to superiors may frequently be misinterpreted by westerners as passivity, ineffectualness or manipulation,[95] but this interpretation does not take into account the mutual Korean self-selfobject relationships. Maintaining each

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[94] Roland, *Cultural Pluralism and Psychoanalysis: The Asian and North American Experience*, 103.

[95] Alan Roland, "The Influence of Culture on the Self and Selfobject Relationships: An Asian-North American Comparison," *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 6, no. 4 (1996): 473-474.

other's self-esteem in these mutual Korean self-selfobject relationships entails maintaining each other's *chemyeon* in those relationships.

Positive Aspects of Shame of the Korean Self

Shame has traditionally been considered a negative and undesirable experience that should be avoided or eliminated. As Morrison states, since shame can be experienced as a painful feeling of inferiority, inadequacy, and incompetence, it frequently causes one to hide;[96] people are reluctant to reveal their feelings of shame and try to remove them from their experiences. One might even suggest that "there has been a cultural conspiracy to avoid discussing shame."[97] This suggestion implies that cultural norms, beliefs and attitude about shame may impact the conceptualization of shame as an experience that should be avoided. In western society, shame is believed to be evidence of weakness, inferiority, and low status, and western social norms require people to ignore or reject it. In western culture, shame can be the least socially acceptable emotion, a situation which leads people to repress and deny their feelings of shame.[98] Consequently, shame seems to be an emotion little discussed in western clinical work,

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[96] Morrison, *Shame: The Underside of Narcissism*, 1-2.

[97] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 4.

[98] Ha, 1115.

representing a "culture-wide avoidance of pertinent discussion."[99] Even if discussed in psychoanalytic studies of shame, it is considered an abnormal experience that negatively influences one's psychological health, and the focus is on how to remove or eliminate it.

However, some authors, notably Carl D. Schneider and Broucek, recognize the limitations of such conceptualizations and provide a broader view of shame. Broucek explores the problem of shamelessness in modern society and challenges the disrespect for the sense of shame that leads to "the culturally disastrous notion that freedom from shame (including the sense of shame) is the mark of the healthy personality."[100] He notes the failure to recognize healthy functions of shame. In particular, Schneider makes a useful argument for the positive function of a proper and mature sense of shame and proclaims shame as a mark of humanity.[101]

Schneider distinguishes between "discretion-shame" (the sense of shame) and "disgrace-shame" (being ashamed), pointing out that shame is thought of primarily in terms of disgrace in society, with no attention being given to its significant discretionary function.[102] According to him, being ashamed is an affect, a painful experience of the disintegration of one's world, a feeling of being exposed, humiliated, despised, rejected

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[99] Donald L. Nathanson, "Preface," in *The Many Faces of Shame*, ed. Donald L. Nathanson (New York: The Guilford Press, 1987), vii-viii.

[100] Broucek, *Shame and the Self*, 135.

[101] Carl D. Schneider, *Shame, Exposure, and Privacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 4.

[102] Ibid., 18-28.

and dishonored; whereas a sense of shame involves something more than emotion. He explains discretion-shame as an ethic of modesty:

> The connection between shame and virtue is even more closely established when we note that cultures regularly give shamelessness a negative connotation. The concept of *shamelessness* suggests that the lack of a proper sense of shame is a moral deficiency and that the possession of a sense of shame is a moral obligation.[103]

Shame is not "just a feeling," but "reflects an order of things"; discretion-shame not only reflects, but also sustains, personal and social ordering of the world.[104]

Shame in Korean society is not, to a western degree, a negative feeling. It is often valued and encouraged in the traditional Korean emphasis on mature personhood essential for Korean selfhood, which is closely related to the system of *chemyeon* based on Confucian ethical principles. As discussed earlier, *chemyeon* is an important part of Korean personhood, representing a significant value both in the individual and social development of a person. It is expected to be well maintained or protected by self-cultivation through relationships in the group or other community that is considered an extension of the self. Losing one's *chemyeon* means failing to achieve and maintain one's harmonious relationships among members of the community. A person without this self-cultivation is considered a shameless person, a person who has no *yeomchi* or ignores *suchi*, a person who has no sense of shame or of being ashamed. Consequently, for Koreans, having a sense of shame or feeling shame is not always inappropriate but

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[103] Ibid., 19.

[104] Ibid., 20.

can be virtuous, and shame as both disgrace and discretion can be considered essential for mature humanness. This dimension of shame for Koreans is echoed well by David W. Augsburger's statement:

> Shame . . . is an intrinsic and essentially healthful part of our humanness, both in its discretion and in the pain of disgrace. We can learn from its sensitivity to delicate human relationships and profit from its alertness to failure anticipated or failures suffered. Shame is not the undeniable sign of immaturity or inferiority in the person or the group. It is a communally oriented, socially responsive concern for relationship, a caring for harmony, a hope for trust maintained or restored.[105]

Therefore, shame for Koreans represents a natural and necessary feature of human existence, which can protect the individual as well as the group or community in relationships. As James Fowler notes, a proper sense of shame contributes to maintaining and strengthening the bonds between persons and the communities of which they are a part. This role of shame serves "as the custodian of a self worthy of respected membership in the group or groups that are essential to one's self-esteem and self-worth."[106] To be able to feel shame or have the sense of shame, in particular with regard to *chemyeon*, is to be able to reflect on one's humanity through self-cultivation in relationships, which can develop mature Korean selfhood and self-esteem.

In sum, the essential structure of shame involving *chemyeon* depends on how an individual perceives others in relationships; Koreans tend to focus more on the thoughts

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[105] David W. Augsburger, *Pastoral Counseling Across Cultures* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986), 118.

[106] James Fowler, *Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 104-105.

of others during the experience of shame. The experience can be characterized according to values of social conformity, interdependence, and hierarchical relationships in highly empathically attuned and reciprocal self-selfobject relationships. The shame experience in *chemyeon* has to do with Korean self-esteem that corresponds to what is called we-self-esteem or interdependent self-esteem; it is the evaluative aspect of the concept of the Korean we-self. Maintaining Korean self-esteem—maintaining not only one's own self-esteem but also others' self-esteem or the group's esteem—also involves mutual self-selfojbect relationships. In this regard, shame for Koreans can positively function to protect and sustain both the integrity of an individual and the social ordering.

However, although Korean shame involving *chemyeon* in the *uri* culture can encourage self-cultivation through reciprocal self-selfobject relationships, which is a positive aspect of the Confucian tradition, it may lead to more-disgraceful shame experiences, since the system of *chemyeon* is also strongly associated with negative features of the patriarchal, hierarchal, and authoritative social system. In such a social system, Koreans' attempts to maintain their own *chemyeon* by shaming others or to maintain others' *chemyeon* within the *uri* relations by shaming others in outside groups can cause significantly disgraceful shame both to the shamer and the shamed. In this situation, Korean self-esteem on both sides can actually be low, but it might not be exposed as low because *chemyeon* is protected, in which case a deviant self-selfobject relationship might be engaged in, and positive self-cultivation can hardly be expected, though mutual self-selfobject relationships are ongoing. This situation is strongly related

to *chemyeon* in modern Korean society that has to do with social forces of competition and the pressure for achievement.

CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARD AN APPROACH OF PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY TO THE KOREAN SHAME EXPERIENCE

This chapter explores effective strategies for healing the Korean experience of shame in care and counseling, according to a pastoral-psychological method suited to the Korean cultural context. In search of pastoral implications for shame indigenous to Korean culture, I will employ frameworks corresponding to those I have utilized in previous chapters to analyze the Korean shame experience. Since I have used expanded versions of Kohut's formulations, I will explore a pastoral-psychological approach through Donald Capps' pastoral perspective informed by Kohut's formulations, but I will further broaden Capps' frameworks to include Korean psychological constructs.

Kohut's formulations concerning shame in his self psychology, with emphasis on the selfobject's empathetic resonance in self-selfobject relationships, have greatly influenced understanding of the potential care and healing of shame in the fields of pastoral care, counseling, and theology. Although he does not apply his self psychology to pastoral work directly, his research contributes to the enhancement of it, particularly in his focus on the interrelational nature of being human and healing through empathetic attunement. James H. Olthuis, a philosophical theologian as well as a psychotherapist, suggests, "Self psychology's concern with the relational-communal nature of the human

self and the restoration of the fragmented human self fits well with faith's concern with love, community, wholeness and healing of brokenness."[1] Robert L. Randall, a pastoral psychotherapist, discusses self psychology's applicability to religion in the spirit of empathetic concern for human beings.[2]

In line with these pastoral psychologists' appreciation of Kohut's insights, Capps, drawing on the work of Kohut, is concerned with a pastoral theology for healing shame with regard to the narcissistic self. Capps emphasizes the concept of positive mirroring as the antidote for shame, and demonstrates its pastoral significance. His argument for a theology of shame and his suggested pastoral methodology for healing shame, in interdisciplinary dialogue with Kohut's self psychology, are very useful for and congruent with my project of integrating the psychological examination of shame into appropriate pastoral care models. However, Capps' work has limitations for the Korean *uri* culture, just as Kohut's psychology does, since Capps' pastoral analysis and response builds strongly on self psychology with reference to western culture. I will suggest distinctive pastoral implications for responding adequately to the shame experience in the *uri* culture.

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[1] James H. Olthuis, "The Covenanting Metaphor of the Christian Faith and the Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut," *Studies in Religion* 18, no. 3 (1989): 315.

[2] Robert L. Randall, "The Legacy of Kohut for Religion and Psychology," *Journal of Religion and Health* 23, no. 2 (1984): 106.

Donald Capps' Pastoral Approach to Shame

In his book, *The Depleted Self*, Donald Capps discusses a pastoral theology of shame, arguing for the need to center on "the problematics of the self." According to him, if a theology functions as therapeutic wisdom, it needs to address "the therapeutics of the self."[3] He posits his concern for the self in the context of the western experience of a sense of wrongfulness according to the dynamics of shame rather than guilt: a concern for a new type of individual or self that is labeled narcissist, and is more shame-based than guilt-based. He points out that contemporary theology has failed to understand and has often denounced the narcissistic self that has been recognized by psychologists and psychotherapists.[4] Therefore, he tries to make the psychological acknowledgment of the narcissistic self more accessible to the theological field by relying on Kohut's view of narcissism, in which the narcissistic personality is called the "Tragic Man" in contrast to the "Guilty Man,"[5] a term that refers to Freud's oedipal personality. Whereas the guilty self feels guilt because of unacceptable desires for parental objects, the tragic self is beset by a feeling of inner emptiness and a feeling of deep shame, which result from inadequate parental mirroring or no mirroring.[6]

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[3] Donald Capps, *The Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 100.

[4] Ibid., 3-4.

[5] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 206-207, 224-225.

[6] Capps, 33.

Capps notes that "the narcissistic personality neither claims to be without guilt nor is beyond committing certain wrongful acts that can hurt and damage other persons."[7] Since the traditional psychoanalytic view has closely been related to the Christian view of guilt, Christian theology has developed theologies of guilt, and the issue of shame has been dealt with in superficial ways, usually by engaging in moralistic condemnation of the narcissistic personality. However, narcissists, though they seem to be self-loving and self-satisfied, have a deep sense of shame, feeling empty and depleted. Capps believes that this new, tragic narcissistic self that is shame-based is more likely to be the dominant type in today's western society, and maintains that a different paradigm from the traditional paradigms both of psychotherapy and theology is needed, which resists moralistic condemnation and views narcissism more sympathetically.[8]

In this regard, Capps argues for a psychology and theology of shame instead of a psychology and theology of guilt, and looks at the place of sin in a shame-based theology. According to him, sin has usually been discussed in terms of guilt and guilt feelings but needs to be related to the experience of shame; this is a reformulation that calls for a fundamental change in our theological paradigm.[9] He indicates that theologians have paid little attention to the shame experience and viewed it as a social or cultural issue and not as an important issue for an understanding of Christian faith and life. A theology of

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[7] Ibid., 34.

[8] Ibid., 36.

[9] Ibid., 3.

shame, for him, can be a source of therapeutic wisdom to those who are estranged from self, from the world, and from God by shame. It illuminates the problematics of the self, such as the divided self, the defensive self, and the depleted self. Capps conceives that "by focusing on shame we become aware of problematics of the self, and thus of fundamental truths about ourselves, that a theology of guilt may well ignore or obscure."[10]

In terms of the implications for pastoral care and counseling, Capps suggests that positive mirroring is important. Following Kohut's work, Capps emphasizes the lifelong need for adequate mirroring in the forming of the self, asserting that the absence of mirroring leads to self-depletion; "without mirroring, there can be no self."[11] Capps therefore maintains that pastors and parishioners need to give more attention to the mirroring that responds to the depleted self's need to be affirmed through others' acceptance and approval. Positive mirroring enables people to affirm both the self and the other, which leads to mutual self-trust. Through positive mirroring of one another, the bond of shame is replaced by the bond of love established between individuals. Accordingly, the mutual mirroring of selves and mutual beholding respond to the hunger of the depleted self, a hunger for loving and being loved. As Capps asserts, "God is the one who authorizes and underwrites our mutual beholdings."[12] He views mirroring as the

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[10] Ibid., 84-100.

[11] Ibid., 31.

[12] Ibid., 162-166.

very heart of the Christian gospel, arguing that "it is the form and means by which the depleted self experiences divine grace, the benediction of God."[13] Therefore, as he concludes, we can be assured that we are affirmed by God and that we are God's beloved through reliable mirroring that occurs between pastor and parishioners, which is rooted in the mirroring activity of God.[14]

In *Life Cycle Theory and Pastoral Care*, Capps considers the practical approaches for dealing with shame from a pastoral care perspective, from an understanding of shame that is theologically and pastorally responsible. He suggests that as we try to dissociate ourselves from the pain of self-exposure in shame, the shame experience should not be avoided but instead allowed to be exposed again and again to God, since "the core of Christian identity is to be 'exposed before God.'"[15] He proposes "self-disclosive prayer" as a way of exposing the shame experience to God. According to Capps, prayer allows us to probe our shame experiences and to expose them to God's view; by creating intimate conversation with God, we can get insight into God's own understanding of our shameful experiences, and we can thus embrace our shameful self and restore our sense of being "at home" in the world.[16]

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[13] Ibid., 64.

[14] Ibid., 68.

[15] Donald Capps, *Life Cycle Theory and Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 89.

[16] Ibid., 93.

Capps also proposes another way of exposing the shame experience, through confession to the pastor. In his later book, *Agents of Hope*, he readdresses his proposal of confession as particularly valuable for those who are shame-bound; here he follows Michael Lewis' suggestion.[17] According to Lewis, confession allows "the self as the 'confessee' to look upon the self as the object rather than the subject." The act of confessing "allows one to dissipate some of the intensity of the devalued self through regaining value by a positive action."[18] Lewis thus argues for the positive role that confession can play in the restoration of the shame-bound self. In this vein, Capps believes that pastors can be more effective in the informal and occasional role of "confessor," which is a part of the pastor's agency of hope that enables us to dissipate our shame.[19] Capps identifies the pastor's role as personal comforter and emphasizes its importance as her/his pastoral response to the shame experience. As he asserts, the pastor should be concerned more about the importance of shame to Christian identity and be prepared to hear the shameful self's confession as a matter of shame and not of guilt; in this the pastor can disregard the official "theology" of guilt. The pastor can encourage the shameful individual to reveal the story of her/his experience of shame and explore together its possible meaning from God's perspective, so that s/he can recognize that her/his shameful self is exposed not only to the pastor but also to God. Capps points out,

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[17] Michael Lewis, 131-137.

[18] Ibid., 132.

[19] Donald Capps, *Agents of Hope: A Pastoral Psychology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 135.

"For the ultimate comfort is not release from pain, but the conviction that noting can separate us from the love of God."[20]

Capps' pastoral approach to shame, though significant for dealing with the narcissistic self in the modern Christian world, is based mainly on the North American context and does not consider cultural differences in practical responses to shame, although he expresses his concern for the social and cultural factors involved in shame. Consequently, a new proposal for a culturally more inclusive pastoral-psychological approach to shame needs to be made.

In fact, the recognition of different interpretations of the nature of the self in different socio-cultural dynamics has recently increased concern in the United States for the international dimensions of contemporary pastoral care, counseling, and theology, including theory, method, training, and practices, especially regarding non-western contexts. This change represents a radical challenge to western models of pastoral care and counseling and a significant difference for the practice and conceptual foundations of care.[21] Emmanuel Y. Lartey describes this movement cogently, suggesting three categories that characterize developments in pastoral care and counseling during the past

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[20] Capps, *Life Cycle Theory and Pastoral Care*, 94-98.

[21] Nancy J. Ramsay, "A Time of Ferment and Redefinition," in *Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms*, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 1, 23.

two decades: globalization, internationalization, and indigenization.[22] Globalization describes an uncritical exportation or importation of western theory and practice into different cultures and contexts. Globalization occurs when the theories and practices of the United States and Western Europe are encouraged as dominant approaches, standards, and models in a non-western context. Globalization has certainly been beneficial in some respects, but a great deal of ambivalence exists concerning culture and identity in the processes of globalization in non-western contexts.

Internationalization is the process premised upon an increasing recognition that more contextually appropriate theories and practices are required according to differences in various cultures. In this process, an attempt is made "to facilitate the development of creative and/or integrative approaches relevant to the local contexts by placing Western theories and practices alongside non-Western, local ones."[23] Although such an attempt to relate American understandings to non-western ones in an interactive dialogue allows for an equal position for voices from different contexts in decision-making and practice, such dialogue is premised upon theories and practices of pastoral care and counseling developed in the West, especially in the United States, which is assumed as normative.

Finally, indigenization is emerging in the form of truly non-western theoretical and practical frameworks for pastoral theology, care, and counseling, which emphasize

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[22] Emmanuel Y. Lartey, "Globalization, Internationalization, and Indigenization of Pastoral Care and Counseling," in *Pastoral Care and Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms*, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004), 87-92.

[23] Ibid., 89.

their dependency upon the local cultures and challenge dominant western assumptions. Models and practices developed in the West are reevaluated and modified, and models and practices indigenous to non-western contexts are employed. According to Lartey, there is a progression, in general, from globalization through internationalization toward indigenization, yet not always in a completely linear manner everywhere. He suggests that "internationalization is now more frequently an accurate descriptor of theory and practice in non-Western settings with indigenization emerging as a factor."[24]

In this vein, my position is to argue for pastoral-psychological theories and practices that move toward indigenization through internationalization. This position reflects the similar schema that I have employed in exploring a psychology of the Korean shame experience: an integrated methodology of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology. Using such a schema, I will articulate the pastoral implications for the Korean shame experience with regard to *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi* in the *uri* culture.

Pastoral Implications

Church in *Uri* as a Korean Pastoral Selfobject Milieu

Capps' concept of positive mirroring focuses on self-affirmation of the autonomous self. He maintains that the self-affirmation the depleted self needs is

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[24] Ramsay, 24.

experienced by positive mirroring and that a way "to get at this 'transformation' of the individual into a depleted self is to focus on the major theme of individualism—personal autonomy."[25] Also, his approach to a pastoral healing relationship through positive mirroring is largely individualistic, between the individual pastor and the individual parishioner; and largely one-sided, from the pastor to the parishioner. This model of individualistic pastoral care is not likely to be fully applicable and effective in the Korean Christian community, where the self is relational and contextual and the self and others are mutually influenced in relationships. Therefore, I posit the selfobject function of positive mirroring (and also the adequate idealizing and twinship selfobject functions) in the church as a whole, which serves as a Korean pastoral selfobject milieu in the response to shame.

As I have mentioned earlier concerning Korean self-selfobject relationships, the family or the *uri* group itself serves a selfojbect function; the Korean church as an *uri* community can provide a selfobject function. This kind of self-selfobject relationship implies that not only a person but also a group can function as a selfobject for a member of the group or for the group as a whole. As Kohut's own conceptualization of selfobjects was initially elaborated as diagnostic concern for narcissistic individuals, the concept of selfobject as a group did not have a great deal to do with his work. Yet Kohut was concerned about a selfobject milieu that helps the maintenance of the healthy self in later adult life: "a selfobject milieu composed of his family, his friends, his work situation,

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[25] Capps, *The Depleted Self*, 129.

and, last but not least, the cultural resources of the group to which he belongs."[26] Among these selfobject milieus, he refers to the cultural resources of the group as cultural selfobjects, and he sees that culture can function as a selfobject.[27] This view of Kohut is echoed by his collaborator Wolf: "To the extent that the environment provides selfobject experiences, one may speak of a selfobject ambience consisting of a net of selfobject relationships."[28] But Kohut did not sufficiently develop the concept of cultural selfobjects or selfobject as a group with regard to cross-cultural issues. Consequently, Capps' pastoral work relying on Kohut's formulations does not focus on positive mirroring as a cultural or group selfobject function.

The following illustration that Wolf uses to elaborate the concept of self-sefobject relationships may provide a good explanation of how a group can function as a selfobject:

> Imagine a speaker in front of a group of respected colleagues. As he stands there, he feels pretty good, but slightly apprehensive. How will they receive what he has to say? He tells them what he has on his mind and they listen, more or less attentively. That makes him feel that he is being heard and responded to. As a result, he feels good, more sure of himself. In other words, his self-esteem is enhanced. And, perhaps, the audience will think that this fellow has it "all together."[29]

While he is making his presentation, his self needs certain sustaining psychological responses from the audience as a selfobject, and the audience as a group responds

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[26] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 71.

[27] Ibid., 203.

[28] Wolf, *Treating the Self*, 15.

[29] Ibid., 26.

collectively to the speaker. The notion of the audience as a unit in this vignette is closely related to that of the group self from Kohut's self-psychological perspective. Kohut introduces the concept of the group self as "the existence of a certain psychological configuration with regard to the group."[30] The group self for him is analogous to the individual self. It can be the sum total of the individual experiences of the self, having a set of commonly shared ambitions and ideals collectively. However, Kohut's conceptualization of such a group self is based on his interest in historical process: "The task is to apply psychoanalytic knowledge to the investigation of group psychology with the specific aim of making a contribution to the explanation of historical events, of the course—or, expressed more courageously, the process—of history."[31] The concept is thus not precisely defined and is laid out mainly in his examples of nationalism.

Kohut's concept of the group self provides a basic tool for examining the concept of selfobject as a group in analogy to his self psychology of individuals. However, his conceptualization of the group self entails a premise of a group as a collective set of individuals in the individualistic western sense, which is critically different from the notion of *uri* as discussed earlier. The Korean church as an *uri* group is an aggregate bonded by *jeong* and not a simple collection of individuals or a representation of multiple

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[30] Heinz Kohut, "Creativeness, Charisma, Group Psychology: Reflections on the Self-Analysis of Freud (1976)," in *Self Psychology and the Humanities: Reflections on a New Psychoanalytic Approach*, ed. Charles B. Strozier (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 206.

[31] Ibid., 205.

ones. Accordingly, I apply the notion of the selfobject as a group in a sense modified from Kohut's conceptualization, and this notion implies some pastoral strategies that fit into the Korean cultural context.

In the Korean *uri* culture, not only the pastor but also the member(s) of the church and the church itself can function as selfobjects either of mirroring, idealizing, or twinship; there can also be reciprocity of their selfobject functions. That is, the pastor can serve a selfobject function for the member(s) of the church or the church as a whole, and the selfobject needs of the pastor can also be met by the member(s) of the church or the church as a whole. In the same vein, the member(s) of the church can serve a selfobject function for other members of the church or the church as a whole, and the church itself can function as a selfobject for the member(s) of the church, and vice versa. For instance, when the pastor (or a member) functions as a mirroring selfobject by providing approval and acceptance for the member(s) in the *uri* church, not only is the pastor's (or a member's) selfobject function served for the member(s)'(s) self but also the pastor's (or a member's) selfobject need is responded to by the member(s)'(s) sense of being respected and supported. Also, the *uri* church as a whole can be a mirroring or idealizing selfobject for the member(s) of the church by maintaining its honor and good reputation in society, and the member(s) in turn can serve a mirroring or idealizing selfobject function for the church by feeling sustained and protected in the *uri* church. The member(s) or the *uri* church as a whole can also mutually function as a twinship selfobject for the member(s) of the church or the church itself by providing a sense of belongingness, sameness, or togetherness.

In this Korean selfobject milieu, the restoration and healing of the shameful, depleted self can be facilitated by the interactive and mutual selfobejct functions in strong *uri* relationships. The Korean Christian identity is closely related to the *uri* of the church and of fellow parishioners. The Korean church is the most significant *uri* context for Korean Christians, and the *uri* context where they create relationships with *uri* members through *jeong* underlies selfobject functions in the Korean church. An individual who is ashamed can feel supported, protected, and maintained in integrity solely through her/his sense of *uri*-ness with member(s) of her/his church and the church as a whole; the sense of *uri*-ness itself can serve mirroring, idealizing, and twinship selfobject functions for the individual.

This concept of the *uri* church reflects a concept of the church family, a form of extended family to Koreans, who have a strong feeling of *uri* within the family, with blurry boundaries of the self and the family members in mutual interactional relationships. The healing relationships formed in this *uri* church thus play a crucial role in selfobject functions for Korean Christians. Selfobject functions in the Korean church are often characterized by reciprocal expectations and mutual responsibilities in the Korean cultural hierarchical system. These selfobject functions can be more effectively provided to the Korean shameful self on condition that the pastoral authoritative role of caregivers in the hierarchical structure of the Korean church is not played. Through these mutual selfobject functions, not only the individual who suffers from shame but also her/his

church as a whole reciprocally respond to shame. This is a strategy of care for "persons-in-context," in which "the community itself is the locus and ecology of care."[32]

Capps emphasizes a relationship with God with a focus on divine mirroring, through which the depleted self experiences God's grace. God thus functions as the ultimate mirroring selfobject by unconditionally accepting us, and we affirm that this acceptance is granted by God's grace. Therefore, in this relationship with God as the ultimate mirroring selfobject, we can gain freedom from the painful experiences of shame and be healed from such shame by God's grace. Yet the self-selfobject relationship between God and individuals that Capps proposes is likely to be one-sided; God provides selfobject functions for us, and we use God as our selfobject; God grants us divine grace, and we receive it. This idea of relationship with God reflects the concept of God as a separate divine other, a concept that is influenced by the individualistic western concept of the self. The self-selfobject relationship between God and individuals achieved through grace is thus based on each other's autonomy and independence.

In contrast, the Korean concept of grace, *eunhye* (은혜; gracious favor), represents a different relationship with God, which is inextricably relational and contextual. The term *eunhye* can correspond to the English term grace, but it is generally used in contexts in which a person feels indebted to someone, most often to parents. Korean people traditionally believe that they have received the gift of life and nurture from their parents, which is considered the most fundamental *eunhye* of all, "as vast and boundless as

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[32] Lartey, 108.

Heaven." The concept of *eunhye* is founded on the Korean tradition of filial piety, in which people feel their responsibility and obligation to repay a debt of gratitude owed to parents' *eunhye*, though it may not possible for this *eunhye* to be adequately repaid.[33] The concept of *eunhye* implies mutual obligation in the Korean cultural hierarchical system: parents or persons of superior status graciously grant *eunhye* to persons of inferior status, and the recipients of this *eunhye* try to gratefully and willingly return it and respond to it. In this vein, God's grace for Koreans not only should be given but also can be repaid.

The relationship with God that Koreans have in grace therefore presupposes mutual self-selfobject relationships between God and individuals. God fulfills our mirroring, idealizing, and twinship selfobject needs by supporting and protecting us and by providing us with a sense of belongingness and togetherness. As we experience God as a selfobject through divine grace, we feel our Christian responsibility before God's grace. In the matrix of self-selfobject, God is experienced as the one whom we are part of, and accordingly, God may experience us as part of God; God as our selfobject wants us to function as a selfobject for others just as our selfobjects do for us; as we need our selfobjects, we need to be selfobjects for others. We should not just experience God's role as selfobject as a function of our need, but we also should function as selfobjects; being selfobjects for others can be a way to repay God's grace. In terms of the shame

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[33] Michael C. Kalton, "Korean Ideas and Values," *Philip Jaisohn Memorial Paper* 7 (1979): 11-12.

experience, our depleted and broken self is healed and restored by affirming that God accepts us and by being empowered in God's grace; our self that becomes dissociated from shame can in turn serve as a selfobject for other selves. This mutual self-selfobject relationship between God and us can be experienced through mutual self-selfobject relationships with others as healing relationships in the healing community. Such mutual healing relationships are embedded in *uri* relations in the *uri* church. Therefore, the Korean church can be a pastoral selfobject milieu that conveys God's grace to the shameful self.

In this regard, a pastoral caregiver may be someone other than a pastor or another designated church leader. As Ramsay argues, "Care is a ministry of the church or faith community rather than solely a clerical responsibility."[34] Although a pastor has taken a primary role as a selfobject for church members, everyone can be and is responsible for being a selfobject for others. I propose that the meaning of the term "pastoral" needs to be broadened, and John Patton offers excellent wording: "The modifier, 'pastoral,' is a general reference to the church's care for persons through one of her representatives rather than a reference to the services offered by the administrator of a parish."[35] Therefore, as a pastoral selfobject milieu, the Korean church needs to develop a lay

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[34] Ramsay, 11.

[35] John Patton, *Pastoral Counseling: A Ministry of the Church* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1983), 16.

caring and counseling program to make every member aware of being a selfobject for others and to provide appropriate mutual pastoral care.

Empathy involving *Jeong* as a Basic Source of Caring and Healing in *Simjeong* Discourses

It is basically through empathy, for Kohut, that selfobjects function adequately. Yet Capps does not focus much on empathy, pointing out that Kohut's empathy is a weak and inadequate word to describe the mirroring responses of selfobjects, and that the concept of empathy as "'feeling with' the patient or client" had already been widely promoted "by Carl Rogers and the client-centered school of psychotherapy."[36] However, as Homer Ashby argues, empathy for Kohut is "more than our ability to 'feel with' another person"[37]; Kohut and Rogers develop two contrasting definitions of empathy and use the concept of empathy in different ways and for different purposes, though both of them agree on and emphasize the crucial role of empathy in the healing process.[38]

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[36] Capps, *The Depleted Self*, 67.

[37] Homer U. Ashby, Jr., "Kohut's Contribution to Pastoral Care," *Journal of Supervision and Training in Ministry* 5 (1982): 153.

[38] For a discussion of the concept of empathy of Kohut and Rogers, See Edwin Kahn, "Heinz Kohut and Carl Rogers: A timely Comparison," *American Psychologist* 40, no. 8 (1985): 893-904; Edwin Kahn, "Carl Rogers and Heinz Kohut: On the importance of valuing the 'Self'," in *Self Psychology: Comparisons and Contrasts*, ed. D. W. Detrick and S. P. Detrick (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1989), 213-228; Edwin Kahn, "Carl Rogers and Heinz Kohut: Toward a constructive collaboration," *Psychotherapy* 26, no. 4 (1989): 555-563; Edwin Kahn and Arnold W. Rachman, "Carl Rogers and Heinz Kohut: A Historical Perspective," *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 17, no. 2 (2000): 294-312; and Geoff

Kohut's concept of empathy is worth considering, since it has important implications for pastoral work, but it is still in need of revision in order to be applied to the Korean cultural context, particularly with regard to the structure of *jeong*.

Kohut emphasizes the function of empathy throughout his work, as the basic methodology of his theory and practice. He views empathy as the extension of introspection, i.e., as vicarious introspection, which is an essential constituent of psychoanalytic observation; he notes that "only a phenomenon that we can attempt to observe by introspection or by empathy with another's introspection may be called psychological."[39] Using empathy as vicarious introspection, for Kohut, means that the analyst tries to understand and learn the patient's experience from the patient's point of view. The analyst tries to fit himself into the patient's experience and meaning instead of trying to make the patient fit into the analyst's thought and knowledge. Kohut views empathy as "the mode by which one gathers psychological data about other people and, when they say what they think or feel, imagines their inner experience even though it is not open to direct observation."[40] According to him, the aim of the analyst is "exhaustive empathic comprehension," which requires the ability to use the empathetic capacity for

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Goodman, "Feeling Our Way into Empathy: Carl Rogers, Heinz Kohut, and Jesus," *Journal of Religion and Health* 30, no. 3 (1991): 191-205.

[39] Heinz Kohut, "Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis: An Examination of the Relationship Between Mode of Observation and Theory (1959)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 1, ed. P. Ornstein (New York: International Universities, 1978), 208.

[40] Kohut, "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism," 450.

prolonged periods. Observational practices such as "evenly suspended attention" and "avoidance of note taking" serve the purpose of achieving understanding rather than the wish to cure and help.[41] Kohut defines empathy as the following:

> The best definition of empathy—the analogue to my terse scientific definition of empathy as 'vicarious introspection'—is that it is the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person. It is our lifelong ability to experience what another person experiences, though usually, and appropriately, to an attenuated degree.[42]

What Kohut illustrates in the above definition, in his earlier study, is the meaning and role of empathy in the phase of understanding, which is the first phase of analysis. In his later study, he adds explaining and interpreting as the second phase of analysis. He posits two cognitive processes: empathetic understanding, or observations via introspection and empathy, and theoretical explanation, or the fitting in of the observed-understood data into an experience-distant theoretical context. These processes must cooperate with each other through "abstract reasoning," "the results of empathic observation," "guiding empathic observation" and "being guided by it."[43] The move from understanding to explaining, i.e., a move from confirming that the analyst knows what the patient feels and thinks to giving interpretations concerning the nature and meaning of what the patient feels and thinks, is a move from a lower form of empathy to

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[41] Ibid., 452.

[42] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 82.

[43] Heinz Kohut, "Introspection and Empathy: Further Thoughts About Their Role in Psychoanalysis (1968)," *The Search for the Self*, vol. 3, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1990), 97-98.

a higher form of empathy.[44] The empathetic understanding and explaining should proceed in a more or less accurate and timely manner via the process of transmuting internalization. That is, inevitable empathetic failures of the selfobject that are non-traumatic cause optimal frustration, which allows the self to establish a firm psychological structure, but only when this empathetic failure is repaired by the continuous repetition of the understanding and explaining in a phase-appropriate manner by means of transmuting internalization of the selfobject and its function.[45]

This concept of empathy in Kohut's framework needs to be applied to the Korean culture within the Korean construct of *jeong*. Although the meaning of empathy may not exactly correspond to that of *jeong*, *jeong* entails a deeper process of empathetic understanding in mutual interaction in *uri* relationships. Interconnected individuals in *uri* relationships interchange empathetic understandings deeply through *jeong*; *jeong* as an empathetic bond consists of a symbiotic empathetic resonance between the self and selfobject, and empathy without *jeong* for Koreans is somewhat formal and neutral. For Koreans, *jeong* should be prerequisite to empathy, and empathy should include *jeong* in order for Korean selfobjects to adequately function in highly empathetic attunement. In this vein, Kohut's concept of empathy needs to be broadened for Koreans within the structure of *jeong* as a kind of special state of mind of Koreans.

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[44] Heinz Kohut, "On Empathy (1981)," in *The Search for the Self*, vol. 4, ed. P. Ornstein (Madison: International Universities Press, 1991), 532.

[45] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 108, 172.

Kohut's concept of empathy as an ability to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person represents a radical revision of traditional notions of the analyst as a neutral observer. He emphasizes the indivisibility of the observer and the observed, suggesting that "the field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer."[46] Nevertheless, he claims that empathy is "in essence neutral and objective";[47] and yet he defines analytic neutrality as "the responsiveness to be expected, on an average, from persons who have devoted their life to helping others with the aid of insights obtained via the empathic immersion into their inner life."[48] Accordingly, an analyst, though immersing her/himself in the patient's inner experiences, should maintain her/his neutrality and objectivity. As Stolorow points out, this empathic stance may be impossible; as far as an analyst can be neutral or objective with respect to a patient's subjectivity, s/he is required to banish "his own psychological organization from the psychoanalytic dialogue so that [s/]he can gaze directly upon [her/]his patient's subjective world with pure and presuppositionless eyes—surely an impossible feat for even the most gifted of analysts."[49] Stolorow argues that the empathic stance defies the

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[46] Kohut, *How Does Analysis Cure?* 41.

[47] Heinz Kohut, "Reflections on Advances in Self Psychology," in *Advances in Self Psychology*, ed. Arnold Goldberg (New York: International Universities Press, 1980), 483.

[48] Kohut, *The Restoration of the Self*, 252.

[49] Robert D. Stolorow, "The Nature and Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalytic Interpretation," in *The Intersubjective Perspective*, ed. Stolorow, Robert D., George E. Atwood, and Bernard Brandchaft (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1994), 45.

profoundly intersubjective nature of the analytic process, to which the analyst's subjectivity makes an inevitable contribution.

Stolorow thus maintains that the analytic stance can be best conceptualized as "an attitude of *sustained empathic inquiry*, an attitude that consistently seeks to comprehend the meaning of the patient's expressions from a perspective within, rather than outside, the patient's own subjective frame of reference."[50] An essential ingredient of the analyst's attitude of empathic inquiry is her/his continual investigation of her/his own subjective reality in search of the meaning of her/his affective responsiveness. According to Stolorow, this attitude of sustained empathic inquiry "must of necessity encompass the entire intersubjective field created by the interplay between the differently organized subjective worlds of patient and analyst."[51] Through this sustained empathic inquiry, the analyst constructs an interpretation that enables the patient to feel deeply understood through the mutative power derived from the intersubjective matrix.[52]

This kind of stance involves *jeong*, which cannot ever be neutral. As Choi and Kim indicate, Koreans tend to place great emphasis on being empathetic with what others experience in their minds and on adjusting their behavior accordingly. Thus, "Koreans

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[50] Ibid., 44.

[51] Ibid., 46.

[52] Ibid., 53.

are almost habitually sensitive to subjectifying inner experiences of others"[53] involved in *uri* relationships based on *jeong*. The empathetic mechanism as embedded in *jeong* is not such that one isolated mind enters the subjective world of another; it is instead a process in which a person as one relational-contextual mind becomes fused with another person as another relational-contextual mind through *jeong* and vice versa, and they feel, share, and exchange their *maeum*, i.e., Korean mind, with each other. This process of empathy proceeds through *simjeong* exchange, a mutual experience felt in mind, since one's *maeum* can be understood in *simjeong* interaction; *maeum* in behaviors and conscious reading of that *maeum* are all involved in *simjeong*. Therefore, in terms of the Korean experience of empathy, *simjeong* plays a crucial role in the process of understanding and interpreting each other's inner experiences of *maeum*.

Koreans have developed particular communicative frameworks based on *simjeong*, and the primary form is non-verbal for *simjeong* exchange. This exchange of mind is "from one mind to another" in *jeong*-based *uri* relationships, and it occurs most frequently in familial relationships.[54] In *simjeong* exchange, "one in a dyad experiences arousal of *shimjung* [*simjeong*] as an empathetic reaction to *shimjung* [*simjeong*] aroused in the mind of the other and then the other is empathetic to one's *shimjung* [*simjeong*]."[55]

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[53] Choi and Kim, "Naïve Psychology of Koreans' Interpersonal Mind and Behavior in Close Relationships, 359.

[54] Ibid., 363.

[55] Ibid.

Choi and Kim illustrate a vignette of non-verbal *simjeong* communication between a mother and a son:

> On a rainy day, a mother was waiting for her son [to come] back from school with an umbrella for him at a bus stop. Finally, the bus arrived and the son got angry on seeing his mother, "You shouldn't have come out here with the umbrella for me." The mother replied, "My baby, sorry about that."[56]

Looked at superficially, this conversation consists of the sons' complaint and his mother's apology. However, a strong *simjeong* interaction is entailed in this conversation. The son must be grateful for the considerate behavior of his mother and perhaps feels sorry to give her trouble, but he does not express his real *simjeong* but rather gets angry with her. The mother may be disappointed at him and perhaps recognizes that his getting angry is not his real *simjeong*, but she does not express her real *simjeong* and just apologizes to him. And later, his mother's real *simjeong* could be conveyed to the son by his *simjeong*. This non-verbal form of *simjeong* exchange can also occur through some more-specific behaviors that convey one's own *simjeong* to another: "patting a child in [on] the head, grasping firmly [the] hands of a close friend, sighing together with a friend in trouble," and so forth.[57] Powerful, mutually empathetic understandings are embedded in *simjeong* discourses, though unspoken outwardly. An ability to read each other's *simjeong* and to react accordingly can be well developed in deeply *jeong*-based relationships.

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., 364.

Another form of *simjeong*-based discourse is inevitably verbal. Koreans tend to express their inner mind straightforwardly with one another by pouring out their *simjeong*, and this expression assumes a mode of story-telling relying on *jeong* in deep and long relationships, such as in *uri* relationships. This narrative mode of *simjeong* is closely tied to cognitive judgment and interpretation of each other's inner feelings.[58] During the pouring out of words from the heart in *simjeong* discourses, empathetic explanations and interpretations can proceed reciprocally. This empathetic process in *simjeong* discourses, both non-verbal and verbal, can lead to appropriate empathetic understandings and interpretations in the Korean cultural context. I therefore propose that for Koreans, empathy that involves *jeong* can serve as a basic source of caring and healing by means of *simjeong* discourses.

Simjeong can involve an aroused state of emotion that has to do with self-consciousness; it can often be experienced by one's own negative evaluation of one's self, and Koreans express this state of mind as "my *simjeong* is hurt." It is often hurt "when a truthful friend betrays me," "when my mind is misunderstood," "when others are not considerate and kind to me," "when I am not considered important," and "when I am treated unfairly."[59] *Simjeong* is constituted by "evaluative judgment of aroused emotion" and by "explanation [of] psychological processes in which that emotion is

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[58] Ibid., 365-367.

[59] Ibid., 360-362.

evolved in relation to interpersonal and situational factors."[60] It is thus hurt when one evaluates oneself as experiencing shame deeply and painfully. *Simjeong* discourses allow one to speak out one's *simjeong* that is hurt by shameful experiences that are generally hard to expose, and healing the hurt *simjeong* and healing shame can be achieved through the empathetic process based on *jeong* in *simjeong* discourses. Shame, in a sense, may hurt less for Koreans, because *simjeong* discourse allows for its confession and sharing.

Capps' suggestion of pastoral exposure of shame to others should be reconsidered with regard to *simjeong*. He proposes that the shame experience should be exposed, particularly through confession to the pastor. This kind of exposure is usually impossible or unrealistic for Koreans, as the Korean shame experience heavily involves personal and communal *chemyeon*; they try to hide shame for fear of further shame or humiliation. An individual's shame reflects on the entire family or the group that the individual belongs to, diminishing its *chemyeon*; this is the situation in the church without exception. Koreans are unwilling for their shame to be dealt with openly and exposed to others in the church. Instead, shame can be exposed only in the context where effective *simjeong* discourses are available in spontaneous ways. Pastoral caregivers or other partakers in *simjeong* discourses should maintain confidentiality and privacy and should bear in mind that people want to maintain their *chemyeon* despite the painful experience of shame.

In order to construct healing relationships in the community in which *simjeong* discourses are available, both pastoral caregivers and all the church members first need to

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[60] Ibid., 360.

establish trust and confidence in *jeong*-based relationships. This trusting, empathetic bond is not established immediately and instantly, but little by little through correct and timely understandings and interpretations in *simjeong* discourses. Nonetheless, although *simjeong* exchange contributes to highly reciprocal healing relationships, it may meet a pitfall, which is that relational-based prejudices operate subtly on empathy within *simjeong* discourses. The pitfall is likely to be generated by *uri*-side discrimination, by which persons who are not included in a certain *uri* group within the church can be estranged or excluded. All the members, including the pastor, as caregivers, should watch out for this pitfall, which may hamper the candid and authentic empathy that can be achieved through *simjeong* discourses.

Furthermore, Capps' suggestion that a pastor can be a more effective "confessor" may be in need of revision. For Koreans, a pastor is no doubt a caregiver and counselor, and parishioners believe and expect their pastor to have much more *jeong* or empathy than anyone else. However, since a pastor for Koreans is a relatively authoritative figure, parishioners may not feel comfortable in pouring out their *simjeong* to her/him, especially when it is related to personal and painful experiences. The pastor also may not truly participate in the *simjeong* discourse due to her/his professional boundaries as an authoritative figure, though s/he indeed tries to have empathetic immersion into the minds of the parishioners in question.

As hierarchy and authoritarianism can be everywhere in Korean society, they exist also in the church, in particular between pastors or other church leaders and lay members. In the Korean system, mutual responsibility and the expectation of both caring

and being cared for can lead to a high level of empathy and mutual empowerment. However, as far as hierarchical and positional power is misused, the powerful empathy derived from *simjeong* discourse can hardly be expected; even if mutually empathetic relationships are developed in *simjeong* discourses, they can easily remain superficial when the relationship is only about controlling and being controlled. Therefore, not only the pastor and the other church leaders but also all the parishioners should be prepared to be both "confessors" and "confessees" in maintaining genuine and authentic *jeong*-based relationships in the faith community, going beyond the negative characteristics of the hierarchical and authoritative cultural system.

Last but not least, one reason Koreans have developed *simjeong* discourse within their very close and deep relationships may be that asking for and seeking help, for Koreans, is discouraged by some traditional cultural values. Guided by Confucian principles, Koreans tend to think that a mature person should be able to endure and not express feelings that are painful and shameful. This cultural expectation is strongly related to *chemyeon*; people are reluctant to disclose the shameful self, and they avoid outside intervention in order to preserve their *chemyeon* and the family or other group's *chemyeon* as well. The Korean church is deeply imbued with these traditions, which results in reinforcement of the shame experience within Christianity. Korean Christians have been encouraged not to show personal emotions and to endure negative feelings, and these attitudes has been considered identical to faithfulness. Capps does not take account of factors in the church itself that may contribute to enhancing shame. I doubt,

considering these factors, whether his simple suggestion of exposure is helpful at all in the Korean cultural context.

For Koreans, the Korean church can be a most effective milieu for healing shame, but at the same time it may be the worst environment for disclosing shame. Therefore, all the members of the church as caregivers should be aware of these multifold influences on shame experiences in their church life. They should listen to, embrace, and share the shame experience through the use of unconditional positive regard and without any prejudices, on the basis of mutually empathetic relationships. They all should be significant agents of a healing community where constructive and healthy *simjeong* discourses are available. In order that they become agents of such a community, I propose that they can build up a safe field of *simjeong* discourses by promoting pastoral activities through small group meetings or programs in the church. In particular, Korean small group programs such as Cell Group Services or Mission Group Meetings are very popular and highly active both in and out of the Korean church. In these meetings or programs, members can share their *simjeong* more comfortably and have many opportunities for caring and being cared for concretely. Yet in order for this proposition to be effective, the Korean church needs to train lay leaders appropriately for pastoral care, and to develop appropriate programs.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated the need to increase the cross-cultural effectiveness of mainstream psychological and pastoral-psychological theories concerning shame, with a particular focus on Kohut's self psychology and Capps' pastoral psychology. As a proper way of applying them to Korean culture, I have proposed an integrated methodology of cross-cultural psychology and Korean indigenous psychology. To interpret the Korean experience of shame properly from this perspective, I have analyzed Korean indigenous psychological constructs such as *uri*, *jeong*, *chemyeon*, and *nunchi* in connection to shame, and I have refined and modified Kohut's frameworks of shame for application to Korean culture. These strategies are to help in constructing a psychology of shame for Koreans.

I have proposed distinctive Korean pastoral strategies by expanding Capps' pastoral frameworks, as viewed from the same integrated perspective. This approach can be used to contextualize pastoral care and counseling in other cultures as well. Pastoral care and counseling professionals should be aware of the cultural influences on church life, and should deal with culture-specific factors in order to provide culture-sensitive care.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the methodology for this study is the *derived etic* approach, that is, an integrated one of *imposed etic* and *emic* approaches; it is the methodology of indigenization from without, which involves transporting in psychological theories, concepts, and methods and modifying them to fit the local

cultural context. Nevertheless, I do not merely assert a particular Korean version, i.e., a simply indigenized variant, of the universal assumptions represented in mainstream psychology; rather, I demonstrate that mainstream psychology is not a universal discipline but is in need of revision in order to be cross-culturally inclusive, and that it should be modified by Korean indigenous psychology for local application.

Yet my purpose is not to blindly reject western theories in themselves, but to critique western-centric theories, since mainstream psychology can also be regarded as western indigenous psychology. A way to overcome the limitations of using western-centric theories without reservation is to create theories and concepts of Korean psychology rooted in Korean culture, which are formulated both for and by Koreans. Since Korean psychology has not been fully elaborated as a set of theories, Korean scholars tend to accept the use of mainstream theories, which provide highly structured tools to analyze psychological phenomena. In this connection, western theories in themselves do not need to be regarded with hostility; but it is instead important to point out the western-centric nature of frameworks used in exploring psychological phenomena and to recognize the theoretical and empirical necessity of exploring them from a basis of one's own culture. Mainstream psychological frameworks and Korean psychological methodology are not antithetical to each other but can be complementary, both assisting in an integrated approach.

To illustrate such interactive dynamics, I will borrow and modify an excellent metaphor from Steve S. Shim, a Korean pastoral counselor.[61] A Korean piano player has learned to play American music with an American-made piano while in the United States, and she goes back to her home in Korea, bringing the American-made piano with her. She wants and needs to play not only American but also Korean music, but she realizes that it is hard to play the latter strictly by the methods she has learned. However, she finally discovers ways of playing Korean tunes on a piano, though it is not easy. Her playing of both kinds of music, yet in different ways, contributes to the field of western music by demonstrating the existence of other ways of playing a piano according to a different culture; and she contributes to the field of Korean music by demonstrating that Korean tunes can be played on an American-made piano.

As Shim notes, an American-made piano can be quite useful as long as the piano player is sensitive to variations in culture. I hope that my playing of Korean music on an American-made piano in this study will be useful likewise. Furthermore, I hope that a Korean piano player can play music not only on an America-made piano but also on a Korean-made one; the eventual goal is a musical instrument made especially for Korea.

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[61] Shim, 94-95.

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